

Derrida on the “Invention of the Other”

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Abstract

Derrida’s “Psyche: Invention of the Other” discusses the conflicting predicament of the concept of “invention.” He highlights the different configurations and the problematic history of the concept of invention. The concept of invention is constantly re-invented. Cicero distinguishes inventive power from disposition and elocution entailed in discovering different ideas. Kant¹ reinvented the concept of invention as presentation of work of a genius in fine arts and Schelling advocated the poetic invention of various new forms. With Leibniz we arrived at the creative production various programs and methods reposed on technosciences. Derrida differentiates between the Latin *inventio*’s two meanings, finding or discovering and devising.² Derrida also distinguishes between invention and creation: “Invention uses what is already available in the world, and so is undertaken within the already existent world, whereas creation, acting out of nothing, would claim to bring into existence the very world within which inventions would take place. Creation, in other words, claims to escape the play of differences that, according to Derrida, constitute any context, whereas invention does not” (Cauchi 18). Invention³ pre-convenes impropriety, the severance of an implied indenture. It supplements disorder into harmonious configuration of things and discounts properties. This essay is not only an attempt to map how Derrida explores, historically and epistemologically, the concept of invention but strives to interrogate Derrida’s reflections on the invention of the other and its ramifications to deconstructive process.

Key words: Derrida, invention, other, deconstruction, meaning

¹ Before we proceed, we should ask how Derrida appropriates Kant’s concept of invention: “No one can say for sure, of course, but it would seem at the very least that Derrida hears something in Kant’s analysis of invention that resonates with his own. More specifically, Derrida finds in Kant a kindred conception of invention, kindred because, like his own, Kant’s conception of invention is not simply finding within or a devising out of the already existent, but is the invention of something that did not exist before. Kant’s conception of invention is a conception of creation re-baptised under a secular name. This secular name is more palatable to Derrida and allows him to maintain his advocacy of invention even while actually defending a conception of creation” (Cauchi 21).

² The relation between these two meanings are not new: “These two related meanings are bound to the well-known Greco-Roman axiom that nothing comes from nothing, which was, in the early history of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, often cited by Greek and Roman authors in opposition to Jewish and Christian proclamations about creation. Indeed it was in this encounter that the now classic distinction between invention and creation first came to be articulated and which Derrida retrieves for his analysis” (Cauchi 18).

³ See Leff, pp. 23-44

I

Cicero's⁴ pioneering "oratorical invention"⁵ came as a response to his son's appeal and desire. He responds to his son's request fittingly and narcissistically by explaining in detail the exceptional and distinctive power of an orator. From the rhetorical point of view, invention is "concerned with finding and thinking out the subject matter of the speech; the process chiefly involves identifying and classifying the question at issue according to a specific stance of argument, as well as discovering the most promising sources of proof for persuading one's audience" (Cicero 13).

Derrida highlights how Cicero differentiates between invention and disposition: "invention finds or discovers things, while disposition places or localizes them, positions them while arranging them" (Derrida, *Psyche I* 2). Invention is the discovery of things and disposition is the appropriation or positioning of them. The discovered things are differentiated from verbal forms employed at articulation. Disposition can also be applied when we distinguish between objects and words. Moreover, "since language as an articulated system of basic syntactical rules is always already there, the clear expression of invention (the sphere of elocution), is a non-inventive matter of purely dispositional economy (system, placement, order, organisation)" (Hurst 164). Invention is appropriately correlated to ideas, to objects which we discuss about and not to articulation or verbal forms. Disposition or collocation positions words and formulates substance. It is applied to invention. Accordingly, disposition offers positions with their contents, words and things.⁶

Paul de Man's "Pascal's Allegory of Persuasion" supposes allegory as "sequential and narrative." While allegory is non-temporal, the paradoxes involved carry out its temporal

⁴ Cicero's discourse on invention is not comprehensive. His "invention system for philosophic inquiry admittedly is not complete but it does offer worthwhile insights for reasoning through questions of a general nature and locating moral values that, in turn, can inform and infuse rhetorical argument" (Ochs 227).

⁵ Ochs explains "Cicero's inventional system for philosophic discourse shows a definite influence of the Hermagorean stasis classification but seems also to derive, in part, from the Skeptic's teachings. That is, probability not certainty is the objective of the set of questions. Most important, the Stoic teachings of duty and obligation are apparently paired with the Epicurean dogma on consolation" (218). *On Invention* "contains evidence for early Peripatetic work on hypothetical syllogistic and its influence throughout Hellenistic period. This is not to claim direct knowledge of Theophrastus and (Eudemus) on the part of the young Cicero" (Fortenbaugh 13).

⁶See Guérin p. 69.

function. Allegory is the source of truth and expression of an epistemological constitution. The correlation, de Man identifies, is in rhetoric. The conventional difference of rhetoric as invention and disposition can be recognized in texts that correlate truth and persuasion as to anticipate “analytic and synthetic judgments, between propositional and modal logic, between logic and mathematics, between logic and rhetoric, between rhetoric as *invention* and rhetoric as *disposito*, and so forth” (de Man quoted in Derrida, *Psyche I 3*).

The ‘question of the son’ is the ‘rationale behind the decision’ to establish a discourse on discourse, an exposition on the art of oration and a text on invention: “The child who speaks, questions, zealously (*studeo*) seeks knowledge—is he the fruit of an invention? Does one invent a child?” (Derrida, *Psyche I 3*). Is the child inventing himself? Is the decision of the father (“parental narcissism”) the foundation for invention? The other, by articulating its response, becomes the “absolute invention.” The “irreducible transcendence” is the proximate of all. The heterogeneous and creative response is the consequence of parental desire. Consequently, “The truth of the child, therefore would invent itself in a sense that would be neither that of unveiling nor that of discovery, neither that of creation nor that of production” (Derrida, *Psyche I 3*). Where truth is appropriated beyond any legacy, response can be appropriated. However, this rests on the edges of possibility.

