

Louis Althusser on Psychoanalysis and the Human Sciences

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
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Abstract

This article delves into Althusser's discussion of psychoanalysis and its relevance and presence in the human sciences, with a particular focus on his engagement with the works of Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan. Althusser's philosophical rigor and critical acumen unfold as he interrogates the theoretical foundations of psychoanalytic thought and psychology within the broader context of the human sciences. This examination traverses the intricate intersections of ideology, subjectivity, and knowledge production, dissecting Althusser's reflections on the foundations of psychology, psychoanalysis. Furthermore, the article critically evaluates Althusser's engagement with Lacanian psychoanalysis, highlighting the tensions and convergences in their respective perspectives on the nature of psychoanalytic structures. Through this analysis, the article aims to elucidate the enduring impact of Althusser's critical interventions in reshaping the contours of psychoanalytic discourse and its implications for the theoretical landscape of the human sciences.

Key Words: *Althusser, Lacan, Freud, Psychoanalysis, Psychology*

In his examination of Lacanian theory, Althusser endeavors to explicate the position of psychoanalysis within the expansive domain of the human sciences. This intellectual venture mandates two indispensable prerequisites: firstly, an exacting grasp of the intricate essence inherent in psychoanalysis, and secondarily, a thorough comprehension of the all-encompassing sphere encapsulated by the human sciences (Althusser, *Psychoanalysis* 1).¹ Lacanian theory, with its distinctive emphasis on the structural dynamics of the psyche, necessitates a nuanced understanding that goes beyond superficial interpretations.

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¹ In Althusser's words, "1. an observation de facto: empirically, what place does psychoanalysis currently occupy, what is its practical role today, in the human sciences? 2. a question de jure: given the essence of psychoanalysis on the one hand and that of the human sciences on the other, what is the proper relation between the two?" (Althusser, *Psychoanalysis* 1).

Althusser, in this regard, seeks to delve into the intricacies of Lacan's psychoanalytic framework, unraveling its layers to discern the profound implications it carries for the broader landscape of human sciences. The determination of the position of psychoanalysis, according to Althusser, hinges upon a dual investigation: an empirical scrutiny to ascertain the current empirical standing and practical role of psychoanalysis within the human sciences; and a juridical inquiry seeking to elucidate the intrinsic relationship between the essence of psychoanalysis and the broader human sciences.

The description of psychoanalysis and the human sciences, in their instantiation, lacks a comprehensive theoretical discourse that facilitates abstraction² from the immediate and individualized confrontations experienced by each individual.³ For Althusser, "no reflection can take place without being able to use abstract concepts, and the problem is not played out between concepts that are abstract and others that are not, that is, nonconcepts, but between scientific abstract concepts and nonscientific abstract concepts" (Althusser, *Psychoanalysis* 17). It is imperative to underscore that this deficiency exists for a historically contingent reason, one that is anticipated to be transient as intellectual progress unfolds. It becomes imperative to elucidate how this predicament may be apprehended by an individual, given that the extant modality of engagement is predominantly subjective, stemming from a lack of reflective scrutiny.⁴ Accordingly, the exigency to explore this issue arises from the historical context wherein the problem has not been subjected to rigorous intellectual reflection, leaving personal encounters as the exclusive avenue for engagement. This state of affairs necessitates an explication of how the problem manifests in the experiential realm of each individual. This aspect, however,

"has a number of interconnected facets. Are the free associations of patients in the clinical setting determined primarily by the unconscious conflicts of the patient or by an inextricable amalgam of the unconscious conflicts of the observer analyst and the observed patient? How are we to understand the nature of the transference-countertransference in the clinical relation? If transference countertransference interactions are the mainspring of analytic process, then objectivity is impossible; if there

² "Politzer rejected all Freud's operative concepts on the pretext that they were abstract." (Althusser, *Psychoanalysis* 17)

³ That which is removed from the "speaker's personal experience" (Althusser, *Psychoanalysis* 2).

⁴ It is also important to explicate the method by which this issue may be addressed by an individual, as presently, the sole means of encountering it is through personal engagement. This arises due to its conspicuous absence as a subject of contemplation within extant discourse.

are ways through and beyond transference-countertransference interactions, then a measure of objectivity is possible” (Hanly 427-28).

Althusser’s interface into psychoanalysis unfolds through a profound engagement with Freud’s seminal works. He maintains that while the ubiquitous presence of psychoanalytic concepts permeates various facets of contemporary society, the theoretical foundation necessitates a rigorous examination of Freud’s original texts. This intellectual endeavor, however, immediately confronts a formidable obstacle acknowledged by Freud himself—the psychological resistance that vehemently opposes the integration of psychoanalysis into the public consciousness. Freud’s initial forays into psychoanalytic discourse faced relentless criticism, marking a historical context wherein Freud was disparaged by the intellectual milieu of his time. He was “derided for male chauvinism, stuffy bourgeois attitudes, overdoing sexuality, and valuing subjective states over conscious ones.” (Jacobsen 12). Freud astutely recognized this extraordinary resistance and openly addressed it in his writings, anticipating the inherent challenges of public acceptance. One of the reasons for resistance, as noted by Jacobsen, is that “psychoanalysis was at a deep disadvantage in a superficially scientific popular culture because it acknowledged that human discretion cannot be expelled from the study of humanity without distorting what we find and what we say about it” (9). Freud contended that his theories would be met with disapproval because they fundamentally disrupted the psychic equilibrium of each reader, unsettling their defense mechanisms against personal neuroses. Freud’s analytical explanation posited that his works, by challenging individual psychic defenses, inherently conflicted with readers’ cognitive frameworks for coping with their neuroses.⁵ Despite the analytic foundation of this explanation, Freud, sensing its theoretical limitations, later introduced another concept—the neurotic character of civilization. This shift represented a historical explanation grounded in analytical theory, wherein Freud asserted that our civilization itself was afflicted with neuroses.⁶ Lowenfeld observes:

Freud was always of the opinion that the neurosis is a product of the great demands which civilization makes on man’s instincts. However, civilization

⁵ The concept of neurosis Freud employed to “explain the resistance with which his works necessarily met was an analytical concept, but one that could not be thought *de jure* in terms of the analytical concept invoked” (Althusser, *Psychoanalysis* 4).

⁶ Freud did not, however, distinguish between civilization and culture. He employed the terms culture and civilization arbitrarily (Suzuki 255).

concomitantly offers ever changing aids for the mechanisms of defense and channels for sublimation. It is in view of this fact that the question becomes pertinent as to whether cultural development is not actually motivated by man's endless need for help in his struggle with his instincts. (2)

Freud transitioned from individual-centric psychoanalytic (Campos-Avillar 121) discourse to a broader, historically situated discourse on the neurotic nature of culture.⁷ This strategic move expanded the scope of inquiry from the individual to the collective, posing a historical dilemma beyond the realm of traditional psychoanalytic theorization. Freud's assertion that our culture is neurotic introduced a historical dimension to his theorization, transcending the strictly psychoanalytic domain. This shift forced Freud to grapple with the ideological and historical resistance that his scientific enterprise encountered when disseminating psychoanalytic principles to broader audiences, including scientists.⁸ The ensuing difficulty was no longer purely psychological or psychoanalytic but was entrenched in ideological and historical frameworks.

The resistance encountered assumes a highly nuanced manifestation, specifically manifesting as a discernible incongruence between the conceptual apparatus employed by Freud in his works and the substantive content that these concepts purport to encapsulate. This disjunction can be articulated through the lens of Kantian philosophy, which dichotomizes between concepts organically engendered through a science's intrinsic evolution and those classified as "imported," concepts requisitioned by a science that it has not independently cultivated but indispensably borrows from external scientific disciplines. For Kant, concepts are "at once the basic objects of conceptual analysis, psychological rules for classifying and identifying perceptual objects, and the basic elements of cognitive rationality" (Hanna 252).⁹ In Freud's discourse, the discrepancy

⁷ Freud supposes that "our culture, as such, was neurotic, that is, that a historical subject—no longer an individual, but a historical culture—could be the object, or rather the seat, of a pathological affection of the neurotic type. Thus he raised a problem that was no longer psychoanalytic in nature but rather historical." (Althusser, *Psychoanalytic* 4-5).

⁸ "Freud and Nietzsche remind us that remembering and forgetting both play important roles in the lives of individuals, communities, and cultures. Reading history, learning history, writing history and even reflecting on history, difficult or otherwise, can trigger powerful reactions because we know that history matters, that it can be urgent, and that it is necessary for living as persons" (Rose 6).

⁹ Simultaneously constituting the fundamental subjects of conceptual analysis, the psychological principles governing the categorization and identification of perceptual entities, as well as the foundational constituents of cognitive rationality, epitomize core tenets within the framework of psychoanalytic discourse.

is pronounced; he propounds his analytical framework utilizing concepts drawn from disparate disciplines, constituting an intellectual importation akin to the Kantian paradigm.¹⁰

Freud's theoretical edifice relies significantly on concepts extracted from the realms of biology, the then-prevailing biological theories largely influenced by Darwinian thought, the energetics theory in physics¹¹, and the tenets of political economy.¹² For instance, "The ideas now considered most basic to Darwin's theory have turned out to be basic to Freud's theory too. Aspects of Darwin's theories discarded with time may have seemed essential to Freud for his speculations in applied psychoanalysis but are no loss to his scientific structure" (Ritvo 181).¹³ Each of the disciplines (biology, theoretical physics and political economy) was undergoing a scientific evolution at that historical juncture, and Freud, in a methodological borrowing, incorporated concepts from these areas to construct his analytical framework. This interdisciplinary appropriation is evident in his synthesis of ideas from the dominant biological theories inspired by Darwinian paradigms, the prevailing physics discourse centering around the theory of energy,¹⁴ and the economic theories that proffered insights into comprehending the economic world and its governing laws. This conceptual amalgamation, while instrumental in the formulation of Freud's analytical framework, elucidates the inherent tension stemming from the integration of borrowed ideas, inviting critical examination of the congruence between these

¹⁰ "Kant contrasts the concepts a science has produced by itself in the course of its own development, which belong to it organically, to concepts he terms "imported," namely concepts that a science uses, that it needs, that it necessarily needs to use, but that it has not itself produced in its organic development, that it has borrowed from scientific disciplines existing outside it" (Althusser, *Psychoanalysis* 6).

