

## Nietzschean Genealogy and History

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### Abstract

Nietzschean genealogy as a method is an endeavor that accounts historiography as an interpretive function rather than a unilinear re-narration. Existential history, for Nietzsche, is a relational realm and meanings of interpretation are preferential of an absolute truth/fact. History devoid of interpretive value is allocated to a structural impossibility of dominant history validated through convincing perspectives. Nietzschean genealogy not only contests the privileging of history but also establishes an anti-realist representation of the past locating and depicting symbolical viewpoints. Taking his cue from Nietzsche, Foucault argues that genealogy does not contest itself to history but rather challenges itself to explore origins and discard the metahistoric disposition of “ideal significations” and “indefinite teleologies.” This paper attempts to critically map Nietzschean genealogy, its relevance to history/historiography and Foucauldian response.

**Key words:** *Nietzsche, History, Genealogy, Foucault, Moral*

Nietzsche's genealogical method is an enterprise to record historiography with integrity as it recognises its interpretive rather than privileging status, subjective power rather than gallant objectivity subdued in interpretations and the functional forces involving the illogical exhibition of perspectival realms and meanings of interpreters. “Nietzsche believes his historiography is preferential insofar as it aims neither at absolute truth nor at simply telling one story among many, but as expressing life as will to power. In fact, for Nietzsche, to believe that one's own perspective, the result of one's own determinate conglomeration of physiognomically embattled drives, is no better than any other's, as the postmodern holds, is to deny life—“to castrate the intellect”” (Jensen 179-80). Nietzsche is detached from the interpretive value-relativism assigned to him by the postmodern historians because historian's task is structurally imposing and the impossibility of an authoritative history is validated. Nietzsche's history is “structurally an anti-realist representation of the past as it appears in symbols through his perspective and an attempt to convince other like-typed perspectives of its truth by means of making familiar previously unfamiliar phenomena” (Jensen 180).

Genealogy, as employed by Nietzsche, is dissimilar to following a pedigree. It does not intend to validate the past or enhance its relation to the contemporary. It challenges a solitary origin or object of investigation. Nietzsche's study on Christian morality reveals that it is not

instituted by a particular person in Palestine. In his *Genealogy of Morality*, he arrives that Christian morality is the outcome of a combination of diverse trajectories of development, “resentiment of slaves directed against their masters, a psychological connection between ‘having debts’ and ‘suffering pain’ that gets established in archaic commercial transactions, a need people come to have to turn their aggression against themselves which results from urbanization, a certain desire on the part of a priestly caste to exercise dominion over others etc.” (Geuss 276). Historically conditioned combination of various trajectories contests the designated solitary origin of Christian morality. The location, therefore, becomes unequivocal, inherently positive and diverse.

Moral conceptions has an origin opposed to sentimental presumptions of that which is considered as having value. The undisputed presumptions implicitly direct historiography and constitutes that which is symptomatic of debility. While Nietzsche does not consider and commit himself towards the moral concepts, he also does not favour his arguments toward the violent origins of Christian morality. Value-enhancing passage is a convoluted phenomenon than the origination of value because diverse kinds of transferences have to be recognized.

History of Christianity is a history of sequential efforts from varied “wills” to dominate and re-configure compound habits and emotions, methods of deciphering and acting to enforce meaning. While meaning executed at a particular point in time can be outmoded at a different time, the foundational meaning establishes an existence embedded within a complex realm named Christianity. Christianity, as it involved in acquiring power of resistance rather than impose meaning on the Christian complex.

The pejorative criticism on Hegel’s use of history by Nietzsche suggests that an instruction founded on “Hegelian craniums” is perilous, abysmal and destructive. Detrimental aspects of history have been combined with ideologies of liberalism, communism and fascism. They contribute to the negative elements of political totalitarianism and imperialism. The link between Hegel and Nietzsche is not merely based on philosophical incongruity but on the oppositional and ideological contexts within which Hegel founded his modern use of history. In his *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche envisages the denigrating political events: “The concept of politics has been completely absorbed into a war of spirits, all the power-structures of the old society have been blown into the air—they one and all reposed on the lie: there will be wars such as there have

never yet been on earth” (Nietzsche, *Philosophy and Truth* 97). The “lie,” Nietzsche remarks, includes the modern values embedded within Western consciousness. Hence, it becomes important, for Nietzsche, to counter Hegelian historicism instituted on the binary paradigms of western philosophical consciousness. Nietzsche offers a redemptive essence that can move beyond the nihilist modern consciousness. His reaction to nihilism is implanted in his presentation of a progressive historicism that engenders the discernment of “Eternal Return.” It is a creative awareness with a reoccurrence of “cyclical” interpretation of history corresponding to the vivacity that vanished in modern consciousness.