Is invention a private act or a social act? Invention does not occur without a germinal event. The germinal event refers to the advent of a possibility that remains with every expressive subject. The inaugural production is validated conventionally and traditionally for the future. Thus, it receives the “status of invention” so as to be socially conserved and historically inscribed as part of heritage. “Invention *begins* by being susceptible to repetition, exploitation, reinscription” (Derrida, *Psyche I 6*). In other words, invention begins with an organic anticipation of future possibilities. Invention is a possible organic process that begins with a response to desire resulting in a desirous finding of the new. Moreover, “Every invention supposes that something or someone comes a *first time*, something or someone comes to someone, to someone else” (Derrida, *Psyche I 6*). It is a creative and repeatable chain of reaction and association. Invention, therefore is a

singular structure of event that seems to produce itself by speaking about itself, *by the act of speaking of itself* once it has begun to invent on the subject to invention, paving the way of it, inaugurating or signing its singularity, bringing

it about, as it were; and all the while it is also naming and describing the generality of its genery and the genealogy of its topos: *de inventione*, sustaining our memory of the tradition of a genre and its practitioners.” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 6-7)

Invention has an inventive beginning articulating itself in a reflexive configuration. It is not only creative but also a constitutive presence moving forward in articulating itself as other, ensuing the *trace*.

II

Derrida introduces a poem written by Francis Ponge, “Fable.” The first line, when read as an allegory, presents a truth, “truth of allegory and allegory of truth, truth as allegory” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 9).⁷ This fabulous invention is an invention of the self and of the other.⁸ What is the truth in allegory? Is it present beyond signification? The presence or absence of truth is the basic requisite for allegory. The existence and accessibility of allegory and truth are complementary. However, Benjamin argues that the presence of truth nullifies the existence of truth. Allegory as a mode of articulation is perpetually entwined with human conditions.⁹ It is present in the theme and structure of the fable and reflects as if it were a mirror. The “Fable” dynamically erupts the question of orientation, specular nature of language, the possibility of positioning the other and communicating with the other. Death, the moment of mourning,¹⁰ occur at the breaking of the

⁷ Cowan explains the association between truth and allegory, “A substantive notion of truth is the first assumption of any theory or practice of allegory that sees it as more than a usable technique as rather what Benjamin calls “a constant against the historical variable.” The notion of truth intended by Benjamin is not the Aristotelian one of truth as an *adequatio* existing in the relation between sign and signified, but rather the Platonic conception of truth as a transcendent reality in which objects may only partake—the “plain of Truth” spoken of in the *Phaedrus*. By resorting to a fictional mode literally of “other-discourse” (*allegoria*), a mode that conceals its relation to its true objects, allegory shows a conviction that the truth resides elsewhere and is not detachable in relations between sign and signified. Furthermore, because allegory always makes so bold as to claim it points at the truth, its authentic defense must refute sophistic relativism as well as the now-fashionable assertion of “semiosis” as pure play. Truth exists as a goal, though not beyond signification as will become clear presently” (Cowan 113).

⁸ The fable is an invention that is indeterminately connected to metonymy: “The fantastic is necessarily invention, invention is necessarily fantastic, and the improper, non-dialectical metonymy of their shared construction always already ensures the impossibility of an authentic invention of the fantastical other” (Iverson 7).

⁹ Can truth exist independent of allegory? When can it exist independently? “Allegory could not exist if truth were accessible: as a mode of expression it arises in perpetual response to the human condition of being exiled from the truth that it would embrace. The existence-in-absence of truth is a condition that has been explained in various origin-myths of all, rupture, or exile; it can be understood, however, only by examining the way in which it exists in representation. Truth does not consist of a content to be possessed after digesting away the linguistic form of a philosophical inquiry; rather, as Benjamin insists, the truth *is* the form” (Cowan 114).

¹⁰ It is interesting to note how Freud explains mourning: “In “Mourning and Melancholia” Freud emphasizes that mourning is profound and time-consuming work. There is a “loss of interest in the outside world,” a “turning away from any activity that is not connected with thoughts of the one who has been lost,” and a “loss of capacity to adopt any new object of love (which would mean replacing him.” In his account, “each single one of the memories and

mirror.¹¹ It is at once the moment of necessity and an undesirable event. Our response to this moment of death is enveloped within us, our hurt and how we reflect and cope with bereavement. The metonymy of the other located within ourselves is configured with truth and the possibility of association to the presence of the living other.¹² Death, in fact, problematizes in order to shed light on ourselves and our relationship to the living other. When considered as a necessity, the breaking of the mirror, the instance of death exposes the borders of narcissistic re-stipulation. The moment of death looms vividly, augments and counterbalances suffering. Should we weep over ourselves? When we are considerate about the other in ourselves, we should not weep. “Who are we mourning for, for ourselves, for the other, for us?” (Derrida, *Memories* 33).¹³ We are more concerned about the other within ourselves at this moment. This is because of the relation we suppose we have with the other “outside myself in myself” (Derrida, *The Gift of Death* 61).¹⁴ The narcissistic bruise and grief inflate infinitely for lack of being able to be narcissistic because we cease to locate the memories effected by mourning. The (Derridean) internalizing of mourning (memory) is only a necessary vent to think and reminiscence.¹⁵

expectations” that attached us to the dead must be worked through ‘bit by bit at great expense of time and cathectic energy.’ The mourner “must” relieve and then relinquish their attachment to the beloved severing the memories and images that tie them to the dead in order to reconnect to the world of the living” Freud 252-3, Kirkby 465).

¹¹ Breaking of mirror is considered to bring bad luck (Werness 3).

¹² Here, “We have reached an aporia: the radically *untimely* that carries along its own *historicity*—and in this is made visible the workings, the machinery of the economy of the same. This can be perceived most readily with the useful invention, but also in the gradual reappropriation by the mainstream of what was once the shocking *avangarde*” (Iverson 15).

¹³ Derrida argues that “This terrible solitude which is mine or ours, at the death of the other is what constitute that relationship to self, which we call “me,” “us,” “between us,” “subjectivity,” “intersubjectivity,” “memory.”... We weep precisely over what happens to us when everything is entrusted to the sole memory that is “in me” or “in us.” But we must also recall, in another turn of memory, that the “within me” and the “within us” do not arise or appear before this terrible experience... The “within me” and ‘within us” acquire their sense and their and their bearing only by carrying within themselves the death and the memory of the other” (Derrida, *Memories* 33).

¹⁴ The death of the other precedes, “it is like the experience of mourning that institutes my relation to myself” and “this relation welcomes or supposes the other within its being-itself as different from itself.” Further, “reciprocally: the relation to the other (in itself outside myself, outside myself in myself” (Derrida, *The Gift of Death* 61).