¹¹ "Physicists were asking about the role of the observer in quantum mechanics and relativity. Freud was asking about the role of the observer in psychoanalysis." (Holland 305).

¹² Althusser and Montag, elsewhere, argues, "Before Marx and Freud, culture rested on the diversity of the natural sciences, complemented by the ideologies or philosophies of history, society, and the "human subject." With Marx and Freud, scientific theories suddenly came to occupy "regions" until then reserved for the theoretical formations of bourgeois ideology (political economy, sociology, psychology) or rather occupied surprising and disconcerting positions in the interior of these "regions." (17).

¹³ "No claim can be made for Darwin as the exclusive source of any one of Freud's ideas. Darwin's achievement was the convincing synthesis of an enormous quantity of essential observations which threw new light on old ideas. It is the cumulative effect of these ideas as a consequence of Darwin's work that is impressive. It is probably also psychologically inaccurate to assume that any influence is exclusive for, as Freud points out, psychological phenomena are multiply determined." (Ritvo 181).

¹⁴ Grunbaum observes that, "in Freud's clinical theory, just as in physics, there can be no question at all of "dissolving" a causal linkage between an antecedent C and its effect E on the strength of terminating the recurrence of E by preventing the further realization of C. Far from having elucidated the role of causality in psychoanalysis, Habermas' importation of the causality of fate has only obfuscated it" (8-9).

imported concepts and the unique contours of psychoanalytic inquiry.¹⁵ Herein lies the profound challenge persistently encountered, even in contemporary readings of Freud's texts. The crux of our predicament resides in discerning the relationship between what Freud denotes with his conceptual framework and the inherent theoretical status of these concepts, which are conspicuously borrowed. Moreover, these imported concepts, necessitating a profound transformation to assimilate into the domestic realm, notably lack the requisite theoretical metamorphosis following systematic reflection. It is imperative to acknowledge that, until the advent of Lacan, this theoretical refinement of imported concepts had not transpired. Lacan's intervention marked an endeavor to transmute these borrowed ideas into domestically assimilated ones. Until such transformative initiatives were undertaken, every reader of Freud was confronted with a palpable dissonance between Freud's conceptual apparatus and the tangible substance of what constitutes psychoanalysis.¹⁶

The pivotal query that emerges pertains to the semantic denotation accorded by psychoanalysis to these concepts, which, as of yet, have not undergone rigorous theoretical scrutiny or metamorphosis from borrowed to domestically integrated. Nevertheless, there is a unanimous acknowledgment of the tangible reality encapsulated by Freud's imported concepts, they signify the practice of analysis itself. It is within the realm of this analytic practice that Freud engages with patients, executing therapeutic interventions within a framework denoted as therapy. The term "praxis," though not employed here for its potential connotations of a broader philosophical theorization, is nonetheless acknowledged as a practice situated within the broader domain of praxis in a general sense.¹⁷ Mentioning an instance, Fink explains: "Whereas Freud's praxis

¹⁵ Althusser notes, "when we read Freud's texts: we wonder what relation there can be between what Freud designates by his concepts and the theoretical status of concepts that are obviously borrowed, and which, in any event, needed, in order to become domestic concepts, to be profoundly transformed, that is, needed to undergo a theoretical transformation following a theoretical reflection." (*Psychoanalysis* 6)

¹⁶ "Until Lacan appeared—that is, until an attempt to transform imported concepts into domestic concepts—every reader of Freud encountered a contradiction between Freud's concepts and the concrete content of what he calls psychoanalysis." (Althusser, *Psychoanalysis* 7).

¹⁷ The deliberate choice to refrain from explicit utilization of the term "praxis," notwithstanding its inherent semantic ties to broader philosophical theorization, is a conscientious acknowledgment within the confines of this discourse. Acknowledging that the term, even in its muted presence, signifies a practice firmly situated within the expansive spectrum of praxis in a more general ontological sense, serves as a methodological precision. By opting for a restrained lexicon, this rhetorical strategy aims to navigate the nuanced terrain between specificity and expansiveness, recognizing the intrinsic interconnectedness of psychoanalytic discourse with broader philosophical underpinnings while maintaining fidelity to the immediate context of clinical application.

shifted from suggestion to transference—from hypnotic treatment based on suggestion to a form of treatment in which pure suggestion is minimized—analysts after Freud reverted to suggestion in droves. Analytic techniques promulgating the analysand’s identification with the analyst and the reduction of the analysand’s “irrational desires” to the “rationality” of the demands of the “real world,” represented by the analyst’s demands, all involve reducing transference to suggestion, according to Lacan” (Fink 254). While refraining from delving into philosophical speculations that presume the resolution of the intricate theoretical question surrounding the precise status of the object in question, the recognition prevails that Freud’s psychoanalytic concepts, in their imported guise, encapsulate a tangible and substantive therapeutic practice.¹⁸

Following an arduous engagement with the aforementioned theoretical intricacies, and recognizing the inherent limitations of theoretical constructs in affording direct access to the essence of psychoanalysis, we are compelled to assert that the crux of the matter lies in the actual implementation of psychoanalytic technique, specifically, in the realm of therapy.¹⁹ Yet, this is precisely where we encounter an impasse of formidable proportions. The dilemma emerges because, universally acknowledged, and notably affirmed by psychoanalysts themselves, particularly those who have undergone the rigors of analysis, is the assertion that psychoanalytic treatment begets an experiential dimension—a distinctive and irreducible encounter with therapy. In a metaphorical analogy, psychoanalysts and their patients liken their experience to soldiers who contend that a civilian can only grasp the intricacies of the military through firsthand service. It is colloquially expressed in psychoanalytic circles as the imperative to “do it

¹⁸ While eschewing ontological conjectures that purport to definitively unravel the intricacies surrounding the ontic status of the subject under examination, this discourse acknowledges the prevailing recognition that Freudian psychoanalytic concepts, in their transposed instantiation, manifest as not merely ephemeral theoretical constructs but as efficacious and substantial therapeutic modalities. It is within this discerning context that the dialectic between theoretical speculation and applied praxis gains salience, demanding a nuanced examination of the tangible and substantive dimensions inherent to the imported guise of Freudian psychoanalysis.

¹⁹ The laborious intellectual exertion undertaken in navigating the labyrinthine theoretical nuances articulated above underscores the exigent acknowledgment of the inherent limitations embedded within theoretical frameworks. While these constructs valuably scaffold understanding, the elusive essence of psychoanalysis eludes direct apprehension through theoretical purview alone. Consequently, an imperative arises to demarcate the focal point, positing that the true essence of the matter resides in the pragmatic instantiation of psychoanalytic technique, notably within the therapeutic domain. It is within the crucible of therapeutic praxis that the abstract conjectures and intricate theoretical formulations are transmuted into lived, experiential actuality, engendering a profound nexus between intellectual speculation and tangible clinical application. This assertion accentuates the pragmatic imperative to transcend the theoretical impasse and attend to the practical crucible wherein the efficacy and essence of psychoanalysis are authentically realized.

live,” an injunction to undergo the tangible experience of therapy and confront the institutional reality that mandates this direct and irreducible engagement with therapy, epitomized by didactic analysis.²⁰ Psychoanalysis, in response to this imperative, has given rise to an institution known as didactic psychoanalysis:

...psychoanalysis has created an institution, without which no one can gain access to his own truth, and calls it didactic psychoanalysis: it requires every psychoanalyst to personally undergo the concrete experience of the analytic situation and posits as an absolute principle an effect that is not made an object of reflection de jure, but is affirmed de facto, gives rise to an institution, and in fact selects the psychoanalysts themselves. (Althusser, *Psychoanalysis* 8)

Implicit in this institution is an absolute principle that remains tacit and is not subjected to de jure reflection. Instead, it is affirmed de facto, crystallizing into an institution that carefully selects and certifies psychoanalysts. In practice, this principle manifests in the requirement that individuals aspiring to become psychoanalysts must undergo didactic psychoanalysis. This certification, in turn, is contingent upon authorization granted by existing psychoanalytic societies to undergo didactic analysis with analysts designated as suitable by the society. It is pivotal, as no individual can be recognized as a psychoanalyst without obtaining certification from established psychoanalytic societies, and one cannot undergo didactic analysis without explicit authorization. This institutional framework, intrinsic to the practice of psychoanalysis itself, underscores the extent to which the experiential reality is sanctified within the discipline. In direct encounters or dialogues with psychoanalysts and analysands, the resounding message is unequivocal: comprehension is contingent upon firsthand immersion, as this is an irreducible, concrete experience that eludes understanding from an external vantage point. The mandate is unequivocal, a lived experience is prerequisite to authentic comprehension.

²⁰ The metaphorical analogy drawn between psychoanalysts and their patients, likening their experiential journey to that of soldiers who posit the incomprehensibility of the military intricacies to civilians devoid of firsthand service, encapsulates a poignant heuristic within psychoanalytic discourse. Colloquially articulated as the imperative to "do it live," this phrase serves as a resonant injunction emblematic of the categorical necessity to immerse oneself in the palpable crucible of therapy. This linguistic encapsulation reverberates within psychoanalytic circles, serving as a vernacular shorthand for the irrefutable mandate to undergo the corporeal and ineffable experience of therapeutic engagement. It is a directive that underscores the inherent inadequacy of theoretical abstraction alone and asserts the imperative for direct, unmediated confrontation with the institutional reality of psychoanalysis—a reality exemplified in didactic analysis. In this didactic crucible, the intricacies of psychoanalytic praxis are not merely observed but actively engaged, establishing a direct and irreducible nexus between intellectual comprehension and lived therapeutic experience.