One of the discursive presentations of modern consciousness of history is articulated by Hegel. He merged the segregations between liberal and communist ideologies by regulating ideological interpretations with a progressive critique. However, the “progress in history” foreseen as a superior echelon of civilization entrenched within historical idealism is disadvantageous. The “end of history” is a culmination of its trajectories aimed towards the trails of the modern that integrates Western identity: “The great impact of the notion of history upon the consciousness of the modern age came relatively late, not before the last third of the eighteenth century, finding with relative quickness its climactic consummation in Hegel’s philosophy” (Arendt 68). The “climactic consummation” was appropriated within Western consciousness in order to shape the Oriental Other. The culmination is devoid of any religious achievement but rather was realized through intellectual potential that marks “humankind’s progress toward perfectibility” (Wiser qtd. in Cristante 40).

In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche considers Hegel as a “philosophic labourer” who compiled the deprecating values of past civilizations in a discursive manner for the posterity. He writes, “I do not believe that there was any more dangerous deviation or turn in German civilization in this century which did not become more dangerous due to the enormous and still spreading influence of this philosophy—Hegelian philosophy” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good* 9). Nietzsche contradicts Hegel’s depiction of history in three ways: a) He dissents Hegel’s idea that the historical process culminated in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. End of history suggests that humanity is left with no endeavours to complete and therefore no cause to progress and live for. b) Nietzsche opposes Hegel’s notion that history discloses rationally. Hegel’s philosophy is dissolute because it attempts to vindicate that history has been a sequence of inequalities, illogicalities and

coincidences that have harmed humanity and its cultures. c) Hegel's claim that history is an empirical science is contested by Nietzsche. History, for Nietzsche, is imaginative and creative than scientific because it should aim to endorse life than trail truth.

Hegel develops the credence that modern man is sterile of productive epochs and continues to glorify human beings as "the true meaning and purpose" of history that attained culmination. For Hegel, the final aim of the world is spirit's consciousness of freedom. Human being of decadent moral worth is the "meaning and solution of each and every riddle" and "the ripest fruit on the tree of knowledge" who has attained the goal and naturally perfected. However, Nietzsche suggests that "knowledge does not perfect nature but only kills our nature." (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good* 12). Hegel justifies his era being at the centre of creating rather than knowing history. The foundation of such a point of view is based on their education that is contemplative rather than dynamic in appeal and dedicated to perception of the past.

The basic understanding of historical philosophy is that "world history has been rational in its course" and "reason rules the world". Besides history being a "presupposition," reason is a method of historical progress that instigates the examination of assumptions. *A priori* methods can be constructed to develop freedom into historical investigation and identification of historical events that advances the spirit. Conversely, Nietzsche argues that history does not unfold rationally but by "drives, affects and institutes" of human beings.

Hegel's philosophy is deficient of perceptible facts and theoretical content. Addressing the metaphysical features of history, he epitomized the history of philosophy by examining various cultures. The aim of history, according to Hegel, is the empowerment of the Spirit. Nature, in its embryonic form, is a hindrance to human beings to attain the designated subjectivity. Nature confines human beings in an illogical environment. Consequently, reason and nature are in conflict. History as a rationally driven phenomenon is predestined to set itself free.

Universal history governs the order of events even if they are irregular. Reason being the foundation of history is designated to set the Spirit free by augmenting freedom through subjectivity. Human beings are conscious of the spiritual nature in order for them to achieve spiritual freedom. However, they are in perpetual struggle with Nature because it controverts the inner decree of the Spirit. Nature is a comatose existence. Therefore, human beings should

establish their interests and enlarge their activities to set their minds to achieve freedom. Spirit discloses tangible forms of subjectivity. “*Geist* must be understood as combining the “infinity” of speculative thought, the inner self-reflectiveness of the dynamic of subject and object, with the finitude of temporal movement in space and time, where reflexivity is conditioned by external contingency” (Duquette 88). Objectivity of the Spirit is to be free.