¹⁵ Derrida explains how interiorization becomes a plinth for the articulation of memory, how memory becomes a metonymy and associated to allegorical thinking: “The moment of interiorization keeps within us the life, thought, body, voice, look or soul of the other, but in the form of those hypomnemata, memoranda, signs, or symbols, images or representations which are only lacunary fragments, detached and dispersed—only “parts’ of the departed other. In turn they are parts of us, included “in us” in a memory which suddenly seems greater and older than us... sublimely greater *than* this other that the memory harbours and to itself, pregnant with this other. And the figure of this bereaved memory becomes a sort of a (possible and impossible) metonymy, where the part stands for the whole and for more than the whole that it exceeds.” Memory articulates the other, the experience of the other. It becomes a manner of expressing the other: “It speaks the other and makes the other speak, but it does so in order to let the other speak, for the other will have spoken first. It has no choice but to let the other speak, since it cannot make the other

The allegory in “Fable” interconnects us with the other, establishes the discourse of the other and pushes toward the other. The event presented in the poem stems from its narrative form. The “allegory of allegory” in this fable is an invention. The fable is named “Fable.” The fable invents itself with a fictional story. It is a story of an invention. It narrates and explores itself through a textual mechanism. The fable is in itself the beginning,¹⁶ a “performative demonstration of the very thing it is saying” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 10). “Fable” is a “poetic performative” that concurrently explicates and accomplishes itself. The reflexive nature of a performative is challenging to locate because it does not reflect itself or designate itself as performative. However, the constative exploration of “Fable” designates it as a poetic performative. Narrating the event, it invents itself by inventing the story of its invention. The tale is meant to be read. The narration transpires from within rather than outside of it. It is a tale of inventing itself and the invention of the other. The “inventive event and the relation or archive of an invention, also allows it to unfold in order to say nothing but the same, itself, the dehiscent and refolded invention of the same, at the very instant when it takes place” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 11). The inventive event is enshrouded in the poem and the narration. The poem performs heterogeneous functions. It is at once heteroreferential and self-referential, “allegory and tautegory.” Through inventive power, the poem becomes intimate with language and the dynamics of syntax, thus becoming an “art of *disposition*.”

The performative and constative function¹⁷ of the poem can be seen in the very first line that promulgates its totality. The idea of invention dispenses its two significant strands: “the

speak without the other having already spoken, without this trace of speech which comes from the other and which directs us to writing as much as to rhetoric...This trace is interiorized in mourning as that which can be no longer be interiorized, as impossible *Erinnerung*, in and beyond mournful memory—constituting it, traversing it, exceeding it, defying all reappropriation, even in a coded rhetoric or conventional system of tropes, in the exercises of prosopopoeia, allegory, or elegiac and grieving metonymy...To this thought there belongs the gesture faithful friendship, its immeasurable grief but also its life: the sublimit of a mourning without sublimation and without the obsessive triumph of which Freud speaks” (Derrida, *Memories* 37-8).

¹⁶ Derrida here quotes Valéry’s maxim: “In the beginning was the fable” and the first sentence of John’s gospel, “In the beginning was the logos,” (*Psyche I* 10).

¹⁷ As formulated by Austin (1962), performative language “make things happen” rather than explaining an occurrence, constative language explains: “Constative speech acts refer to a state of affairs in the world, they make a statement which can be evaluated as true or false depending on the goodness of fit between the statement and the

constative—discovering or unveiling, pointing out or saying what is—and the performative—producing, instituting, transforming” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 12). Derrida is also mindful of the “co-implication” these strands bring to the poetic discourse. The poem invents as an act of articulation. It “performs *and* describes, operates *and* states” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 12).

The two significant discourses of invention (in the latter half of seventeenth century Europe) are invention of stories (“fictional and fabulous”) and the invention of machines/devices. One might “invent by fabulation, by producing narratives to which there is no corresponding reality outside the narrative (an alibi, for example), or else one may invent by producing a new operational possibility (such as printing or nuclear weaponry,...).” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 10). Invention, in both these cases, can mean production (fabulous/fiction and “*tekhnē, episteme, istoria, methodos*”). Derrida attempts to locate and appropriate the “unity or invisible harmony of these two registers” (*Psyche I* 10). The correlation links two different functions, the constative and performative.¹⁸ These two strands function mutually when performance embraces “constation” of the constative. This relation is singular in nature as the reflection creatively produces its own self as self-reflection in a productive event, an act of narrating itself. The correlation involves a swift circulatory motion reminding the irony¹⁹ and temporality of the poem. While the text remains itself, it alerts the performative into constative and constative into performative. Therefore, it not only creates a possible infinity but an unsustainable acceleration. The poem begins with a metalingual expression. Using a metalingual language does not express anything because “*there is no language before it*, since it has no prior object beneath or outside itself” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 13). The language and metalanguage of the poem is repetitive as it can

world. Performatives, on the other hand, are speech acts that, when said in a particular context, cause a change in a state of affairs in the world” (Heslop qtd in Ross 77).

¹⁸ Elsewhere Derrida writes, “As opposed to the classical assertion, to the constative utterance, the performative does not have its referent (but here that word is certainly no longer appropriate, and this precisely is the interest of the discovery) outside of itself or, in any event, before and in front of itself. It does not describe something that exists outside of language and prior to it. It produces or transforms a situation, it effects; and even if it can be said that a constative utterance also effectuates something and always transforms a situation, it cannot be maintained that constitutes its internal structure, its manifest function or destination, as in the case of the performative” (Derrida, *Limited* 13).

¹⁹ de Man presumes the manifestations of irony as synthetic and disjunctive. “This division of irony therefore imitates the difference between symbol and allegory, suggesting the musical structure of invention. The synthetic manifestation of irony allows for consciousness of irony allows for consciousness to reconcile a number of conflicts and for language to prevail over a subject’s alienation. The disjunctive manifestation of irony introduces an endless sequence of disjunct moments which are never reconciled but infinitely repeated as the repetition of what de Man calls a self-escalating act of consciousness” (Rapaport 111).

untenably speak and cannot speak of itself. Language is conceptual as it expresses language itself. However, the linguistic nature of language not only expresses but also confronts itself.