We confront yet another formidable obstacle: despite analysts and analysands satisfying the prerequisite of undergoing the concrete experience of psychoanalytic therapy, they find themselves grappling with the challenge of articulating this lived reality. Having immersed themselves in the specifics of this unique situation, they endeavor to convey their insights, resulting in numerous writings with theoretical aspirations penned by psychoanalysts. These texts ambitiously seek to conceptualize the distinctive features of the psychoanalytic therapeutic encounter. However, the ensuing paradox is undeniably staggering—both the anecdotal narratives and the theoretical endeavors, whether expressed in books or texts, aimed at elucidating the imperative of undergoing the tangible experience of psychoanalytic therapy, fail to convincingly persuade or resonate with the broader intellectual audience.

The overarching issue stems from the inherent limitation of all descriptions and reflections on therapy currently available. These fall short in supplanting theoretical concepts that could not only elucidate the nature of analytic practice, which constitutes just one facet of the broader psychoanalytic domain, but more critically, delineate the substantive theoretical underpinnings that define psychoanalysis itself. The lacuna is evident, a satisfactory psychoanalytic theory reflective of the reality of psychoanalysis, the status of the psychoanalyst, and the scientific dimensions of psychoanalytic practice remains conspicuously absent.²¹ Consequently, there is a conspicuous absence of a comprehensive scientific theory that transcends the narrow confines of therapy and can evolve into a holistic theory encapsulating the entirety of psychoanalysis. What is communicated about therapy consistently falls short of achieving the pivotal juncture where a theorization of analytic practice transforms seamlessly into a comprehensive theory of psychoanalysis itself.²²

²¹ The identified lacuna within the discourse on psychoanalysis becomes strikingly apparent, as a conspicuous dearth persists in the formulation of a comprehensive psychoanalytic theory that authentically mirrors the complex reality of psychoanalytic praxis. This lacuna extends beyond the mere theoretical articulation to encompass the nuanced status of the psychoanalyst within the therapeutic milieu and the concomitant scientific dimensions inherent to psychoanalytic practice. The shortfall in this tripartite integration underscores the pressing scholarly imperative for a more nuanced and encompassing theoretical framework that transcends fragmentary perspectives, offering a cohesive and reflective model capable of encapsulating the intricate interplay between theoretical abstraction, the practitioner's role, and the empirical contours of psychoanalytic endeavor. This lacuna serves as a poignant call to intellectual arms, beckoning scholars to confront the epistemic gaps and engage in the meticulous construction of a psychoanalytic edifice that harmonizes theory, praxis, and empirical inquiry.

²² The discursive landscape surrounding therapy conspicuously falters at the precipice where the explication of analytic practice, however intricate, regrettably fails to seamlessly transmute into the crucible of a comprehensive

Within the expansive realm of human sciences, psychology finds itself in an ongoing quest for identity, a quest paradoxically obscured by its own existence. The foundational underpinnings of psychology, unbeknownst to the discipline itself, were laid by the seminal contributions of Freud. The unnoticed establishment of psychology demands an epistemic awakening within the contemporary milieu. It necessitates the realization that the essence of psychology, as delineated by Freud, holds the key to its authentic constitution. In this intellectual context, a critical juncture emerges, requiring the acknowledgment that, akin to Galileo's delineation of the essence of physics through the measurability of the physical, psychology's essence hinges on the delineation of its object. The developmental trajectory of psychology is contingent upon a profound awareness of the essence intrinsic to its object, namely, the unconscious (Althusser, *Psychoanalysis* 18). To articulate this in scholarly parlance, it becomes imperative for psychology to recognize that its maturation is intricately bound to the conceptualization of the object of its inquiry as the unconscious.

In the realm of psychoanalysis and psychology, a discernible progression marked by dialectical stages unfolds. The reality principle, central to psychoanalytic discourse, has evolved to be construed as emblematic of societal realities. "The reality principle is society, not in its material reality, not in the fact of feeding the child, etc., but in the norms that the immediate familial entourage transmits to and imposes on the child, norms that are the necessary regulations of the society itself" (Althusser, *Psychoanalysis* 25). This conceptual shift posits that the subject of psychoanalysis manifests as the intricate interplay between the child as a biological entity and the sociocultural milieu in which their existence is rooted.²³ The initial moments of life, wherein

theory befitting the expansive domain of psychoanalysis. This persistent shortfall reflects an intellectual lacuna wherein the articulation of therapeutic methodologies and their underpinning rationales remains disparate, disjointed, and falls short of achieving the synthesis requisite for a holistic and overarching theory of psychoanalysis. The failure to traverse this pivotal juncture underscores a deficiency in the current scholarly discourse, emphasizing the exigent need for a more integrative and unifying conceptualization that transcends the fragmented depictions of therapeutic practice, ultimately engendering a seamless convergence into a broader theoretical framework that authentically encapsulates the multifaceted dimensions intrinsic to the psychoanalytic enterprise. This lacunae-laden juncture serves as a clarion call for scholarly recalibration, urging the scholarly community to bridge this theoretical lacuna and cultivate a more cohesive and encompassing understanding of psychoanalytic theory.

²³ The child "develops from a biological entity into a psychological one" (Morris, Javier and Herron 8).

the child is immersed in the familial milieu, serve as the crucible where biological vitality converges with the normative dictates of upbringing.

The object of psychoanalysis, thus construed, encapsulates the confluence of the biological and the sociocultural, wherein societal norms are imparted through the agency of parental figures, most notably, the mother. These norms are instantiated in the regulation of fundamental aspects such as nutrition timing, toilet training, and the subsequent continuum of social expectations. The reality principle, as contended within this paradigm, transcends the material facets of societal existence, manifesting instead in the normative strictures transmitted by the immediate familial context. The crux of this psychoanalytic development hinges significantly upon the pivotal oedipal moment, a focal point that has garnered particular attention from thinkers such as Sartre. This juncture is posited as the epoch when the child internalizes the reality principle, assuming the societal obligations imposed upon them. This transition is epitomized in the symbolic example of the child refraining from wetting their diaper, not out of a mere biological impulse but due to an assimilated awareness of societal expectations—an awareness encapsulated by the concept of the "superego." It is "that controls the setting up of all the other subordinate agencies is simply a specific moment that can, moreover, be considered the moment when neurological maturation, motor maturation, visual maturation, biological maturation, and psychological maturation converge, and it happens to be precisely the moment when the child interiorizes the social obligation that is imposed on him in exchange for life and the forms that that social obligation takes" (Althusser, *Psychoanalysis* 25-6). The crux of this assertion holds profound implications, fundamentally reshaping the interpretative landscape of psychoanalysis and engendering consequential reflections on its application and theoretical underpinnings. At its core, the postulation contends that the object of psychoanalysis emerges as the product of a nuanced interplay between the individual and the intricate fabric of their social milieu. Within this paradigm, the scrutiny of psychoanalytic objectivity mandates a dual lens: the exploration of the individual's biological propensities and an in-depth analysis of the societal constraints imposed through the conduit of the immediate environment, notably the paternal and maternal figures, with the latter assuming a pivotal role, overshadowed by the overarching authority of the father. This paternal figure not only imparts identity, sustenance, and directives but also

orchestrates the familial domain, fortifies against externalities, and assumes a defined legal persona within the societal framework.

The imperative of this perspective lies in the recognition that the very essence of psychoanalysis unfolds at the intersection of individual biological impulses and the sociocultural dynamics encapsulated within the immediate familial sphere. According to Althusser, the “psychoanalytic concepts are connected with a psychoanalytic object whose origin is to be sought in the relations between a biological being (the little child) and a specific society, and the superego, the establishment of authorities, represents the interiorization of the norms of social constraint in that society and its structure” (Althusser, *Psychoanalysis* 30). A comprehensive understanding of psychoanalysis as an object necessitates a simultaneous engagement with the realms of biology and sociological inquiry (Kandel 505-524). This entails a profound epistemic synthesis that perceives the object of psychoanalysis as intricately woven into the tapestry of society itself. A corollary of paramount significance emanates from this synthesis, namely, the identification of the object of psychoanalysis within the crucible of societal dynamics. This underscores a departure from insular analyses confined to individualistic realms, propelling the discipline toward an expanded purview that acknowledges the inseparability of the psychoanalytic object from the broader social fabric. As expounded in Sartre’s interpretations, this juncture becomes the nodal point wherein praxis, embodied in the individual project, seamlessly integrates into the larger tapestry of society. One might aptly analogize this convergence as Sartre’s pineal gland, a minute and unassignable locus, akin to Descartes’ conceptualization, yet indispensably serving as the epicenter where individual projects transmute into social praxis and find acceptance within the societal milieu.²⁴ This convergence, encapsulated within a defined region, constitutes the locus of coincidence wherein the individual’s aspirations harmonize with and contribute to the

²⁴ “Descartes resorts to arguing that mind and body interact in the pineal gland at the base of the brain, which fails to answer the question of *how* they interact. Though Sartre considered himself to be a Neo-Cartesian, a French philosopher in the tradition of Descartes, Sartre’s theory of consciousness is opposed to dualism and driven by a desire to circumvent it. For Sartre, mind, consciousness or being-for-itself is not a mental substance, a distinct entity with its own independent existence. It is intentional it exists only in so far as it intends objects” (Cox 65). Sartre’s theory of consciousness, influenced by existentialism and phenomenology, rejects the notion of the mind or consciousness as a separate, independent substance. Instead of positing a dualism where the mind and body are distinct entities, Sartre emphasizes the intentional nature of consciousness. According to Sartre, consciousness is not a thing or substance; rather, it is an ongoing process of intentionality—it exists only insofar as it is directed towards objects in the world.

broader sociocultural fabric, an intellectual confluence reminiscent of Descartes' delineation of a point of intersection near the pineal gland.