Nietzsche writes, “At last my mistrust now turns to the question whether history is actually possible? What, then, does one want to ascertain? Something which, in a moment of happening, does not itself ‘stand fast’” (Nietzsche qtd. in Jensen 155). Uncertainty exemplifies a fundamental problem for Nietzsche’s philosophical project. He configures how history “used to be” and how the ability is positioned augmenting that which stands fast. Morality, aristocratic values, birth of tragedy and ascetic ideals are deliberated as possible elaborations of the phenomena under question.

Reliance considers the rhetorical devices emphasized in non-historical frameworks. Historiography is foundational to Nietzsche because it is the core concern of reality. The intrinsic historicity of reality is elucidate. “A lack of historical sense is the root mistake of all philosophers” because “everything has come to be; there are not eternal facts; just as there are no absolute truths. From now on, therefore historical philosophizing will be necessary, and along with it the virtue of modesty” (Nietzsche qtd. in 155-6). In this sense, philosophy is an extension of the idea of history. The belief in becoming singular in intellectual and historical matters are revised in the rational method. Morality lacks historical sense but not without the mention of the extension of the idea of history. Consequently, Nietzsche attempted a new model that is epistemologically and ontologically different from traditional models of designating and explicating the past.

In his attempt to conceptualize history in an evocative manner, Nietzsche, attempts setting free reality from history, belief from concept by configuring an independent method. Anticipating a progressive method, Nietzsche locates his progressive method in the character of reality and symbolic description. History is described and abbreviated in symbols.

The character of reality is, for Nietzsche, a constant process, a continual flux of forms and shapes, the meaning of which shifts and transmogrifies along with the conceptual symbols of those interpreters who try to encapsulate it. Our values, as a part of reality, will be no different. They will be no Platonic forms existing

immutably beyond space and time, awaiting the philosopher capable of apprehending them beyond the flux of appearances" (Jensen 157).

The mutability of presence is reality, only reality that cannot be made real. Therefore, one can conceptualize reality in language to construe reality symbolically in order to make it real. History can be conceived with concepts and must be configured by historical people. Genealogy is a historically conditional anti-realist representation embedded within and configured to persuade a particular and determinate viewpoint. Nietzschean *Genealogie* is valued as enduring and uninfringeable. His purpose inclines to historical elucidation. Morality is associated to reality, the reality as it was there. Nietzschean criticism of other historical accounts of morality underlines their incapacity to consider the history of morals. Desirability of truth and unbiased accounts of historical facts are supposedly a polemic that makes the readers critically conceive about morality through able means of displacement. The prescriptive potential of historical elucidation is his meta-history that extract the problematic in all probable methods.

*Genealogie* distinguishes the issue of pinning the veracity of Nietzsche's propositions by offering manifold strategies of extenuating it. The existing dominant understanding elucidates a historical transfiguration of morality that develops the historical accuracy and history of morality. He does not configure fictive narratives but proposes representational anti-realist depiction of historical subject matter with varied perspectives. Seeking the origins of morality cannot locate an alpha-point with mechanical cause or proliferate scientific explications of what impacts the existent moral history.

Nietzsche attempts to enunciate a sequence of natural contingencies that develops the meaning of augmenting ideals that are falsified. Naturalistic conditions are hypothetically conceivable in terms of reliable in relation to divine interruptions, providences and metaphysical machineries. Therefore, it is problematic to isolate that which is ironic and rhetoric to offer a naturalistic account of the explicated causes. Ascetic ideals transpire out of the protective and healing instincts of condescending life. Historical progress of resentments maintains justification of a causal account where these resentments are considered as derivatives. The empirical causes allows to offer a deductive origin of morality where the development of meaning becomes instances of good or evil. Metaphysical realms brings together various events forming a teleological historiography which could assign the centre by forwarding the progress of ascetic ideal.

Nietzsche concords with counterfactual theory of explication: “We think of a cause as something that makes a difference, and the difference it makes must be a difference from what would have happened without it” (Lewis 161). Explaining a real event typically in an anti-realist mode of depiction is construing an effort to reveal what actually happened. Reality is active because descriptions of events navigate our world which are considered to be symbolic in its enterprise that carry within anti-realistic representation. However, there is a persistent substantial realm that continues to alter a convincing symbolic representation. “The popular notion of causality as it was usually interpreted, demanded that all events to be regarded as derivative from ultimate substantial entities. When the ultimate substantial nature of matter began to disappear under the bombardments of physical research, the popular notion of causality was seriously undermined” (Mandelbaum 218). Traditional ideas designate causes as representationally abstract. However, a historian connects reality with meaningful and familiar options of two related events representationally historicized.