The swift alteration between the performative and the constative, between language and metalanguage, fabulous and functional, self-reference (autoreference)²⁰ and heteroreference is not a mark of instability but a process that paves way for the very event. Further, the distinction between the performative and the constative is not disabling but creative which makes it “integrally literary.”²¹ The alternating procedure of the performative and the constative is observed by de Man as following:

If the critique of metaphysics is structured as an aporia between performative and constative language, this is the same as saying that it is structured as rhetoric. And since, if one wants to conserve the term “literature,” one should hesitate to assimilate it with rhetoric, then it would follow that the deconstruction of metaphysics, or “philosophy,” is an impossibility to the present extent that is “literary.” This by no means resolves the problem of the relationship between literature and philosophy in Nietzsche, but it at least establishes somewhat more reliable point of “reference” from which to ask the question.” (de Man 131)²²

The presence of “Fable” itself/ how it gives itself/ how it narrates itself is an obvious process of invention. Rather than expressing the breaking of mirror as a misfortune, the presence and possibility of mirror offer constatives and performatives expressing the “infelicity” of language. The irony, here, offers a “provisional conclusion” by aligning itself with allegory to

²⁰ Self-reference refers to what the text performs: “This self-reference or auto-reflexivity, in which a text exhibits and performs what it speaks about—or to put it in other words, in which a text is an instance of, or ‘instantiates,’ what it thematises—is, perhaps, the most subtle and incisive dimension of the performative” (Pfister 22). Senatore considers performativity itself as “autoperformative...self-founding, self-referring and independent from any instance outside language itself” (2). Benveniste explains the “self-referential, of referring to a reality that it itself constitutes by the fact that it is actually uttered in conditions that make it an act. As a result of this it is both a linguistic manifestation, since it must be spoken, and a real fact, insofar as it is the performing of an act. The act is thus identical with the utterance of the act. The signified is identical to the referent. This is evidenced by the word ‘hereby.’ The utterance that takes itself as a referent indeed self-referential” (Benveniste 236).

²¹ Culler explores the connection of performative to the literary: “...the performative brings to centre stage a use of language previously considered marginal—an active, world-making use of language, which resembles literary language—and helps us to conceive of literature as act or event. The notion of literature as performative contributes to a defence of literature: literature is not frivolous pseudo-statements but takes its place among the acts of language that transform the world, bringing into being the things that they name” (97).

²² Derrida explains: “deconstruction loses nothing from admitting that it is impossible; also that those who would rush to delight in that admission lose nothing from having to wait. For a deconstructive operation, *possibility* is rather the danger, the danger of becoming an available set of rule-governed procedures, methods, accessible approaches.” It is “a certain experience of the impossible...that is...of other—the experience of the other as the invention of the impossible in other words, as the only possible invention” (15).

effect a discovery of a “truly temporal predicament.”²³ The predicament, de Man points out, is a significant condition, a quasi-nature formulating a category capable of constituting an artifice. Moreover, the structure of image is also specular, “reversed mirror-image” (de Man 225). These two images of irony correlate through the “experience of time.” It is a synthetic structure even when the distinctions of the structure is explicit. A true invention brings something new, other than what already exist. Therefore, invention is the coming of the other. The coming of the other challenges/severs with conventions:

As breaking with convention, with what *is*, the other’s coming, in a quasi-causa sui, is conditioned upon nothing other than itself, even if, as Derrida argues throughout the late *Rogues*, it is not therein wholly in possession of itself, not wholly sovereign. It is here where we will be able to discern a certain proximity between Derridean invention and the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. (Cauchi 18)

“Fable” is an allegory affirming ironically the veracity in the present. Truth is embedded within the domain of allegory. The *elle*, of the poem, is a present subject. The feminine witnesses the author’s irony, “She would speak of the author, she would state or show the author himself in her mirror” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 18). She, the Psyche, is beauty and/or truth reflecting herself. The reflection is her but not her name. The mirror is mythical in nature. It creatively assembles and alters the distance between the two “selves,” “the impossibility of seeing oneself and touching oneself at the same time, the “permanent parabasis” and the “allegory of irony” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 18). The distance stays “unovercomeable” but abounds between the selves. From the light of Lacan’s of mirror image,²⁴ Raj argues, the search in the mirror is the search for the psyche. The self seeks to appropriate itself “within a cradle of psychic energy” (“Searching Self” 27) so as to be free. Mirror is a symbol for the realization of self:

²³ “The act of irony, as we now understand it, reveals the existence of a temporality that is definitely *not organic*, in that it relates to its source only in terms of distance and difference and allows for *no end, for no totality*. Irony divides the flow of temporal experience into a past that is pure mystification and a future that remains harassed forever by a relapse within the inauthentic. It can know this inauthenticity but can never overcome it. It can only restate and repeat it on an increasingly conscious level, but it remains endlessly caught in the impossibility of making this knowledgeable applicable to the empirical world. It dissolves in the narrowing spiral of a linguistic sign that becomes more and more remote from its meaning, and it can find no escape from this spiral. The temporal void that it reveals is the same void we encountered when we found allegory always implying an unreachable anteriority. Allegory and irony are thus linked in their common discovery of a truly temporal predicament.” (de Man 222).

²⁴ “Lacanian subject is fragmented as it involve in the making of the self. The *beance* (gap) between necessity and demand is at the basis of the desire to accomplish the whole in both body and self of the subject. The search for wholeness of the self, in Lacanian subject, transpires in the manner in which it relates to the outer world” (Raj, “Girish Karnard’s *Hayavadana*” 251).

Realization of the self through reflection demonstrates how our identities are configured by the understanding of its image and how it is created through the image that is recognized of the other. Similar to mirror images our identities are not constant but a collection of images and perceptions of self. They also allow us to have knowledge of our world, rational world view. When we look into the mirror we suppose an image and we do not accept the images that are set by the society for use. Our self-image is partial, therefore when we view ourselves in the mirror, we attempt to shift. (Raj, "Searching Self" 28)

"Fable" occurs as an event consolidating the performative (the creative, the transmutative) and the constative (the expression of what is, the disclosure) and having an impact on invention, "the double mirror" and the "allegory of Psyche." The event of the poem is entirely unstable. The tropological conditions of the literary inclines on the invention of language as event that cannot obstruct reading or interpretation. However, it deconstructs without incapacitating so as to ignite the speech event. The mirror and the Psyche (her) are consequences of tropological effects of origin. The "double séance" serves the beginning of "Fable." However, temporality self-manifests through iteration and "aberrance of difference" appropriated in terms of event. The fractured or the broken in the "Fable" refers to the splintering of the mirror and the temporality of allegory becomes anticipatory instance of speech as event. The rupture or breaking or origin involves the invention of "Fable" through dissemination recognizable through reading. The psyche of deconstruction, therefore, is ruptured. The double mirror effect cannot function as a lack. This is the "mind of deconstruction."