Within Lacanian psychoanalytic discourse, the reality principle assumes a distinctive complexion, wherein it is construed as an intrusive imposition enacted upon the individual by the pervasive influence of social norms. This intervention operates surreptitiously through the intermediary conduit of the immediate familial environment, thereby establishing a nexus between the individual and societal expectations. This intricate dynamic is further accentuated by the individual's internalization of these societal mandates, encapsulated in the form of the superego. In this nuanced perspective, the psychoanalytic endeavor transmutes into a delicate negotiation, a nuanced diplomatic dialogue necessitated by the intricate entanglement of individual psychodynamics with the broader sociocultural fabric. This negotiation, akin to the subtleties inherent in delicate diplomatic maneuvers, presupposes the intermediary role of the psychoanalyst. The psychoanalyst, in this context, assumes the role of a mediator, poised to rectify the perceived imbalances within the individual by adeptly navigating the intricate web of societal influences. The therapeutic intervention unfolds as a sophisticated negotiation wherein the psychoanalyst, endowed with the mantle of authority, seeks to redress the perceived afflictions inflicted upon the individual by societal norms. The underlying narrative often manifests as a portrayal of the individual as a beleaguered entity, ostensibly crushed beneath the weight of societal expectations, a scenario wherein the superego, as the internalized manifestation of societal dictates, exerts undue pressure, ostensibly weakening the ego. The psychoanalyst, in this scenario, emerges as the arbiter poised to ameliorate the perceived deficiencies of the individual's ego by fortifying its resilience. The process of fortification invariably invokes an intricate psychoanalysis of the defense mechanisms employed by the ego, an exhaustive exploration into the strategies adopted by the psyche to navigate the demands imposed by the superego.

In the dialectical interplay between philosophy and psychoanalysis, a notable shift is discerned, whereby philosophy asserts its imperative role in elucidating the tangible facets inherent in psychoanalytic therapeutic practice, a domain hitherto obscured by theoretical opacity. This recalibration is particularly intriguing, transitioning from erstwhile theoretical engagements to a

pragmatic discourse grounded in practical considerations. Noteworthy is the shift in the modality of exchange: where previously theoretical discourse predominated, the contemporary dynamic unfolds as a reciprocal exchange wherein psychoanalysis contributes the palpable, practical dimensions, specifically the dualistic dynamics inherent in the therapeutic relationship between the practitioner and the patient. In this complex exchange, psychoanalysis, embodying a discipline theoretically unilluminated, extends to philosophy the tangible, the “concrete” essence intrinsic to its therapeutic praxis. In explicit terms, this concrete manifestation is encapsulated in the nuanced interplay characterizing the relationship between the psychoanalyst and the patient, a relationship inherently dual in its constitution. This concrete dimension becomes the offering, the empirical substrate that psychoanalysis bequeaths to philosophy for analytical scrutiny. Reciprocally, philosophy undertakes the responsibility of endowing psychoanalysis with the conceptual apparatus essential for discerning and comprehending this empirical substance. It is through philosophy’s intellectual lens that the concrete, as furnished by psychoanalysis, is transmuted into a coherent realm of thought, constituting the veritable object and essence of psychoanalysis itself. Hence, the symbiotic exchange unfolds as psychoanalysis bestows the practical groundings, and philosophy, in turn, furnishes the theoretical frameworks essential for a comprehensive apprehension of the intricate therapeutic dynamics inherent in the psychoanalytic endeavor. This dynamic collaboration underscores a profound synergy wherein philosophy, traditionally the vanguard of abstract ideation, converges with psychoanalysis to unravel the substantive intricacies embedded within the tangible contours of therapeutic praxis. “Philosophy has to falsify the experience of reality, of the analytical practice itself, in order to be able to declare it to be philosophical” (Althusser, *Psychoanalysis* 33).

Psychoanalysis, positioned as the quintessence of psychology, extends its influence ubiquitously over the entire spectrum of disciplines tethered to the psychological domain. Discerning a theoretical demarcation between psychoanalysis and its counterparts, such as psychology, psychotherapeutic medicine, and psychiatry, proves to be a nuanced endeavor. The intricate challenge arises from the fundamental proposition that the analytic situation, foundational to psychoanalysis, is intrinsically akin to the broader realm of intersubjectivity, the primal substratum of interpersonal dynamics. Intersubjectivity “represents a vantage point, a conceptual

frame, and a position to occupy” (Kirshner 11).²⁵ Navigating the theoretical nuances between psychoanalysis and its disciplinary counterparts poses a formidable intellectual task. The ontological alignment between psychoanalysis, psychology, psychotherapeutic medicine, psychiatry, and other cognate disciplines obscures distinct theoretical boundaries. Given that the analytic situation, integral to psychoanalysis, finds a fundamental identity with the original state of intersubjectivity, the pivotal query emerges: How does one delineate a substantive divergence between psychoanalysis and the philosophical underpinnings of intersubjectivity?

Lacan found that language offered a more accommodating vehicle for situating intersubjectivity into a psychoanalytic conception of the unconscious than did phenomenology. Lacan also incorporated Hegel’s dialectical theory of desire into his conception of intersubjectivity and structuralist theory of language. Hence intersubjectivity, though originally an integral component of phenomenology, gained currency among psychoanalysts who were either opposed to phenomenology or unfamiliar with it. (Thompson 36).

The challenge is compounded by the overarching consideration that the analytic situation, as emblematic of psychoanalysis, encapsulates an elemental congruence with the foundational dynamics of intersubjectivity. Consequently, a cogent explication is requisite to expound upon the nuanced distinctions, if any, that segregate psychoanalysis from the intricate tapestry of intersubjective philosophy. This inquiry necessitates an exploration into the very essence of psychoanalysis vis-à-vis the philosophical conceptualizations of intersubjectivity, delving into the finer epistemological differentiations that may reside within their respective theoretical frameworks.

²⁵ “For psychoanalysts, inviting first-person accounts of experience, along with undertaking a second-person dialogue of inquiry, provides access to another person that would be otherwise unobtainable. When we ask the other to tell us about his experience or what he is seeking from therapy (saying “you”), we invite a direct address (from an “I”) that calls on us immediately and, at least for the time of the exchange, creates a relationship, an entanglement, which can decenter us from our usual postures.” (Kirshner 11) In the psychoanalytic paradigm, the solicitation of first-person narratives, coupled with the initiation of a second-person dialogical inquiry, affords an avenue to apprehend facets of an individual that would otherwise elude empirical grasp. When the investigator prompts the subject to articulate their experiential realm or elucidate their therapeutic objectives—employing the second-person address (“you”)—an immediate and unmediated engagement emerges, wherein the respondent employs the first-person pronoun (“I”). This dialectic engagement not only compels a direct and unfiltered revelation of subjective experience but concurrently engenders a transient relational nexus. This relationality, established through linguistic exchange, possesses the potential to displace entrenched conceptual stances, momentarily destabilizing the accustomed epistemic postures of the investigator. This process, imbued with relational intricacies, underscores the transformative potential inherent in the intersubjective dialogical encounter, subverting conventional analytical positions.

Historically, the challenges confronting psychoanalysis were twofold, delineated between its marginalization by cultural institutions and the broader nonanalytic milieu. However, when these challenges manifest intrinsically within the analytic domain itself, a distinct set of complexities ensues. This internal dynamic elevates the difficulties beyond a mere lack of comprehension by individuals unacquainted with Freudian tenets; rather, it unveils a deficiency in the apprehension of psychoanalysis within the very echelons that should ostensibly possess a profound familiarity with its principles. The internal predicament transcends a mere lacuna in understanding Freudian paradigms and becomes emblematic of a failure to grasp the essence of psychoanalysis among those ostensibly versed in its intricacies. This nuanced internal discord complicates the psychoanalytic landscape, introducing an intricate layer of difficulty that surpasses the more straightforward challenge posed by external entities lacking Freudian insight. In the current configurations of the psychoanalytic realm, specifically within its juridical, social, and economic structures, these complexities manifest in multifaceted ways. The challenges are not confined to intellectual comprehension alone but extend into the organizational fabric of the psychoanalytic world, encompassing legal frameworks, societal constructs, and economic paradigms. The intricacies embedded within these structural dimensions of the psychoanalytic landscape add layers of difficulty, as they shape and, at times, impede the recognition and integration of psychoanalytic principles even within the very milieu purporting to champion its cause. Consequently, the ongoing struggles within the psychoanalytic domain extend beyond intellectual disparities to encompass profound challenges entrenched within the organizational, societal, and economic frameworks that shape its institutional existence.

Both Freud and Lacan exhibit a dual concern manifesting in their respective works: an adamant endeavor to extricate psychoanalysis from the proximate discipline that purports to be its closest kin, namely psychology, and conversely, a concerted effort to tether it to seemingly more distant disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, or ethnology. This nuanced framing of the problem, coupled with the contemplation of its resolution, offers a novel lens through which to ascribe renewed significance to certain texts in Freud's oeuvre, texts that have hitherto been dismissed as aberrant, largely owing to the prevailing psychological paradigm through which psychoanalysis has been traditionally perceived. Noteworthy among these texts are Freud's treatises like *Totem*

and Taboo, The Future of an Illusion, and Civilization and Its Discontents. In these writings, Freud embarks on a deliberate trajectory, attempting to impart a sociological essence to concepts that conventionally appeared rooted in the psychological realm (Jacobs 145). It is in these intellectual endeavors that Freud endeavors to imbue these concepts with a sociological character, deviating from their conventional psychological interpretation.²⁶ Perhaps, in doing so, he sought to realign these concepts with their inherent nature, shedding the psychological constraints that had heretofore obscured their true import. This intellectual move by Freud, regarded by some as perplexing or anomalous, may be apprehended as an attempt to relocate psychoanalytic concepts within a broader sociological framework. It invites speculation that Freud, confronted with the challenge of siting psychoanalytic tenets firmly within the purview of psychoanalysis itself, encountered considerable difficulty in anchoring psychoanalysis within an existing objective reality. Consequently, Freud's exploration of sociological dimensions in certain texts may be construed as a strategic maneuver to extend the conceptual boundaries of psychoanalysis, transcending the confines of psychology and probing its integration within broader sociocultural and anthropological terrains. The interpretative shift proposed here underscores the intricate intellectual terrain traversed by Freud, challenging the conventional categorizations that have relegated certain texts to the periphery of his intellectual legacy.

