

## Derrida's Economimesis

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### Abstract

This article presents an interpretive reading of Jacques Derrida's essay "Economimesis." "Economimesis" constitutes a complex interweaving of production and mimesis within the domain of aesthetics, demonstrating intricate connections to politics and political economy. The study examines the alliance between production and mimesis in Derrida's engagement with Kant's third *Critique*. It contends that Derrida's exploration of "economimesis" provides a novel hermeneutical framework for understanding the complexities of aesthetic production, reception, and consumption. Moreover, it argues that this conceptual apparatus provides a glimpse into the broader power dynamics and economic imperatives underpinning the creation and circulation of art as well.

**Key Words:** *economimesis, Derrida, Kant, mimesis, aesthetic judgment, fine-arts,*

Kantian critique of pure taste judgments is associated with "pure indeterminacy, pure morality, and empirical culturalism" (Derrida, "Economimesis" 2). This suggests a politics in play, albeit not overtly, that influences the discourse. The elements imply the presence of politics that shape the discourse surrounding art and beauty. Derrida suggests that discourses on these topics are inevitably influenced by politics and the broader context of political economy. Moreover, he traces the origins of these underlying motifs back to Plato and Aristotle, emphasizing their enduring relevance and impact. When these motifs are adopted into a new system, their functions and identities undergo transformation. The new system establishes boundaries through a set of conditions, leading to the disarray of structures and altering their perception and function. This dynamic process highlights the fluidity and evolving nature of aesthetic discourse

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discourse within the realm of politics and cultural frameworks. Discourses about art and beauty are influenced by politics and political economy.<sup>1</sup> The underlying motifs involved dates back to Plato and Aristotle. When adopted into a new system, the functions and identities of these motifs change. This system frames its limits by a set of conditions where structures are deranged, their perception and function change.

The idea of belonging subject is open to amplification and dislocation by “the structure of the *parergon*” (Derrida, “Economimesis” 2). This nudges to simulate a leadoff in instances following methods acknowledged as neither empirical nor meta-empirical. Derrida identifies two locations whose choice is driven by the concept of *economimesis*. There does not appear to be a link between *mimesis* and *oiknomia*. *Oikonomia* involves not only the circulation of capital and signs but also the regulation of the community and processes of multiplication and publication (Genbauer and Wulf 302). Kant’s aesthetic philosophy primarily focuses on the subjective experience of beauty and the creation of art, rather than addressing economic and social aspects in the same breadth. It centers on the subjective experience of beauty and the creation of art as its primary focus, placing less emphasis on addressing economic and social aspects in the same breadth. Aesthetic judgments are based on personal feelings of pleasure or displeasure and are not determined by objective rules or concepts. “Aesthetic judgement depends on rules but, unlike metaphysics, it cannot make them. It is only the presumed universality of the voice heard when faced with the art object that establishes the rationality of aesthetic judgements—a presumption that cannot be confirmed without contaminating taste with reason” (Wigley 161). Kant’s philosophy highlights the disinterested nature of aesthetic experience, where it is detached from personal desires or interests. *Oikonomia*, as a universal economy, encompasses not only the circulation of capital but also the circulation and regulation of signs and symbols that shape social relationships and power dynamics.<sup>2</sup> Derrida intends to demonstrate the opposite, that

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<sup>1</sup> In his comments on Kantian discourse on art and beauty, Buckman observes, “On the one hand, Kant has a very restricted view of what counts as the beautiful. In fact, he is more inclined to consider as beautiful those things that occur in nature rather than those that occur from contrivance through art. The second comment is that Kant perceives any conception of the beautiful on a purely epistemological basis lurking in the beautiful. It is precisely for these two reasons that Nietzsche is so harsh and heavy handed with his discussion of Kant as an aesthetician.” (Buckman 46)

<sup>2</sup> *Oikonomia*, conceptualized as a universal economy, extends beyond the mere circulation of capital and includes the intricate web of signification and symbol circulation that profoundly influences social relationships and power

mimesis and political economy are connected, not only through economy but can adapt to diverse political systems, including those which are opposed to each other. He does not define economy as “economy of circulation” or general economy, since the difficulty will be reduced (hypothetically) if there is no opposition between these two economies. The relationship between the two cannot be founded on identity or incongruity. Derrida challenges conventional assumptions by asserting that mimesis and political economy are not only interconnected through economic mechanisms, but are able to adapt and function within a wide range of political systems, even those that are fundamentally opposite. Rather than simply defining the economy as a “circulation economy” or a general economy, he avoids simplifying it, as this would oversimplify the complex relationship between the two. Derrida contends that the connection between mimesis and political economy cannot be defined by an identity or incongruity that is rigid. Instead, he explores the complex interplay between these concepts, emphasizing their fluidity and their ability to adapt and influence each other across diverse political and economic contexts.