The fabulous invention is the invention of truth. It is the "truth as fable, of the fable of truth, of the truth of truth *as fable*" (Derrida, *Psyche I* 19). There is truth in mourning and there is an incredible mourning of truth. The breaking of mirror does not articulate the mourning but along with the mirror, mourning advances through the in(ter)vention of the word. Thus, it is both invention and intervention of the word. That which blocks the transparency of the mirror approves the invention of the mirror, the trace of language. The conjunction (*igitur*) could suggest for a psyche and on the psyche. Can we consider psyche an invention? For Derrida, it is an invention and a figment. It can function efficiently at the mirror effect and remain an invention. The narration of the "Fable" is a place for itself and there is nothing outside itself and nothing other than itself. The witness of such an invention is the production that becomes the literary.

The desire for invention traverses the dream of inventing a new desire. Alongside is the presence of the desire for deconstruction. Deconstruction is inventive as it does not rely on methodical procedures. It “opens up a passageway, it marches ahead and marks a trail; its writing is not performative, it produces rules—other conventions—for new performatives and never installs itself in the theoretical assurance of a simple opposition between performative and constative” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 23). The deconstructive process entails an assertion, the advent of invention. The advent becomes a possibility through the deconstruction of “conceptual and institutional structure of invention that neutralizes by putting the stamp of reason on some aspect of invention, of inventive power: as if it were necessary, over and beyond a certain traditional status of invention, to reinvent the future” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 23). The function of characterization in deconstruction emphasizes the “impasse, fatality, aporia, grid-lock, impossibility, obstruction, aberrance, and uninterpretability” (Rapaport 125). Deconstruction is an act of invention and acceleration. It does not block the double bind of the performative and the constative but entails an assertion entreating the coming of an event.²⁵ Deconstruction “is a structure of conceptual relationships which have been traditionally overstabilized by privileging the notice of device (invention as machine or method) and the priority of agency (the inventor).” (Rapaport 125).

III

Inventions are disconcerting. It disturbs the settled status one would like to assume when invention takes place. Derrida attributes this aim to deconstruction. Deconstruction should suppose this task of interrogating the “traditional status of invention itself” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 23). Invention is finding something for the first time: “To find is to invent when the experience of finding takes place for the first time” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 23). Invention is an event without any precedence but innovation extends to the future. It also could be the act of unveiling (return to nakedness?) what was found already.²⁶ It produces what was not already found or created but

²⁵ “Derrida is implicitly interrogating how “deconstruction” can come to appearance as an institutionalized invention, method, or device or how he himself can come to appearance as its inventor if the founding event that is deconstruction radically breaks with institutionalized concepts or statues without which an invention cannot be recognized” (Rapaport 126).

²⁶ In his essay “The Purveyor of Truth,” Derrida suggests: “Exhibiting, baring, stripping down, unveiling—this is an old routine: the metaphor of truth, which is as much as to say the metaphor of metaphor, the truth of truth, the truth of metaphor. When Freud intends to bare the original *Stoff* beneath the disguises of the secondary processing, he

bring together a configuration. Invention is not creation of an existence or “a world as a set of existents” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 24).

Does “Fable” create anything? No, it invents by resorting to a lexicon and syntactical regulations. It follows the poetic tradition and code to fashion a fictional narration. It brings out an event, narrates a fictional story and produces a machine by interfacing a difference or disconcerting the expectations.

The coming of a new event surprises because the moment of coming about is devoid of status and edict. The coming about of the new is a subjective function. It belongs to a human subject, an inventing subject. The human subject is endowed with the ability to articulate about invention. The subject’s propensity for invention results in a “narrative fiction or historical fabulation and of technical or technoepistemic innovation” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 25). While divine creation offers the platform and guidance for human invention, divine creation is not fashioned after human thinking. However, human beings can “invent gods, animals, and especially divine animals” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 25). This “techno-epistemo-anthropocentric dimension inscribes the value of invention in the set of structures that binds the technical order and metaphysical humanism differentially” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 25). Contemporary inventions occur through interrogation and deconstructive performances that link the system of traditions.

Invention, when discussed within legal or institutional status rattles statutory conditions. Statute envelopes a juridicopolitical rhetoric that causes institutional stability. The moment of acknowledgement is foundational to the essence of status. Status is the essence deliberated as stable, recognized and validated by social and symbolic order. Status can be correlated with invention and their value is purposeful in relation to generality. Patent of an invention attributes a status to the author making their inventions reproducible within rights. The status of invention assumes public recognition of originality and authenticity. Originality is conveyable to the human subject accountable for the production of something new. To invent is to produce or discover and also reinvent invention. Aligning with theological thinking, Derrida assumes that invention cannot be attributed to God because God creates.²⁷ Further, God invented the rules and

foresees the truth of the text. For him the text would be geared, from its original content, toward its naked truth, but also toward truth as nakedness” (34).

²⁷ Morton observes that, “Bernard, in using his *ingenium*, his creative power of understanding and invention, to impose poetic form on his material and to write the world, makes himself the image of the *deus artifex*, the

procedures for creation. This can be correlated to the mythopoetic power and process with which creative arts invent historical and epistemic narratives. Modernity also regards invention as coming to know/find for the first time. Invention, modernity considers, as an inauguration or unveiling a discovery of what is existent. Invention, during this period, become technologized.

IV

Derrida discusses three different ways to think about invention: a) invention involves the ability or propensity to invent, inventiveness.

Inventiveness, as Derrida demonstrates, requires a prevailing code against which the radical discontinuity of the 'new' can be *recognized*, and yet which thus denies the very possibility of that discontinuity by which the 'new' defines itself. It is this necessary *countersignature* of recognized value, one that should in fact deny its status as an authentic invention, which guarantees its positioning within the economy of the same. (Iverson 7)

Inventor is credited with a "natural genius." b) invention is "the moment, act, or experience, the "first time" of the new event, the novelty of this newness" (Derrida, *Psyche I* 30). c) invention refers to the essence of novelty, the "invented thing." These three meanings are contextual and derived semantically from the term, "invention." "Invention" also entails two meanings, 1) it is suggestive of "first time," the moment of discovery, "the invention of what was already there and came into view as an existence or as meaning and truth" (Derrida, *Psyche I* 31). 2) the productive nature involved in invention, for instance, the production of a technical apparatus. When invention is further detached from a historico-chronological discourse, we do not talk about the invention of truth or beauty and so on.