In contemplating Freud's contributions, it becomes evident that the phenomenon under consideration aligns with a historical awareness within the annals of cultural evolution. The rise of psychoanalysis, construed as the ascension of a hitherto unparalleled scientific discipline, reverberates with a cultural cognizance of the past. It encapsulates a recurrent phenomenon wherein the history of culture bears witness to the advent of a scientific discipline that, in its assertion of novelty, stands in stark contrast to antecedent fields that had crystallized earlier. If Freud's endeavors indeed represent an epistemological rupture, an irrevocable break from the continuum of prior fields, then this rupture assumes a profound significance. It becomes a

²⁶ Writing on the sociological relevance, Hamilton suggests that, Freud's ideas may not be directly applicable to sociological research, "as in the models and of social relationships which he developed. His theories constitute a necessary corrective to those 'structural' theories which explain all social action in terms of external processes determined by essentially economic forces. Within such theories questions of the rationality or non-rationality of *individuals* become subordinate to the logic of *systems*. They suffer, in effect, from an inadequacy of description of individual action and behavior." (viii)

transformative phenomenon not confined to mere conceptual reconfiguration but harboring, within its very essence, a latent potentiality akin to a genuine virtuality. This latent potentiality, akin to a tangible yet unrealized force, possesses the inherent capacity to disrupt and overturn the established norms of the field against which it emerges. The rupture, in its virtual actuality, embodies an intrinsic propensity to challenge, subvert, and reconfigure the intellectual landscape that precedes it. This conceptualization underscores the revolutionary nature of psychoanalysis, positioned as a disruptive force capable of reshaping the intellectual contours of the scientific field from which it diverges.

The foundational underpinning of the pedagogical framework discussed herein resides in the conceptualization of the word as a sign manifesting a fundamental human need. Implied within this construct is an intricate philosophy of language wherein the sign is construed as an expression of an individual's psychological subjectivity, delineated by exigencies. "Freud was constantly engaged in a search for a connection between intellectual desire and speech, and how this concern with linguistic usage spread to others" (Petocz 183). The utilization of language is thus perceived as a systematic deployment of signs functioning as mediators for the articulation of these inherent needs. The overarching philosophy of language embedded in this narrative revolves around the individuation of the subject through the prism of their needs. Language, in this schema, is construed as a system of signs intricately linked to the subject, with communication serving as a conduit between two subjects, facilitated by the direct correspondence of signs with their referents. However, a critical inflection emerges in the subsequent examination of this linguistic paradigm. The deviation from the anticipated outcome prompts a reevaluation of the initially posited philosophy of language. The utterance, described as a vocal sign denoting possession, is deemed futile in fostering relationality due to its inherent lack of utility vis-à-vis the individual's needs. The author posits that this utterance is susceptible to numerous anomalies, tethered to the transient and variable nature of the associated affective states, rendering it inconsequential and, ultimately, disregarded.

In a psychoanalytic context, the enigmatic articulations may be construed as symbolic manifestations of repressed desires or latent memories, echoing the psychoanalytic tenet that language serves as a repository of unconscious material. Philosophically, the observed linguistic

anomalies prompt contemplation on the nature of language as a medium of intersubjective understanding. “Lacan believes that without language everything must remain not only unobservable but undifferentiated, without structure: and since (as Freud demonstrates) the unconscious is highly structured, it cannot exist before language does” (Cameron 20).²⁷ The divergence from the anticipated efficacy of language in mediating needs raises questions regarding the inherent limitations of linguistic expression in encapsulating subjective experiences. The ephemeral and variable nature of the linguistic sign, as underscored by the fleeting pleasure associated with it, underscores the intricate interplay between language and affect, challenging the presumed stability of linguistic symbols. In scrutinizing the interpretive framework underpinning the process of humanization in the biological subject, a comprehensive ideological apparatus unfolds, tethered to a psychological subject shaped by his primal needs. Within this paradigm, language is relegated to the status of a mere theory of the sign, functioning as an intermediary between the subject’s needs and the tangible entities these needs are anchored to. The conceptualization posits an intricate interplay wherein language, as a communicative conduit, becomes the means by which a child acquires the desired object through interaction with another agent. In this schema, need is both determined and expressed through a linguistic sign, transacted through an intermediary, thereby establishing a direct nexus between the thing sought and the communicative act. This circularity ostensibly completes the communicative circuit, yet it unveils the presence of two distinct subjects: the one vocalizing (the uttering subject) and the one comprehending language, ushering forth a distinctive linguistic milieu characterized by an unequivocal correspondence between the sign and the signified, the signifier and the thing signified.

Embedded within this ideological backdrop is an imaginative apparatus, a figurative machinery wherein two subjects purportedly communicate through language as a conduit, an instrumentality emblematic of signifying the sought-after entity. This construct fundamentally hinges on a fusion of subjectivity and needs, positing their conflation as the linchpin for effective communication. It

²⁷ “Lacan reasons that the unconscious must in fact be constructed through language, as language develops in the child. This process governs and differentiates what is, before language, a mass of instinctual drives, an ‘hommelette’ (little man (sic)/omelet) spreading in all directions. For Lacan, then, it is learning language that makes us what we are; and since our sexuality and gender identity is an important component of what we are, ...” (Cameron 20)

is within this theoretical matrix that the rupture within modern linguistics manifests, an epochal schism strategically seized upon by Lacan. The pivotal deviation lies in the horizontal flattening of the two subjects in their alterity, subjects invariably delineated by their exigencies. This conflation, wherein the subject and their needs undergo a troubling identity, converges with the identity attributed to the sign and its signified. The confluence of these parallel identities forms an overarching structure encapsulating a shared problematic, serving as the foundation upon which the psychological subject is delineated. The recourse to an imaginary mechanism, a conjectural theory embraced by Itard, underscores the attempt to imbue the nascent biological entity with the qualities befitting a psychological subject. However, the efficacy of this endeavor is conspicuously flawed. Despite Itard's earnest endeavors, the theoretical framework's efficacy falters, leading to an empirical observation of aberrant phenomena. An expression, ostensibly meaningless within the prescribed ideological contours, takes on significance as it becomes intertwined with manifestations of joy. A theatrical spectacle ensues, accompanied by the enigmatic presence of a specific young girl, whose association with certain utterances eludes the theoretical grasp of Itard. These anomalous occurrences, while dismissed as aberrations within the predetermined theoretical schema, remain unassimilated into the overarching conceptual framework.

In the realm of analytic practice, the psychoanalyst grapples with what can be designated as the indelible imprints of an archeology, wherein the subject under therapeutic scrutiny bears the presently extant residues of the pivotal juncture in the integration of the nascent human entity into the cultural milieu. Lacan, in emphasizing this intricate process, unveils a seminal revelation: the transformative journey labeled as "passage from the biological to the cultural" is, in reality, an outcome orchestrated by the agency of the cultural impacting the biological. This seminal insight necessitates a nuanced reevaluation of the conventional representation of the trajectory "biology → culture," urging the recognition of an alternative structure wherein culture actively engenders the progression, signifying a profound inversion in the dynamics of determination. It is through the ceaseless influence of culture upon the embryonic biological entity that the intricate process of integration into the cultural matrix unfolds, redirecting attention from the purported becoming-human of the individual to the continuous agency of

culture molding the incipient being into a human subject. This paradigm thereby reveals itself as a phenomenon of investment ostensibly directed towards culture, but in reality, it is culture that consistently precedes itself, assimilating the being destined for human subjectivity.

A consequential corollary emerging from Lacan's reflective discourse posits that antecedent to the emergence of the little human being's becoming-human lies not within the realms of psychology or the psychological subject, but rather within the domain he terms as "the order of the symbolic," or, more expansively, the law of culture. In elucidating this proposition, it becomes imperative to underscore its profound implications, particularly by juxtaposing it against the conceptual backdrop it challenges. This fundamental revelation stands in stark opposition to a pervasive problematic entrenched in an ideology, as exemplified in the context of Itard, encapsulating the psychological development of the incipient biological entity. The central issue, resonating with the philosophical quandaries of the eighteenth century, revolves around the transition from a purported state of nature to the complex sociocultural state. This age-old conundrum, critiqued with acumen by Rousseau, delineates a paradoxical ideology encapsulating the transition as a shift from one discrete state to another. Rousseau, in his critique of Hobbes, unveils the ideological circularity enshrined in this conception, dismantling the veracity of a linear progression between these ostensibly distinct states. However, "it is perfectly possible to prove or disprove statements, issues of objectivity must be framed within the established structure" (Smith 94). In scrutinizing Lacan's groundbreaking insights, it becomes manifest that this revolutionary perspective obviates the simplistic dichotomy inherent in the nature-culture problematic. By foregrounding the law of culture as the harbinger of the humanizing process, Lacan redirects attention from the myopic fixation on the psychological subject, undermining the erstwhile prevailing paradigm that sought to delineate a clear demarcation between nature and culture.²⁸ The intellectual gravity of this perspective extends beyond the confines of psychoanalysis, resonating with broader philosophical discourses and compelling a reevaluation

²⁸ "Psychoanalysis reminds us of how certain fixations inspire neuroses, whether it is Freud's fixation on the oral stage of development of Lacan's fixation on the premirror stage. Fixations have a way of fragmenting reality on account of the myopic inability to see the broader, all-encompassing picture, the "forest for the trees." Fixations can thus be intellectual in that they adversely affect our levels of understanding." (Brannigan 44-5)

of entrenched conceptual frameworks pertaining to the intricate interplay between human development and cultural instantiation.

Rousseau's critique of Hobbes and the natural-law philosophers pivots on their purportedly fallacious conceptualization of a being situated in the state of nature. Rousseau contends that these philosophers, Hobbes emblematic among them, err by ostensibly imagining an entity devoid of cultural attributes, whereas, in actuality, they project onto the state of nature the intricate structures endemic to the societal milieu. Specifically articulated in Rousseau's introductory exposition in his *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality Among Men*, this criticism resonates profoundly, revealing a perennial truth that remains pertinent even in contemporary discourse. Rousseau astutely exposes the fallacy of envisaging the transition from nature to society through a lens that articulates the conditions of societal existence in a form purged of societal characteristics. The subject, posited as "man in the state of nature," is erroneously endowed with attributes, latent or actualized, intrinsically tied to a subject forged within the cultural tapestry of society. A noteworthy evolution within Rousseau's thought, as exemplified in the second *Discourse*, marks a departure from conceiving the problem of transition solely in individualistic terms. Departing from Condillac's individual-centric inquiry into the developmental trajectory of a given individual, Rousseau shifts the paradigm to contemplate societal development as a collective phenomenon. In this profound shift, he perceives the enduring antecedence of culture or society in relation to its own cultural evolution, acknowledging that society perennially precedes itself. This pivotal truth, which Rousseau later abandons in his pursuit of representing the political and social ideal in the form of a natural man, resonates profoundly in Lacan's reflections. The perpetual antecedence of culture with respect to itself is encapsulated by the symbol of the circle, a representation of this self-predication intrinsic to cultural development.