Admitting the opinion of an attribution of responsibility and of causal effectiveness depend on the subjectivities of the historian and the audience rather on the substantial realms. Nietzsche’s genealogical description of the causes of the history of morals involves an important significance of morality:

morality in Europe today is herd animal morality—in other words, as we understand it, merely one type of human morality beside which, before which, and after which many other types, above all higher moralities, are, or ought to be, possible. But this morality resists such a ‘possibility,’ such an ‘ought,’ with all its power: it says stubbornly and inexorably, \*I am morality itself and nothing besides is morality! (Nietzsche, *Beyond*202)

Traditional moralities are founded on the principle of single interpretation, how things in the past really are. Unfriendly belief in reality of representation became absolute and varied perspectives fashioned to a single univocal judgment about history. Foucault identifies how Nietzsche undercuts traditional realist idea of historical causation for ethical discourse (see Foucault 1977). Conventional historiographical idea of cause assumes a sole adequate contingency that elaborates how and why something happened. While the Judeo-Christian ethical rules are believed to be divinely inspired, rational human beings, today, anticipate immutability. The empirical idea of subject-free objectivity is found to have open anticipation for truth. The ideal assumes a divine value where other values become closely human and self-interested.

Nietzsche's idea of "descent" underlines this unintentional character of what is classically deliberated as significant in the progress of a phenomenon. The casual designation of genealogy as a pedigree, a person is designated as a specific veneration attributed with him. Social systems are valued as part of history in contrast to genealogical historiography. This "disturb what was previously considered immobile; it fragments what was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself" (Bouchard 146). From the origin transpires a historical norm-idealization concerning the value of standardized thing that validates history of its progress:

Whereas 'descent challenges the value of the present on the basis of its past, Nietzsche concept of 'emergence' resists justifying the past on the basis of the present. Events are not some end point or goal of a thought-out process. Emergent phenomena are ephemeral, capable of arising only through conflict and confrontation, but never justify some cause from which they are believed to result. History is a sort of struggle of forces, where what emerges does so by virtue of a momentarily stronger power of expression over its counter. The masters and slaves of *Geneologie* never experience a Hegelian *Aufhebung*. The belief in the glory of the 'last day,' for which Nietzsche ridiculed Hartmann and Strauss and through them Hegel and Marx, never comes about if antithetical emergent never reach their final synthesis. (Jensen 166).

Punishment is a singular name of varied phenomena whose meanings are attributed within an affectedly ossified structure, an endeavour to affirm something that which does not fasten itself.

The general history of punishment up to now, the history of its use for a variety of purposes, finally crystallizes in a kind of unity which is difficult to dissolve back into its elements, difficult to analyse, what one must stress, is absolutely undefinable. (Today it is impossible to say precisely why people are actually punished: all concepts in which an entire process is semiotically concentrated defy definition: the definable is only that which has no history. (Nietzsche, *Genealogyii* 13).

Nietzsche's depiction recommends the favourability of anti-realism because punishment is not a real existent thing to which we can assign weightage to supplement and assess real causal association. It is assumed as a valuable symbolic designation whose meaning encompasses a convoluted history of palimpsest and re-interpretations to the extent where reality is obscured by the advent of fresh hermeneutical forces. Nietzsche attempts to involve the interpretation that is fundamentally different from the emergent interpretation as a significant essence. By disclosing punishment as an emergent interpretation, he disconcerts the self-confidence of the systemic rituals of punishment which punishes in the name of God, state, rights, law and justice.

The cause of the emergence of a thing and its ultimate usefulness, its practical application and incorporation into a system of ends, are *toto coelo* separate; that anything in existence, having somehow come about, is continually interpreted anew, requisitioned anew, transformed and redirected to a new purpose by a greater power; that everything that occurs in the organic world consists of overpowering, dominating, and, in their turn, overpowering and dominating consist of new interpretation, adjustment, in the process of which their former ‘meaning’ and ‘purpose’ must necessarily be obscured or completely obliterated. (Nietzsche, *Genealogy*II, 12).

Anti-realist historiography is explicitly suitable for challenging traditional beliefs. By revealing its incongruences, Nietzsche develops a critical realism founded on assorted critical tools. Genealogy is not a convenient mallet but a universal contention that relies on validated traditions. “The historical refutation as the decisive one.—Once it was sought to prove that there was no God—now it is shown how the belief that a God existed could have emerged, and by what means the belief gained authority and importance: in this way the counterproof that there is no God becomes unnecessary and superfluous” (Nietzsche, *Genealogy*95). Hypostasized belief is culturally embedded within a historical critique in terms of how varied beliefs and interactions of genealogy is established.