Invention of truth, the moment or sense of discovery, is existent.²⁸ This suggests the "invention of another type of truth and another sense of the word "truth": that of a judicial proposition, thus of a logico-linguistic mechanism" (Derrida, *Psyche I* 31). In case of truth, finding or identifying truth assumes that of two truths being invented: "the truth of unveiling and

craftsman creator god who conceives of and then fashions the world, as well as in the image of the mediating figure of Pantomorphos who writes individual creatures into being" (11).

²⁸ From the literary point of view, invention truth can be deliberated as truth as *mimesis*: "Truth as *mimesis* assumes the unproblematic stability of language as an instrument with which to render or represent the world, and as such *mimesis* carries a deep suspicion of literature. Mimetic truth-seekers are highly anxious about the capacity of language to 'mean so many different things.' But their highest anxiety is reserved for metaphor and metonymy, allegory and myth, narrative and rhetoric, especially when these supposed 'literary' intruders are discovered lurking in philosophical and scientific discourse, as they so often do" (Payne 133).

the truth as a propositional mechanism” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 32).²⁹ The term “finding” encircles a mysterious ambiguity in relation to places, the place one finds something. This place is indeterminate. Is ‘finding’ a search or an encounter? How do we recognize “finding” as a method of invention? Derrida quotes the *Logic* of Port-Royal to discuss the method. In discovering truth, there are two methods: one is called “*analysis, or method of resolution*, that can also be called the *method of invention*; and the other, which is for conveying truth to others when it has been found, is called *synthesis or method of composition*, and can also be called *method of doctrine*” (qtd. in Derrida, *Psyche I* 33). Invention of truth is to be found on the premise of our desires. The truth we find or found is invented in terms of a subjective relation to something. If it relates to the nature of that thing is uncertain. Therefore, the name attributed to “truth” includes things related to truth in plural. Truth is true supposition based on methods of predication. One who finds/invents truth configures suppositions rather than create the source of truth. Truth nominates the interconnection between the individual and the mechanism of production. In this sense, a person has not invented a thing/anything. The essence of anything is not invented but an attempt to find truth as supposition. Invention entails a hypothetical logico-discursive mechanism where the condition of generality is correlated to the functions of its applications. While invention can take place only once, the invented thing/artefact is “repeatable, transmissible, and transposable” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 33). Even when invention takes place once, it is a plural process divisible in itself. The iterability and inauguration of the event of invention circumscribes the mechanical apparatus and the “fictional or poetic narrative.” Once the inauguration of the event of invention takes place, “invention is invented” with accessibility and availability. Invention reposes on iterability and the simulation apparatus used by various subjects to make copies. While this apparatus can be simple or complex, given the discursive processes, there is a sequentiality in procedures involved. The inventive foundation that marks iterability as its elemental procedure follows the principle of reason.

²⁹ “A truth, here, transforms, works, makes things work, changes things. There is truth when a mutation occurs, a revolution, rather than a revelation—unless of course, the revelation in question is effectively revolutionary, engenders and changes the world” (Derrida and Grossman 17)

The structure of language/mark/trace is conspicuous and inherent in the inventive procedure. Descartes and Leibniz³⁰ acknowledge that the “invention” in “invention of truth” is not accidental. The invention of language and foundation of technological/technosemiotic aspect belongs to the realm of truth because truths “are discovered truths *and* predicative connections in true propositions” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 35). Derrida reminds that Descartes uses the term “invention” in his exposition of universality of language:

The invention of this language depends on the true philosophy; for it is otherwise impossible to enumerate all the thoughts of men, and to record them in order, or even to distinguish them so that they are clear and simple, which in my opinion is the great secret one must have in order to acquire correct knowledge...this language is possible, and that one can find the knowledge on which it depends, by means of which peasants could better judge the truth of things than philosophers do now. (qtd in Derrida, *Psyche I* 35)

Derrida highlights how Descartes observes the correlation between the invention of language and the knowledge of truths. However, in this process, this knowledge functions as the judge of the truth of things. The invention of the language “presupposes *and* produces science, it intervenes between two states of knowledge as a methodic or technoscientific procedure” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 35). The simulated language is positioned at the point of origin of invention and proceeds to invent. The new language serves the function of invention through the “space of its signature.” The signatures and countersignatures are a mode of invention: “When Derrida speaks of signatures and countersignatures and of fathers and sons, he is, in fact, pointing out that inventions are always signed for or appropriated by others. That is, deconstruction as a linguistic event cannot be anything else but an “invention of the other,” of something countersigned by someone else” (Rappaport 126)

V

Invention and inventors progress with truth; they invent the method, the process and the hypothetical apparatus. They speculate and establish. Inventors have a certain status as their path to invention and it becomes a method. It never ensues without the opportunity of recapped application. Accordingly, inventor invents a general truth establishing the correlation between a subject and predicate.

³⁰ Muhit 117-35, Bolton 242-73, Jarett 83-100.

Universality encloses perfect objectivity using boundless iterability. The iteration reposed in the singular presence of invention distorts the witnesses of inventors. The individual or his singular identity is interconnected with an extrinsic activity. The rights held by the author involves juridical mechanisms and contracts established by performative acts. The rights of the inventor encloses a scientific idea and industrial manipulation. Inventions are technoindustrially mechanized to be introduced to the general public. The distinctions involved reposes on “philosophemes” for its authority.

The politics of invention circumscribes the aleatory into its schematic designs. The politics of research and culture are integrated with the politics of industry to augment the economy. Drawing his cue from Leibniz, Derrida brings together this politics with the general idea of invention.³¹ For Leibniz, “universal characteristics would not only be a dispositional aid (the laying out of a syntax or system) for organizing what we already knew, but it would be a productive form that could help us perceive what was missing in our knowledge, invent the means to find it, and eliminate controversy” (Hurst 165).