In exploring into Lacan's contribution, it becomes apparent that psychoanalysis grapples not with the direct observation of the antecedence of culture at the moment of the infant's transition to humanhood, but rather with subsequent phenomena embedded within a cultural milieu. Analytic therapy is directed towards individuals who have traversed the threshold of infancy, emphasizing the complexities associated with the first recurrence of becoming-human. Lacan

discerns the fallacy in classical psychoanalytic theory, rooted in a psychological paradigm, particularly evident in the challenges posed by the recollection phenomenon within therapeutic processes. The perennial conundrums surrounding the reality of recollections, such as the primal scene, abreaction, and regression, arise from the failure to recognize that analytic practice unfolds within a culturally constituted world, within subjects already entrenched within a determined societal and cultural framework. Lacan's critical gaze exposes the inherent pitfalls of neglecting the cultural context within psychoanalytic theory, elucidating that the intricacies of recollection, abreaction, and regression are not genuine problems between the biological and the psychological. Instead, they stem from the oversight that the cultural precession in the human development narrative is inherently entrenched within culture itself. The conceptualization of the identity of signification inherent in the precession of culture within the domain of analytic therapy confronts an inherent complexity when juxtaposed with the retrospective localization ascribed to recollection, abreaction, regression, and analogous phenomena concerning the maturation of the little biological being. Lacan posits that the development of the subject involves the invocation of the signification of the phallus solely through what he terms a metaphor, specifically the paternal metaphor. This metaphor encompasses the assignment of procreative capabilities to the symbolic entity known as the Name-of-the-Father and the ascription of meaning to the paternal relationship. Symbolic identification, a crucial aspect, unfolds through the intricate process of introjecting the unitary characteristic of the symbolic Father. It is essential to note that this process of introjection is inherently symbolic and is invariably accompanied by a symbolic denomination (Campbell 67-8). This predicament proves insurmountable within the confines of a conventional psychological theory of the unconscious. Lacan, however, adeptly navigates and resolves this quandary by elucidating that the possibility of recurrence is intricately linked to the persistent relationships forged during the cultural development of the individual, commencing from childhood and extending through the linguistic conditions that sustain this persistence, the symbolic order, whose explication necessitates subsequent clarification.

The viability of such recurrence, in contradistinction to the constraints inherent in a psychological subject's conception of temporality, becomes comprehensible by recognizing that

it is ensconced within the conditions of possibility governed not by social memory frameworks, as understood by Halbwachs, but rather by the structural framework of the symbolic, tethered to the model of language. The cultural development of the individual, transformed from a little biological being into an adult seeking therapy, adheres to this condition of possibility as an intrinsic facet of its own temporal unfolding. It is on this foundation that one can apprehend the intricate relationships between psychoanalysis and psychology, elucidating the paradoxical nature of their coexistence and the persisting misunderstandings that ensue. The dialogue between psychoanalysis and psychology unfolds within a paradoxical milieu. The emergence of psychoanalysis as a scientific discipline, inevitably compelled to articulate itself within an established terminological framework, generates an ambiguous situation. This predicament exposes the temptation for psychoanalysis to either succumb to the preexisting background or, conversely, for the established ideological framework to assimilate and dilute the distinctiveness of psychoanalytic tenets. This delineation forms the second facet of this exposition, with a particular focus on psychology. Herein, two instances of psychology's endeavors to assimilate psychoanalysis serve as illuminating examples, inviting schematic reflection on the nature of this assimilative psychology.

In examining psychology's attempts to digest psychoanalysis, the inherent tensions and contradictions come to the fore. This assimilation is not a seamless process but rather an ideological negotiation fraught with complexities. The dialectic between psychoanalysis and psychology necessitates critical scrutiny to unveil the subtle maneuvers and consequences of such assimilative efforts. The ensuing analysis will unravel the contours of this intricate relationship, providing insight into the broader philosophical and epistemological implications that underpin the convergence and divergence of these two domains of inquiry. Anna Freud's endeavor to integrate psychoanalysis into psychology reveals an attempt to assimilate the tenets of psychoanalysis within preexisting psychological paradigms. The essence of her conceptual framework can be succinctly characterized as an endeavor to conceive psychoanalysis as the interiority intrinsic to the biological or psychological domain, with the ultimate objective of establishing a relationship with the social sphere. In this assimilation, conventional categories are retained, albeit with a noteworthy modification wherein the psychological subject is reconfigured

as possessing a biological interiority, an internal realm encompassing the "id," instincts, drives, and proclivities, which, in turn, forms the basis for subsequent engagement with society.²⁹ This assimilative effort introduces a conceptual dichotomy within Anna Freud's theory. The psychological subject, according to her, undergoes a bifurcation, epitomized by the id, characterized as the biological component housing instincts and drives, and the ego, positioned in a conflict-ridden relationship with the id. Anna Freud describes "the ego as 'the seat of observation', i.e. that part of the personality which scans the internal world, thoughts, wishes, feelings and impulses arising from the id, as well as the superego's reactions to these. The ego also anticipates reactions from people in the external world, and the likely results of expression of these id manifestations" (Edgcombe 12-3). The ego, tasked with the arduous responsibility of defending itself against the id's aggression and excesses, also navigates a complex interplay with the external reality. This external reality assumes a dual nature: it encompasses the perceived reality—the objective world with its norms and ethics—mirrored in the form of the superego. The superego, in turn, articulates and imposes the moral imperatives dictated by the societal environment upon the individual personality. The central tenet of Anna Freud's theory resides in the notion of a double personality, a duality comprised of the id, characterized as the biological domain of instincts and drives, and the ego, engaged in a perpetual struggle to mediate between the id and external reality. This struggle unfolds within a subject governed by three agencies, the id, the ego, and the superego. The introduction of these dimensions within the subject constitutes an expansion of the interiority, presenting them as mere reflections or repercussions stemming from the enduring centrality of the ego. A critical assessment of Anna Freud's assimilation of psychoanalysis into psychology underscores the persistence of a conceptual locus, the ego. The

²⁹ The dialectics of psychology and psychoanalysis engender a dynamic interplay between distinct theoretical frameworks and methodologies, enriching our comprehension of human behavior and mental processes. In this discourse, key psychological subjects come to the forefront. Psychology, with its emphasis on observable phenomena, scrutinizes conscious mental processes and behavior, exploring the intricate interplay between nature and nurture. In contrast, psychoanalysis delves into the depths of the unconscious mind, spotlighting hidden motives, desires, and unresolved conflicts, with a primary focus on early childhood experiences. The dichotomy extends to therapeutic approaches, where psychology employs techniques like cognitive-behavioral therapy, while psychoanalysis utilizes methods such as free association and dream analysis to unveil unconscious content. Developmental psychology in the broader field charts the stages of human growth, while psychoanalysis, pioneered by Freud, accentuates psychosexual stages and the enduring impact of childhood conflicts on adult personality. Despite these disparities, contemporary psychology increasingly adopts an eclectic stance, incorporating elements from various theoretical perspectives, acknowledging the enduring influence of psychoanalysis. This ongoing dialogue between psychology and psychoanalysis not only underscores their complementary strengths but also contributes to a nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the intricacies of the human psyche.

ego, construed as the central subject, grapples with the intricate task of synthesizing theoretical and practical dimensions while confronting the antagonistic forces of the id and societal reality. The theoretical dimension encapsulates the perceived reality and ethical norms, and the practical dimension involves the ego's attempts to maintain its position amidst the onslaughts from the id and social reality.

A distinctive focus within Anna Freud's framework revolves around the elucidation of "the ego's defense mechanisms." This emphasis entails an exploration of the mechanisms through which the subject endeavors to preserve its centrality within the ego, thereby fostering a synthesis that simultaneously addresses theoretical reasoning and practical considerations. The preoccupation with the "ego's defense mechanisms" reflects a broader trend within psychoanalysis centered on the subject's strategies for self-preservation, encapsulating both theoretical and practical facets. The psychologizing reinterpretation of psychoanalysis, exemplified by theorists like Anna Freud and Lagache, engenders profound technical ramifications, notably emphasizing the paramount importance of analyzing resistances. This emphasis underscores the significance of scrutinizing the defense mechanisms employed by the ego to fortify itself against external aggressions, particularly those posed by the psychoanalyst, perceived as a potent ego capable of jeopardizing the internal equilibrium of the ego's unity. The psychologization of psychoanalysis, as critiqued by Lacan, converges towards a theory that accentuates the protective functions of the ego, leading to intricate consequences that veer towards obscurity, especially concerning the potential interaction between the ego's mechanisms and those of the id. Anna Freud's approach, rooted in an antiquated psychology, positions the ego as a moral subject contending with a dichotomy between its internal dimensions and the external objectivity of societal norms. This classical psychological framework, predicated on a duality between the subject's interiority and the external world, effectively dissolves key tenets of Freudian theory. Anna Freud's work results in a perplexing dissolution of psychoanalytic principles, culminating in an uncertain delineation of the possibilities for interaction between the ego and the id.