Purposefulness of a perception assumes restricted horizon within hermeneutical interaction. However, the significant counter-interpretation to Nietzsche’s ideas on morality is connected to Darwinian evolution. His genealogical critique challenges the psychological reflection underlying historical development and the universal position of historical judgment. Nietzsche’s historical naturalism is historically imitative social configurations. When he identifies the impact of progress, he challenges the exertion of power from alternative dynamics. Nietzsche writes:

I highlight this major point of historical method, all the more since it runs counter to precisely that prevailing instinct and fashion which would much rather come to terms with absolute randomness, and even the mechanistic senselessness of all events, than the theory that a power-will is acted out in all that happens. The democratic idiosyncrasy of being against everything that dominates and wants to dominate, the modern misanthropy has gradually shaped and dressed itself up as intellectual, most intellectual...But this is to misunderstand the essence of life, its will to power, we overlook the prime importance which the spontaneous, aggressive, expansive, reinterpreting, redirecting, and formative powers have, which ‘adaptation’ follows only when they have had their effect; in the organism itself, the dominant role of these highest functionaries, in whom the life-will is active and manifests itself, is denied. (Nietzsche, *Genealogy* II 12).

History challenges a sole absolute subject devoid of hermeneutical possibilities of historical events and thwarts oppositional interpretations by competing changes in perspectival realms of meaning. Historiography is a representation of will-to-power as it operates, challenges and reconfigures the past of the will discarding the vacuity of a sole absolute hermeneutic possibility. It requests neither the logical establishments nor its empirical records but observes the probabilities of perspectival explication that offers a symbolic representation meaningful and even substantial in its configuration of the event. Moreover, interpretations are vulnerable to subjective perspectives and practices of history that are innately untenable. When representations are configured as an abstinent ideal of objectivity, altruism sorts the one absolute pattern of interpreting the facts of history. Therefore, interpretation and re-interpretation of prevailing hermeneutical possibilities suggest an innate preferability that expresses oppositional intention and method of interpretation.

In order to abolish counter-interpretation and competing powers, Nietzsche necessitates the preferability of his historiography as expression of power. In order to acknowledge the meaning, historical conflict of power interprets and re-writes the necessity of counter interpretations through time and text exemplifying the practice of what is historically accounted for morals and historiography that engages in the very same position. “Consistent with his claim that morality is a dynamic of competing interpretations situated within typological perspectives, Nietzsche offers a dynamic power-based historiography aware of its meta-historical status as an anti-realist representation and perspectival explanation that stems from his own perspective and hopes to find acceptance within similarly typed readers” (Jensen 172). Here, what Nehamas (See 1985 and Geuss 1994)) envisages as rightly practiced history gains importance. History as correctly practiced is a historiography that discards absolute and privileged hermeneutical possibilities of history. It reflects, represents and mirrors the features of historiographical interpretation as a potential competing wills to power.

Nietzsche’s critique on existent historiography functions as a particular challenge for interpretations that elucidates phenomena from an unfavourable psychological perspective and as a historical discourse. The critique of foundational psychology that configuring individual historical judgments are inert and essentialist interpretations that are expressed through social systems which validate their existence on the foundations of interpretation. However, it fails to

account for the historical feature of reality. Rationality compels to represent reality as durable uncovering the anti-realist character of those representations illustrating radical transition of genealogical project moving away from other historiographical forms.

Nietzsche's presentation of historical reality is an anti-realist representation that contradicting the employment of causal notions. His generalizations apprehend the truth of the past as it really existed/happened. Nietzsche's genealogy is not a self-enterprising paradox that necessitates tenacious and considerable vision of history for the probability of re-configuring it. He employs designations emblematically as "prescriptions of action" that associate to their exterior because they manifest efficaciously at evolving the familiar under scrutiny.