Leibniz maintains that there is a variance between the methods we employ to teach systems of knowledge and those found.³² Chance plays a major role in inventions. These inventions are directed to our posterity and also become part of history in its effort to produce their systems. What is invented is encircled within general truths and bodies of knowledge perpetually guiding the application of differences. Application is fashioned between chance and method. The method of invention makes the pedagogical definition. Is chance a part of invention? If there is no foundational relation to the system of invention, then how is it associated with the history of art? Is chance reoccurring? The function of an inventor is to

³¹ ‘It is true that often an example, envisaged by chance, serves the occasion that prompts an ingenious man to search for general truth, but it is very often quite another matter to find it; aside from the fact that this path of invention is not the best or the most used by those who proceed by order and method, and they make use of it only on those occasions where better methods come up short. While some have believed that Archimedes found the quadrature of the parabola by weighing a piece of wood hewn into parabolic shape, that this particular experiment of this great man see well enough that he had no need of such an aid. However, even if this empirical path of particular truths had been the occasion of all discoveries, it would not have been sufficient to give rise to them...Moreover, I admit that there is often a difference between the method we use to teach bodies of knowledge and the one which they were found...Sometimes...chance has occasioned inventions. If all these inventions had been noted and their memory preserved for posterity, this detail would have been a very considerable part of the history of the arts, but it would not have been adequate for producing their systems. Sometimes the inventors have proceeded rationally to the truth, but along circuitous paths.’ (Leibniz qtd in Derrida, *Psyche I*, 38).

³² Leibniz, G.W. *The Art of Controversies*, pp.94ff.

embody chance and not to stumble upon truth by chance. The inventor knows the chance, knows how it is to be lucky to recognize the no chance scenario. To know chance is to forestall and decipher chance in order to direct oneself to make it work. This transformational process at once conserves and invalidates chance affecting the position of the aleatory event.

Policies (government and industrial) of invention are homogeneous and are incorporated with an arithmetic. Invention of the other is converse to that of the identical, its difference paves way for the advent of another. Invention of the other, which we anticipate, is wholly other, “the one that allows the coming of a still unanticipatable alterity, and for which no horizon of expectation as yet seems ready, in place, available” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 39). The preparation comes along with the wholly other, a passivity is collected with everything that comes down to the unsuitable. Allowing the other to act or to transpire is not an apathetic activity. When it remains incalculable and aleatory, the other incorporates a heterogeneous relation with the calculable. Even when the invention is the wholly other, it is invention because one anticipates it, details its destiny, allows it to come in. Therefore, “The invention of the other, the incoming of the other, is certainly not constructed as a subjective genitive, and just as assuredly not as an objective genitive either, even if the invention comes from the other—for this other is thenceforth neither subject nor object, neither a self nor a consciousness nor an unconscious” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 39).³³

Deconstruction is the preparation for welcoming the other. Deconstructive process is a double genitive.³⁴ It is deconstructive invention that, “comes back in the step—and also the step—of the other. To invent would be then to “know how to say “come” and to answer the “come” of the other” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 39). However, the caution is that we are never sure if it ever comes about.

³³ An invention without verification could not be assimilated; it would be pure accommodation; at the limit, it would not even be “for a consciousness.” There is no consciousness that does not perceive every sense as a sense “for self” (this “for self” being one of a transcendental subjectivity, not a psychological one). Every sense being for a consciousness, by definition not being able to make itself a stranger to a “transcendental ego,” an intentional ego, it always reveals itself as “already” present. At the limit, an invention without verification would deny the intentionality of consciousness; it would be invention “of” nothing or invention (of) itself (by) itself, which would destroy the very sense of any inventions, which is a synthetic sense” (Derrida, *The Problem* xxiii).

³⁴ Parker considers “double genitive” as a feature of Derridean inclination towards “syntactical undecidability” (39). With “Double genitive,” Derrida emphasizes the force of deconstruction, “‘force’ is the object of deconstruction and that deconstruction itself has a force that is particular to it” (Gasché 2).

Derrida also attempts to unpack the homogeneous relation between aleatory, authority and modern politics of invention. This law of the same is an integrative process anticipating assimilatory power that neutralizes innovation and novelty as much as chance. The power involved precedes the assimilation of the aleatory other, “of the other chance event, actually occurs; it suffices that it be possible, projected, potentially significant” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 39). It serves to obtain meaning from economic horizon paving the way for “the political economy of modern invention” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 39). Derrida cautions that the economic and aneconomic registers cannot be differentiated strictly. However, they “cannot be harmonized, dialectically interwoven, or organised into a hierarchy or teleology in which one is subsumed under the priority and governance of the other” (Hurst 166). In order for invention to be dynamic and face its aneconomic description “as an original-originary transgression of the possible, that which was not possible beforehand (the absolute other, the impossible) has to come to the inventor” (Hurst 168).

Aligning with Leibniz’ “the new species of logic,” Derrida emphasizes its necessity:

We would need a new species of logic, which would deal with the degrees of probability, since Aristotle in his *Topics* did not such thing as that, and satisfied himself with putting in some order certain popular rules, distributed according to the commonplaces, that may be of use on some occasion in which it is a matter of amplifying the discourse and giving it credibility, without taking pains to give us a necessary scale of weighing the probabilities and for forming a solid judgment. He who would wish to treat this question would be well advised to pursue the examination of games of chance; and in general I would wish that a clever mathematician would produce a substantial work, well detailed and well reasoned, on all sorts of games, as that would be very useful for perfecting the art of invention, the human mind coming better into view in games than in more serious matters. (Leibniz qtd. Derrida *Psyche I* 40).

The “games” are “mirror games.” These games appear in the psyche that guides inventiveness to a preeminent image of truth. The art of invention is a representation of the principle of reason, one that assimilates the arithmetic of probabilities. The new shade attributed to the art of invention redeems the imagination and liberates from imagination. It journeys through and beyond the imagination. Saving the mind and the imagination, the foundational aspect of this new art of invention is the grammar of possibilities, it proliferates without encumbering imagination.

VI

The above argument suggests that what we possess is an “economy of imagination.” Economy of imagination has an embedded history. The standing of imagination alters without affecting the status of invention. Does economy of imagination liberate philosophical innovation and inventiveness? What is the theological status of invention? What is the relation between theological truth and infinite reason? Does each of these interrupt or augment the other? Schelling’s philosophical poetics reminds us the “artistic drive” in the philosopher. It is a creative process with endless possibilities.³⁵ It is a productive imagination which is significant for philosophical invention. Such a stance underlines that philosopher can be inventive by making a step towards the formal sphere and still can be original. This is an “event and a sort of invention, a reinvention of invention” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 42).