Lagache's interpretation of Lacan, grounded in a philosophy of existence, consciousness, and intentionality, represents a departure from the classical psychological paradigm championed by

Anna Freud. Lagache's efforts, while purportedly highlighting Lacan's deobjectification³⁰ of psychology, inadvertently misconstrue Lacan's actual intent—a nuanced elaboration of objectivity as a prerequisite for understanding subjectivity. This misinterpretation is particularly ironic, as Lacan's central contribution lies in refining objectivity, rather than dismissing it. An intriguing facet emerges in Lagache's response to Lacan, where he formulates a theory of the doctor-patient relationship within psychoanalysis as a "two-body psychology." This conception underscores a shift towards intersubjectivity, introducing a novel kind of subjectivity—one not bound by the biological backdrop emphasized by Anna Freud, but rather a subject imbued with meaning. Lagache's departure from Anna Freud aligns with his pursuit of a psychology of intentionality, dissolving the structures delineated by Lacan into mere structures of meaning, indicative of a pronounced shift towards a psychology rooted in the conscious realm. The connection between Lagache and Politzer further illustrates this departure from Freudian structures, as they collectively endeavor to supplant the structures of the Freudian unconscious with a psychology grounded in first-person drama—a psychology attuned to the conscious realm. This intellectual trajectory accentuates the transformation of psychoanalytic discourse into a psychology of consciousness, echoing historical attempts to reconcile psychoanalysis with prevailing psychological paradigms.

Lacan's fundamental critique of psychology's attempts to assimilate psychoanalysis revolves around two central points. Firstly, he underscores a persistent confusion inherent in these efforts, an entanglement between the subject and the ego. This confusion, according to Lacan, reflects a misunderstanding of the ego's role within the subject, specifically its function of recognition and

³⁰ "...the desires to poison, fragment and destroy the mother's body constitute the process of deobjectification, a process which has a physical reality." (Brennan 100) Lacan introduces the concept of "deobjectification" as part of his theoretical framework that synthesizes Freudian psychoanalysis with structural linguistics. Lacan's ideas on deobjectification are deeply rooted in his emphasis on language and the symbolic order. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, individuals are considered to be subjects constituted by language, and the process of deobjectification involves disentangling oneself from the fixed and object-like images or representations that language imposes. According to Lacan, the entry into the symbolic order through language entails a fundamental loss—the loss of a perceived unity or completeness. The subject becomes fragmented, and desires are shaped within a linguistic and symbolic context. Deobjectification, in Lacanian terms, involves recognizing and grappling with this lack, which is essential for the development of subjectivity. From a broader psychological perspective, Lacan's emphasis on deobjectification underscores the intricate interplay between language, subjectivity, and the symbolic structures that shape human experience, inviting a reconsideration of traditional notions of self and identity in the context of linguistic and symbolic frameworks.

misapprehension. Secondly, Lacan contends that the psychology underpinning attempts to refute psychoanalysis is marred by a conflation of structure and meaning. This confusion becomes conceivable only within the framework of a philosophy rooted in consciousness. The crux of Lacan's objection lies in the fact that when psychoanalysis is reduced to the typical structure of psychology, the profound nature of the unconscious becomes obscured. The core theme of Lacan's criticism can be succinctly articulated: the reduction of psychoanalysis to the conventional structure of psychology results in a loss of comprehension regarding the essence of the unconscious. In this reductionist endeavor, the unconscious is either relegated to the realm of a biological id—an entity falling short of the elusive subjectivity intrinsic to the subject—or is construed merely as the experienced but concealed sense, at constant risk of devolving into the nonsensical within the intentional confines of consciousness. This critical perspective hinges on the detrimental nature of centering the subject on the ego, effectively subjecting the structure of the subject to the imaginary contours of the ego. Consequently, as the unconscious becomes immanent to the psychological subject, it forfeits its essential dimension of transcendence—a transcendence evident in Freud's own works, wherein the unconscious is sought as something beyond the subject, extending into a realm beyond the confines of the psychological subject.

Modern psychology, particularly within the frameworks of Sartrean or Politzerian perspectives, seeks this transcendence in intersubjectivity.³¹ Lacan contends that this quest for the transcendence of the unconscious, manifested as immanence within the alter ego, is situated at the very crux of the issue. The transcendental intersubjectivity, which assumes the role of the unconscious in such psychological paradigms, mirrors the structure of the psychological subject.³² In both cases—whether dealing with the internalization of the unconscious in

³¹ According to Sartre, individuals are inextricably linked to others, and their sense of self is not only shaped by internal consciousness but significantly influenced by external perceptions. "Being-for-Others" posits that the gaze of others objectifies and evaluates us, leading to a heightened self-awareness based on external judgments. This constant scrutiny, known as "the look," can create a sense of alienation as individuals grapple with societal expectations and external definitions of identity. Sartre's exploration of intersubjectivity underscores the complexities of maintaining authenticity within a social context that seeks to shape and define individuals, contributing to the ongoing discourse in philosophy and psychology on the interplay between individual subjectivity and social construction.

³² In Husserl's phenomenology, transcendental subjectivity refers to the foundational and irreducible nature of consciousness in constituting the world. The transcendental ego, as Husserl posits, is the source of all meaning and intentionality, actively shaping and giving sense to our experiences. Zahavi, in his work on phenomenology, particularly in "Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective," further explores the dynamic

biological or meaningful terms, or grappling with recognition and its transcendence within a framework of transcendental intersubjectivity, the underlying structure remains consistent. It is a structure in which the authentic configuration of the subject succumbs to the illusory framework of the ego, epitomizing the pitfalls of a centered structure. The conceptual underpinning of psychology hinges on a trio of foundational structures, the individual, the subject, and the ego. However, a meticulous examination of these terms reveals disparities in status, content, and significance. The individual, a concept rooted in biology or societal functions, holds distinct meanings in different domains such as biological classification and social role distribution. The subject, in the context of psychology, deviates from its conventional use, signifying an entity subjected to external orders and imputations, thereby requiring justification for its actions. This inversion introduces a paradox within psychology, originating from its overtly political origins, as the subject, conventionally an active agent, now assumes a position of subjugation to external directives. The third term, the ego, embarks on a trajectory intrinsically tied to a philosophical problematic that emerged in the seventeenth century. The ego is associated with truth, objectivity, and a synthesis function. It reflects a shift towards subjectivity as a veritative entity, a subject of objectivity. Consequently, the triadic synthesis of the biological individual, subjected subject, and veritative ego lays the groundwork for the possibility of psychology. Yet, delving deeper into the conditions facilitating the emergence of psychology unveils intriguing phenomena. Psychology materializes as an ancillary outcome of political, moral, or philosophical ideologies. This by-product assumes a dual nature: it can manifest either as a normative pathology, revealing the pathos and deficiencies of the originating ideology, or as a mirror foundation, a reflective support system reinforcing the ideological framework from which it stems.

In dissecting the roots of psychology, it becomes evident that its very existence is intricately entwined with ideological underpinnings. It is both shaped by and shapes the ideological

nature of Husserl's transcendental subjectivity. Zahavi emphasizes the pre-reflective and embodied aspects of subjectivity, highlighting how consciousness is inherently directed toward the world in a pre-reflective manner before explicit reflection occurs. This nuanced understanding contributes to the ongoing discourse on the nature of subjectivity, offering insights into the lived experience and the intricate interplay between consciousness and the objects it intends. Zahavi's work underscores the importance of recognizing the pre-reflective dimension of consciousness in comprehending the richness of human subjectivity within the framework of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology.

landscape, either reflecting the flaws and pathologies inherent in the originating ideology or serving as a reflective mirror that reinforces and sustains the ideological foundations. This nuanced interplay between psychology and ideology unveils the complex dynamics shaping the theoretical underpinnings of psychological discourse. It is paradoxical to invoke psychology in the context of Plato, given that psychology, as a distinct discipline, was not thematized during the classical period of the Greek philosopher. Nonetheless, even in this early era of Greek philosophy, foundational structures were established, later becoming integral conditions for the emergence of psychology. In examining Plato's notable work, *The Republic*, the tripartite division of classes mirrors a corresponding tripartite division within the individual subject. Plato posits that deciphering the nature of man can be more effectively achieved by scrutinizing the structure of society—an approach likened to reading a text in capital letters rather than small letters. Plato's examination of the human subject reveals a tripartite structure comprising the *epithumía* (appetitive desires), *thumós* (spirited element), and *noûs* (reason). This human subject, delineated by a tripartite structure, emerges as a by-product of Plato's endeavor to address political issues. It simultaneously reflects these political concerns within the individual while presenting itself as the solution and foundation of these issues. This conceptualization constitutes a foundational pathology—a proposition that the existence of three agencies within man (*epithumía*, *thumós*, and *noûs*) provides the basis for establishing a genuine order in society or, conversely, the potential for disorder. The transfer of this difficulty, presented as a solution, leads to paralogisms evident in the details of *The Republic*.³³ Each individual is reduced to one function of the tripartite structure based on their assigned class, creating a contradiction between the structure of the human being and the societal functions they are meant to fulfill. Plato's resolution involves substituting the tripartite structure with a hierarchical arrangement of functions within the human subject. This immediate infusion of moral considerations into a prospective psychology serves to justify political pathologies, rationalizing the divergence of the

³³ In Plato's philosophical perspective, particularly articulated in his dialogue *Timaeus*, he introduces a tripartite division of the human soul comprising *epithumía* (appetitive), *thumós* (spirited), and *noûs* (rational) components. *Epithumía* encapsulates basic desires and bodily needs, *thumós* embodies emotions and courage, while *noûs* represents reason and intellect. Plato's psychology suggests a hierarchical structure where reason ideally governs over the appetitive and spirited elements. This tripartite division serves as the foundation for his ethical and political philosophy, as seen in "The Republic," where the harmonious and just individual aligns desires and emotions with rational principles. This influential framework has significantly shaped Western discussions on human nature, soul, and the interplay between reason, emotions, and desires in the pursuit of virtue and justice.

social order from its ideal state. Within Cartesian philosophy, the role of establishing the structure of the ego unfolds with distinctive features. The possibility of psychology in Cartesian philosophy doesn't align with a psychology of the ego cogito, as the ego is cast here as a subject of objectivity, synonymous with a subject of truth. Rather, psychology, in Descartes, finds its ground as a pathology, a counterpart to normalcy that legitimizes the ego's exercise of objectivity. Descartes shapes psychology to account for error, confusion, and inattention, elements constituting the flip side of the ego's rightful engagement with objectivity.