Nietzsche's genealogy is based on constitutive function. The position of an anti-realist historiographer in the text and his effectiveness as a historiographer in configuring values is not historically defined but can be envisioned as an ongoing historical process that offers not definition but interpretation. Interpretations are not willingly configured but functionally formulated by the psychological dynamics of the interpreter. The interpreter embodies his (historical) perspective. The foundational nature of an interpreter is to drive an interpretation based on Will-to-Power:

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But every purpose and use is just a sign that a will to power has become master over something less powerful and has impressed upon it its own sense of a function; and the whole history of a 'thing,' an organ, a tradition can to this extent be a continuous symbol-chain of new interpretations and adaptations, whose causes need not be connected even amongst themselves, but rather follow and replace one another just accidentally. (Nietzsche, *Genealogy* II 12)

Inert explanations of impalpable historical realities like 'things,' 'organs,' or 'traditions' are symbolic designations that challenge or displace the power that augments a specific interpretation against a universal history. In the structure of an organ, the Will-to-Power is an issue of interpretation. It marks borders and interprets varied degrees and differences of what it may become as it masters the event. It is an organic process that predetermines perpetual interpretation. Historical interpreter manifests the will to power by interpreting the past from a subjective perspective. It proceeds constitutively and functionally through an understanding that could employ and replace similar interpretations.

Ethical motif is represented emblematically as a sort of Will-to-Power, in Nietzsche representing the feelings of power. Conditions of life validate a historical valuation that

considers itself ethical. The interpersonal and self-contradictory instincts are not allowed to encompass the ascetic ideal possibly objective in positivist sense. Absolutism of the ascetic ideal involves an analogical determination to the perspectival expression circumscribed by the power that drives an adequate correspondence to the world outside reality. Genealogical historian represents a state of affairs that is symbolically demanding the meaning of his correspondence with reality. Interpretation subverts the acceptance of typological perspectives with transitory intersections.

Convictions and static values are foundationally psycho-physiognomic substrate. Values mirror historical externalizations that are specifically imbibed to constitute perspectives. Devoid of deliberative self, the independence of value systems characterize the images of what could appear. Utilitarian aspects of truth is considered as repugnant because interpretations of history is vivifying. History is needed “for the sake of life and of action, not so as to turn comfortably away from life and action, let alone for the purpose of extenuating the self-seeking life and the base and cowardly action. Only insofar as history serves life, do we serve it” (Danto 79-80). In contrast, Nietzsche observes that history can be endured by personalities that can extinguish it because the strategy involved cannot propel the interests of interpretation in its recognition of how historiography can itself become an expression of power. The value of interpretation is delimited by intermingling of perspectives where power aims to choose that which is ambiguous. “Genealogy is gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary. It operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times” (Foucault 139). History of morality is monolithic, diminishing history and origin to a limited concern for effectiveness. Language keeps intact their meaning directing desires in linearity where ideas recollected their logic. From these components, genealogy recovers an essential limitation that record singularity of incidents extraneous to repetitious finality. The recurrence employing casual progress of evolution isolate the varied presence of engaging roles. Moreover, genealogy must explicate occurrences where absence becomes a moment of realization. It necessitates “patience and knowledge” in its association to original material. The “cyclopean monuments” are configured from inconspicuous and deceptively unimportant truths and to a demanding method that cannot reproduce errors. Genealogy challenges persistent sophistication and it does not position itself to history as the “lofty and profound gaze of the

philosopher might compare to the molelike perspective of the scholar; on the contrary, it rejects the metahistorical deployment of ideal significations and indefinite teleologies. It opposes itself to the search of “origins” (Foucault 140).

Foucault interrogates on the reasons relating to Nietzsche’s quest for origin. It is an endeavour to bring together the essence of elements, there pristine probabilities and secured identities because the enterprise presumes the existence of static forms that precede the world of “accident and succession.” The search is guided to “that which was already there,” a form of primeval truth completely acceptable to its nature and it requires the elimination of varied faces to eventually reveal an original identity. However, if the faith reclines on metaphysics and locates an alternative element that is timeless and significant secret that is fashioned in a pattern that examines the history of reason, then it is devoted to truth and method forged into rationality. Genealogical examination mirrors the idea of liberty as the foundational nature of being and truth. “What is found at the historical beginning of things is not the inviolable identity of their origin; it is the dissension of other things. It is disparity” (Foucault 143).