Should a philosopher exhibit originality? Derrida argues as follows:

No one had said before that a philosopher could and should, as a philosopher, display originality by creating new forms. It is original to say that the philosopher must be original, that he is an artist and must innovate in the use of form, in a language and a writing that are henceforth inseparable from the manifestation of truth. No one had said that philosophical invention was an *ars inveniendi* poetically and organically supported by the life of a natural language. Descartes himself had not said it when he recommended the return to French as a philosophical language. (Derrida, *Psyche I* 42).

Schelling’s original thoughts on the economy of imagination is entangled within the paradoxical boundaries of invention in semblance of “supplement of invention.” Invention, for Schelling is supplementary, an add on that establishes an addition to complete the whole. It attempts to fill the gap and carry forward the program. Derrida mentions that this program is still theological in nature because the program anticipates to articulate “original” and “absolute” knowledge. “Total knowledge has the unity of an absolute manifestation (*absolute Erscheinung*, invention as unveiling or discovery) that is finite in reality but ideally infinite, necessary in its reality, free in its ideality” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 42). However, the invention of the other is bound within limits and is attributed to the chance of a mortal being. It is entangled in an “infinite amortization.” The

³⁵ “Art is, however, explicitly associated by Schelling with revelation, but it is revelation in the sense that genius opens up something with respect to ourselves; it is a nature within ourselves that comes to light, that is revealed. Yet the artist is driven to reveal this unity of self in the work, not by desire so much as an inner contradiction that must be resolved. Genius can in this sense be taken to be response as much as a creation; it is the response of our whole being, a being that is not only the drive towards production itself but is also a being that has within itself the origin of this drive, a whole that had been originally divided” (Dodd 81)

rationality of invention is a form of “spectacularly supplementary logic of an anthropo-theocentrism” (Derrida, *Psyche I*, 42). Humans as rational beings is designed to be a counterpart to the manifestation of the world. This a theological supposition. Human activity is considered to be complementary to God’s revelation and bearer of divine essence.

“Invention manifests, it is the revelation of God, but it completes that revelation as it carries it out, it reflects revelation as it supplements it” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 43). Humans mirror the psyche of God, it appropriates the whole by furnishing a lack. The psyche cannot be diminished as a “soul supplement.’ The psyche is “the soul as supplement, the mirror of human invention as the desire *offor* God, in the place where something is missing from God’s truth, from his revelation” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 42). The complement of the two emerges as the invention of the other. The psyche offers itself as a mirror for God, it advances a speculation, a program. This is the logic of the *supplement of invention*.³⁶

The possibility of invention and the status it receives is validated by an institution. Institutions are foundations of inventions and the status conferred on inventions is made possible because of institutions. The possibility of an invention coming back is set in motion by the politics of technoscientificity. The economy of invention does not sever the psyche or traverse the mirror. The logic of supplementarity interfaces with the configuration of the psyche in a convoluted maner. The complexity of a fable leads beyond the invention of something other than the fabulous repetition. The performance of the “Fable” follows the regulations to institute an autopoetics. This discards the already existent precarious regulations to re-invent itself.

Invention fashions a singular situation. It is a possibility and

...the invention of the possible, the *tekhnē* of a human subject within an ontotheological horizon, the invention in truth of this subject and of this horizon; it is the invention of law, invention according to the law that confers status; invention of and according to the institutions that socialize, recognize, guarantee, legitimize, the programmed invention of programs; the invention of the same through which the other comes down to the same when its event is again reflected in the fable of a *psyche*. (Derrida, *Psyche I* 44).

³⁶ “This logic of the *supplement of invention* could be verified, beyond Schelling, in every philosophy of invention, indeed, in every account of philosophical invention, in all political economies, all the programmings of invention, in the implicit or explicit jurisdiction that evaluates and legislates today each time we speak of invention” (Derrida, *Psyche I*, 43).

Invention is not bound by any conformity. Paradoxically, invention does not invent anything, we cannot anticipate the other to come when nothing comes to the other from the other. The other, in invention, is not a possibility. The possible invention, therefore, is the invention of the impossibility. However, for the other, an invention of the impossible is the certainty of the impossible. When an invention expresses itself to be the invention, it appears to be a possibility, scheme of possibilities of auto-economy.

The invention of the same and the possibility of the invention is not against any possible inventions. Any attempt to reinvent the possibility of invention itself or another invention or the invention that is to come or would come through auto-economy is an iteration. It appropriates a place for the other to come. If we consider that the other is not invented, the deconstructive inventiveness encircles the beginning, “uncloseting” and subverting exclusive schemes and structures to pave way for the other. The coming of the other cannot be appropriated by any preparation of its coming. The coming of the other is a possible arrival. It is not invented, neither calculable nor decidable. It is a possible invention.

The concept of invention remains to be deconstructed. As we grapple with it, we do not find itself or invent itself. It can be invented only by the other and stall from anticipating the coming of the other. The response to the other comes through a desirable and worthy invention. The other is “what is not inventable, and it is therefore the only invention in the world, the only invention of the world, *our* invention, the invention that invents *us*. For the other is always another origin of the world and *we are to be invented*. And the being of the we, and being itself. Beyond being” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 45).

The other performs beyond the psyche. The necessity of performativity is established in the other. However, is it adequate? Performativity presumes traditional institutionality to sever the mirror. Deconstruction invents and affirms and allows the other to come into the performative. It perturbs the conditions of the performative and of whatever differentiates it securely from the constative. The writing is accountable to the other, “opened to and by the other, to the work of the other; it works at not letting itself be enclosed or dominated by this economy of the same in its totality, which guarantees both the irrefutable power and the closer of the classical concept of invention, its politics, its technoscience, its institutions” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 46). The economy of invention does not reject these possibilities as it re-appropriates what is

set into play with the difference of the other. The motion that is set is irreducible to meaning, existence or truth, traversing the possible results in a non-status position. The other is not new but its coming traverses beyond the constructed past and present to invent the “techno-onto-anthropo-theo-logical conception of invention” (Derrida, *Psyche I* 46). Derrida aptly concludes his lecture with the following lines:

What am I going to be able to invent again, you wondered at the beginning, when it was a fable.
And of course you have seen nothing coming.
The other, that’s no longer inventable.
(Derrida, *Psyche I* 46)

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