In Descartes, the psychological subject, preconditioning the subject of objectivity, is framed as a subject of error capable of transforming into a subject of objectivity. The ego's veritative functions determine negatively the fundamental functions of the psychological subject, including memory, attention, haste, prejudice, imagination, and feeling. These categories become avenues through which Descartes envisions the possible pathology inherent in the flip side of the subject's normalcy. Descartes's *Traité des passions de l'âme* serves as a treatise on theoretical pathology, exploring gnoseopathology while simultaneously articulating an ideal normality.³⁴ The psychological subject becomes the arena where the interplay between the subject of truth and the subject of error unfolds. Concepts like attention and freedom play pivotal roles in shaping the psychological subject's destiny, a destiny existing in the shadow of the subject of objectivity, embodying both its flip side and its potential.

In Spinoza's framework, the imaginary ceases to be a mere psychological function but emerges as an element, a totality that integrates psychological functions and constitutes them. The distinction of kinds of knowledge in Spinoza, especially the treatment of imagination, suggests a departure from psychological subjectivity toward a more expansive notion of the imaginary.

³⁴ The term "gnoseopathology" in relation to René Descartes can be understood within the context of his philosophical inquiries into the nature of knowledge and the mind. Descartes, a pivotal figure in the history of modern philosophy, is renowned for his methodical doubt and the foundational statement "Cogito, ergo sum" (I think, therefore I am). His exploration of epistemology and the reliability of knowledge led to a foundational dualism between mind and body. The concept of gnoseopathology, in this context, could be interpreted as an investigation into the potential pathologies or distortions in the process of acquiring knowledge. Descartes' emphasis on clear and distinct ideas, his skepticism toward sensory perception, and the separation of mind from body all contribute to a framework where errors in cognition and understanding could be seen as deviations from a rational and clear thought process. This perspective sets the stage for later discussions on the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, offering insights into the potential pitfalls and limitations in the human pursuit of knowledge as elucidated by Descartes' methodical and systematic approach to understanding the self and the world.

Spinoza's focus on historical existence as an exemplary instance of imagination positions it as a world rather than a psychological function. This potential shift in the problematic of the psychological subject in Spinoza challenges the cogito and may signify a refutation of the psychological subject's traditional framework. The disappearance of the subject of truth or objectivity in Spinoza's work could signal a critique of the cogito and an entry into a realm beyond conventional psychology. In the philosophical realm of Descartes, the emergence of a psychological subject is intricately linked to a fundamental problematic that pits truth against error. This dialectic, constituting the crux of Descartes's philosophy, not only serves as the bedrock for the entire Western philosophical tradition but also becomes the focus of Spinoza's later critique. However, this critique, though historically submerged, might hold an enduring relevance that has yet to resurface overtly. The question that looms large is why, within Descartes's framework, truth finds expression in the form of the ego and why the constitution of truth demands the emergence of a subject of truth. This phenomenon, pivotal in the genesis of Western philosophy, sets the stage for Spinoza's critical engagement.

Descartes's problematic, inherently polarizing truth and error, seems to impose the necessity of a subject of truth. The concepts of truth and error act as crucial markers encapsulating the demand for the subject of truth. The very core of this demand lies in the notions of truth and error themselves. Error, in Descartes's philosophy, assumes the role of the negative counterpart of truth—a nonconcept construed not in its specificity but as the nonconcept of the concept. It is crucial to recognize that error, in Descartes's conception, is considered only in relation to truth, reflective of a truth projected onto error without delving into the dynamics of their relationship. Error, according to Descartes, is the mere exterior, the exclusion from truth—a consequence of judgment that, in turn, operates as a dividing force. The relation of error to truth, conceived as a dividing up, equates to a judgment, a decision between truth and error without probing the foundational act establishing this division. The philosophy of judgment, inherent in Descartes's thought, seems intimately tied to a specific negative relation between truth and error—a relation perceived as a dividing up rather than a scission. This philosophy of judgment is inseparable from a particular type of relationship between truth and error, a relationship conceptualized as a dividing up rather than a scission. In this context, the emergence of the subject as a subject of

truth becomes inevitable. The act of judgment, signifying the decision between two values without a thorough examination of the foundation of this distinction, forms the basis for establishing the category of the subject as a subject of truth. Descartes's philosophy reflects not only the clarity of truth but also the shadows of confusion and error that precede it. The subject, within this framework, becomes both the pathology of the subject of truth and its contingent precondition. Descartes, in contemplating the whole history preceding him, reflects upon the confusion and error embedded in the philosophical discourse.

The profound question then arises: Why did a philosophy of judgment, entailing a negative relation between truth and error and founded on a dividing up rather than a scission, become a necessary precursor to the category of the subject as a subject of truth? The correlation between truth and error, leading to a philosophy of judgment, inevitably paves the way for a philosophy of the subject—a subject that assumes the role of arbiter between truth and error. This raises the overarching query regarding the imperative for the subject of truth to be conceived as essential in grasping the distinction between truth and error. The heart of this issue lies in the conceptualization of error as the antithesis of truth—a pure negation. The failure to critically examine the scission between truth and error, portraying it instead as a dividing up, propels the emergence of the subject of truth. The entire edifice of Descartes's philosophy hinges on this crucial distinction, where the subject of truth becomes a necessary entity to mediate and arbitrate within the dichotomy of truth and error. In a retrospective examination of epistemology, a discernible distinction emerges whereby we can analytically delineate the conditions that facilitated this differentiation. Through a historical inquiry, one can now ascertain the circumstances that made the demarcation between truth and error possible. Descartes, in his philosophical framework, ascribes a specific content to error, identified with Thomist and Aristotelian doctrines, while the truth is epitomized by the emerging Galilean physics. This historical process, however, is not scrutinized by Descartes himself, prompting the imperative for an external examination.

The genesis of this philosophical paradigm, and consequently the emergence of a subject encapsulating this judgment on the relationship between truth and error, cannot be solely attributed to Descartes' cognitive misjudgment. Rather, it necessitates an exploration of the

underlying function of illusion and the misconstrual of a historical and cultural schism—a misunderstanding constituting a transformative event in the trajectory of knowledge. It becomes imperative to proffer a hypothesis: Descartes, within the philosophy of judgment, envisaged the historical relationship between nascent and antiquated knowledge within the cultural context, framed within the category of the subject of imputation—the moral subject. This category becomes entwined with a world of moral imputation and responsibility, exemplified by the ambiguous role of the judge who condemns and excludes, yet assumes responsibility for such decisions through the attribution of rightful claims. Such a contamination of ethical categories by the moral and religious dimensions inherent in the subject of imputation represents a theoretical reflection on the inception of a new scientific discipline. This complex intertwining could serve as the focal point for an in-depth historical analysis. It prompts an exploration into why Descartes found it imperative for a subject of objectivity to shoulder the responsibility for conceptualizing a historical event—a facet stemming, perhaps, from his reluctance to scrutinize and critique the objective social structure of the world in which he found himself. This lacuna, evident in his failure to subject the social structure to a moral imputation judgment, unveils a potential historical oversight. Furthermore, the divergence in approach becomes apparent when contrasting Descartes with Spinoza. The latter manages to evade the categorization of the subject of imputation projected onto the subject of objectivity, precisely because he critiques the moral world in his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*. In dismantling the identification of subjects and critiquing the constitution of the subject as imposed by the structure of the imaginary, Spinoza unveils a social structure inherently reliant on the production of such subjects for its sustenance.

Commencing in the eighteenth century, the genesis of psychology is intricately entwined with a recurrent schema, as this epoch marks the true inception of psychological inquiry. An exploration into the constitution of the psychological subject during this period reveals an unmistakable alignment with the prevailing philosophy of the eighteenth century, notably sensualist empiricism. A discernible pattern emerges, illustrating that the delineation of the psychological subject, its functions, and the parameters of psychological study are decisively shaped by the philosophical underpinnings of sensualist empiricism. Psychology transcends its conventional role as the mere pathology of a subject of truth. Instead, it metamorphoses into the

philosophical equivalent, seamlessly amalgamating with the tenets of sensualist empiricist philosophy. The critical juncture arises from the philosophy's propensity to conflate the subjects of truth and error within its theory of the empiricist subject. This conflation serves as the impetus for a transformative redefinition of psychology. No longer confined to the realm of pathology, psychology becomes intricately interwoven with philosophy itself. The crux of this transformation lies in the elevation of fundamental philosophical quandaries into the domain of psychology. The epoch witnesses the assimilation of the foundational problems of perception and sensation into psychology, not as mere pathological inquiries but as quintessential questions of philosophical bedrock. Concurrently, the burgeoning influence of natural sciences and neurophysiology solidifies psychology's integral connection to physiology. The study of foundations becomes inseparable from the perceptual functions ascribed to the subject by the empiricist sensualist theory of knowledge. An intriguing facet deserving of scholarly scrutiny within this correlation is the role of language. As alluded to earlier, language assumes paramount significance, emerging as an indispensable element in the comprehensive framework of eighteenth-century empiricist sensualist epistemology. It is cast as the linchpin, tasked with constituting the very possibility of objective discourse. Additionally, language is charged with the responsibility of resolving inherent problems projected onto the psychological subject, meticulously instituted by the philosophical tenets of empiricist thought. This historical juncture beckons for a nuanced examination, probing into the multifaceted interplay between philosophical currents, psychological redefinition, and the instrumental role of language in shaping the trajectory of knowledge during the eighteenth century. Psychology manifests itself as the intricate interplay between pathos and theoretical, moral, political, or religious dimensions. On one facet, it stands as the very pathology embedded within these domains, and on the other, it assumes the role of a foundational pathology capable of metamorphosing into normalcy. This duality underscores psychology's capacity to serve as a reflective mirror wherein the subject of objectivity contemplates the potentiality of deviating from its inherent nature while concurrently contemplating the potentiality of embodying its essence. Within this intricate phenomenon, psychology undertakes a prescribed function that the theoretical subject finds untenable under prevailing conditions. It operates as a delegated agent, assuming the responsibilities bestowed upon it by the theoretical, moral, religious, or political subject. In these instances, psychology

encapsulates a profound mirroring function, portraying a reflection fraught with nuances of misapprehension veiled within the guise of comprehension.

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