History teaches to identify that the noble origin is no more than “a metaphysical extension which arises from the belief that things are most precious and essential at the moment of birth” (Nietzsche, *The Wanderer* 3). “The origin always precedes the Fall. It comes before the body, before the world and time; it is associated with the gods, and its story is always sung as a theogony. But historical beginnings are lowly: not in the sense of modest or discreet like the steps of a dove, but derisive and ironic, capable of undoing every infatuation” (Foucault 143). The ultimate proposition of origin is associated to the site of truth. From the point of view of a complete distance, devoid of manacles of positive knowledge, the origin configures possibilities of a field of knowledge whose function to convalesce it fabricate a demonstration of the excesses in language. The origin locates a place of unavoidable loss, the point where truth of things is related to truthful discourse, a point of transitory articulation that discourse has concealed and lost. “It is a new cruelty of history that compels a reversal of this relationship and the abandonment of “adolescent” quests: behind the always recent, avaricious, and measured truth, it posits the ancient proliferation of errors” (Foucault 143). The impossibility of veiling the truth is unquestionably the nature of flaw that cannot be discarded because it is founded into an unchangeable form that belongs to the process of history. Truth appropriates to the instance that

discards flaw and challenge the form that develops the unattainable. Truth and its authentic sovereignty embed history within history emerging “in the time of the shortest shadow” where the horizon arise from the moments of time.

A genealogy of values, morality, asceticism, and knowledge will never confuse itself with a quest for their “origins,” will never neglect as inaccessible the vicissitudes of history. On the contrary, it will cultivate the details and accidents that accompany every beginning; it will be scrupulously attentive to their petty malice: it will away their emergence once unmasked , as the face of the other. Whatever it is made to go, it will not be reticent—in “excavating the depths,” in allowing time for these elements to escape from a labyrinth where no truth had ever detained them. (Foucault 144)

The genealogist requires history to dismiss the fantasies of origin to remove the shadows. He should be able to identify the events of history and its discrepancies to convene a philosophical discourse. “History is the concrete body of a development, with its moments of intensity, its lapses, its extended periods of feverish agitation, its fainting spells; and only a metaphysician would seek its soul in the distant ideality of the origin” (Foucault 145).

Investigation of descent also allows the familiarity within an idea of multifold events where it is considered as form. Genealogy does not make-believe to temporally retrieve the restoration of a continuity that functions beyond the dispersion of lost things. It is the function that demonstrates the activity that perpetually reinstate the presence predetermined from its vicissitudes.

Genealogy does not resemble the evolution of a species and does not map the destiny of a people. On the contrary, to follow the complex course of descent is to maintain passing events in their proper dispersion; it is to identify the accidents, the minute deviations—or conversely, the complete reversals—the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us; it is to discover that truth or being do not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents. (Foucault 146).

Nietzsche associates rationality of heritage as a procurement, a tenure that progresses through solidity and arrange unstable flaws to the fragile inheritor of the minds. The search for descent is not about configuring foundations but rattling the existent fragments of unified thoughts where heterogeneity is imagined to be self-consistent. Historical developments appear as result of sequence of subjugations that respond to the requirements of war and punishment. What seeks to

realize the moment that arises out of genealogy is the reestablishment of varied systems of oppression and not the anticipatory power of meaning that dominate.

Success in history is owned by those who seize rules, those replace or alter them and control this complex mechanism. “The isolation of different points of emergence does not conform to the successive configurations of an identical meaning; rather, they result from substitutions, displacements, disguised conquests, and systematic reversals. If interpretation were the slow exposure of the meaning hidden in an origin, then only metaphysics could interpret the development of humanity” (Foucault 152). The force that participates in the subject of development humanity assumes a sequence of interpretations. The function of genealogy is to record its history. It could be the history of liberation or ascetic life as they face varied interpretations where it becomes part of historical process.

Nietzsche challenges the form of history that re-interfaces a suprahistorical point of view, a history whose function is to configure the eventually diminished plurality of time into a totality encompassed itself, a history that augments subjective identities and attributes a method of conciliation to all the dislocations of the past, a history whose point of view on precedes the implications to teleology, a complete development. Historian’s history extends its guidance extra-temporally to encircle an apocalyptic objectivity. When the historical sense is guided by suprahistorical point of view, metaphysics can augment its objectives by supporting itself to the demands of objectivity. However, historical sense can dodge metaphysics and become privileged device of genealogy when it discards absolutes. It relates to the perception of the glimpse that differentiates and disperses the liberating plurality and marginal elements capable of disintegrating itself.

Historical meaning extends a dimension akin to the process of development. Knowledge, however, does not incline to rediscovery but eliminate itself from the discovery of the self. History becomes operative in its introduction to discontinuity where being in itself becomes an interaction with instincts. Effective history divests the self from assuring stability of life and nature. It will not allow to be moved beyond an invisible determination that finds its foundations in tradition. Effective history challenges traditional history because the former rearranges the association recognised by the upsurge of an event and required perpetuity.

An entire historical tradition (theological or rationalistic) aims at dissolving the singular event into an ideal continuity—as a teleological movement or a natural process. “Effective” history, however, deals with events in terms of their most unique characteristics, their most acute manifestations. An event, consequently, is not a decision, a treaty, a reign, or a battle, but the reversal of a relationship of forces, the usurpation of power, the appropriation of a vocabulary turned against those who had once used it, a feeble domination that positions itself as it grows lax, the entry of a masked “other.” The forces operating in history are not controlled by destiny or regulative mechanisms, but respond to haphazard conflicts. (Foucault 154)

Effective history can also reverse the association to traditional history depending on metaphysics. The establishment of contemplative distances brings abstract reflections on individualities. It accomplishes the impossibility of peeking into alternative perspectives. Effective history validates various lofty epochs with suspicion as it reverses the practices of historians. It examines the nearest from a distance that allows history to employ its idiosyncrasies. Effective history assumes a perspective that reveals particular time and place over the preference of controversy. Nietzsche’s historical sense is an explicit perspective that aligns a system of injustice. Its understanding is oblique as it deliberates and affirms to reach the traces of what is prescribed as discreet effacement. He associates historical sense to historian’s history. “They share a beginning that is similarly impure and confused, share the same sign in which the symptoms of sickness can be recognized as well as the seed of an exquisite flower. They arose simultaneously to follow their separate ways, but our task is to trace their common genealogy” (Foucault 157).

Historical sense gives rise to three functions that challenges Platonic modalities of history. The first being parodic: guided against reality and challenges history as “reminiscence or recognition.” Second is dissociative, guided against identity and challenge history configured as perpetuity or representative of a tradition. The methodical detachment of identity is an attempt to amalgamate under the guise of parody. Such an endeavour is plural and limitless in its intersections. History, therefore, will not be a forgotten identity but a convoluted configuration of discreet and plural elements which remains heterogeneous and with varied powers of synthesis. “The purpose of history, guided by genealogy, is not to discover the roots of our identity but to commit itself to its dissipation. It does not seek to define our unique threshold of emergence, the homeland to which metaphysicians promise a return; it seeks to make visible all those

discontinuities that cross us" (Foucault 162). Third is sacrificial, guided against truth, it challenges history as knowledge. History becomes self-interrogative and examines the scientific consciousness. It identifies the methods and transfigurations of the will to knowledge. Knowledge holds itself from its scientific roots as to become a speculative subject according to the demands of reason. Its progress is not related to constitution and affirmation of a free subject because it configures a progressive dependence to the instinctive violence. "The desire for knowledge has been transformed among us into a passion which fears no sacrifice, which fears nothing but its own extinction. It may be that mankind will eventually perish from this passion for knowledge. If not through passion, then through weakness. We must be prepared to state our choice: do we wish humanity to end in fire and light or to end on the sands?" (Nietzsche, *Dawn* 501).

Nietzsche's critical interpretation of universality and objectivity of ascetic scientific historiography is identified as a postmodern reflection by Said. Postmodern historiography directs conversely against the absolute interpretations and defiance against the inherited cultural norms. Denying the intensity of drafting codes to history and offering a subject-less objective presentation of events, postmodern historiography is akin to Nietzsche's scientific historiography that endeavours to represent the past as a necessary progress in the course of history by validating human projects.(Lyotard's) Postmodernism as "incredulity" towards privileging and absolute meta-narrative is closely associated with Nietzsche's rejection of "one-size-fits-all" universalist story about the events of the past in deference to "perspectival" presentation (See Lyotard 1984 and Dews 1988). Hayden White observes that Nietzsche discarded a sole historical account associating events they represent. "To ...these essentially constrictive conceptions of truth, Nietzsche opposed his own conception of the relativity of every vision of the real" (White, *Metahistory*332). Elucidations cannot be assumptions that fit into law but are narratives that collocate varied and meaningful descriptions. "For it is by figuration that the historian virtually constitutes the subject of the discourse; his explanation is little more than a formalized projection of qualities assigned to the subject in his original figuration of it" (White, "Historicism" 54). Subverting ideological indulgences and linguistics suitabilities, the importance of explanatory configurations offers to the world a naturalistic-teleological perspective.

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