As a consequence of the present economic context, each location is described in terms of economics. Every time *salary* is discussed, it is regarded as significant. Derrida mentions two remarks from Kant’s third *Critique*: a) definition of free art in opposition to mercenary art b) in Fine-Arts, mind must inhabit itself, “excite and satisfy itself without having any end [*but*] in view and independently of any salary” (Derrida, “Economimesis” 3).<sup>3</sup> Across various aspects of life, including different locations, economic considerations tend to dominate the language and discourse. The first remark interjects a definition of art in general. Kant demonstrated in that

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dynamics. In this broader understanding, *oiknomia* encompasses the ways in which signs and symbols are produced, circulated, and regulated within a society, shaping its cultural and social fabric. These signs and symbols, ranging from language and gestures to rituals and ideologies, carry meaning and communicate values, norms, and power structures. They influence how individuals perceive and interact with one another, as well as how social hierarchies and systems of control are established and maintained. *Oiknomia*, in this comprehensive sense, recognizes that the economy extends beyond financial transactions and recognizes the vital role of signs and symbols in shaping social relationships and power dynamics.

<sup>3</sup> Derrida references two remarks from Kant’s third *Critique* to shed light on this issue. Firstly, Kant distinguishes between free art, driven by intrinsic motivation, and mercenary art, motivated by financial gain, highlighting the dichotomy between artistic expression and economic considerations. Secondly, Kant emphasizes that in the realm of Fine-Arts, the mind must engage in self-reflection and seek fulfilment independently of any financial end goal or salary. Derrida's mention of these remarks serves to underscore the need to preserve the autonomy and integrity of artistic pursuits, challenging the reduction of art to mere economic transactions.

natural beauty is superior from a moral perspective through an analogy between judgment of taste and moral judgments.<sup>4</sup> This analogy facilitates an understanding of the “ciphered language” that nature articulates to us through its “beautiful forms,” the real signatures that lead us to regard nature as an art production. The analogy between art and nature provides a principle of reconciliation between them. It allows itself to be admired as art not by accident but according to a set of stipulated laws. Although, on this point, Hegel suggests the opposite, “that there is nothing beautiful other than what is art” (Derrida, “Economimesis” 4). Kant’s analogy between art and nature facilitates an understanding of nature’s inherent beauty and meaningfulness.<sup>5</sup> In his view, nature communicates with us through its “beautiful forms,” which serve as a kind of ciphered language. These beautiful forms are considered to be true signatures of nature’s artistic production. Artistic production “only resembles nature when it does not imitate nature, except when art expresses its potentiality, which is no longer imitation of natural objects but imitation of natural action” (Gyenge 120). We can appreciate nature as an art form governed by its own set of laws through the analogy between art and nature, thus providing a principle of reconciliation. The statement implies that beauty found in nature is not the result of chance or randomness, but rather of intentional aesthetic order and purpose.

According to Kant, “art is not nature,” thus endorsing to “the inherited, ossified, simplified opposition between *tekhne* and *physis*. On the side of nature is mechanical necessity; on the side of art, the play of freedom” (Derrida, “Economimesis” 4). This proposition recognizes “the intentionality of the work of art by connecting it to the concepts which guided that intentionality” (Guyer 148). Art is distinct from nature, thereby endorsing the traditional dichotomy between

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<sup>4</sup> Kant’s inclusion of the concept of art broadens the scope to encompass various forms of aesthetic experience, including the appreciation of natural beauty. This expansion allows for a connection between aesthetic judgments and moral judgments, highlighting the potential for moral significance in the experience of beauty. Kant’s analogy between the judgment of taste and moral judgments suggests that the contemplation and appreciation of beauty, whether in art or nature, can elicit a sense of moral elevation and serve as a reflection of our moral sensibilities. In this sense, the philosophical interpretation implies that the aesthetic experience, encompassing both art and natural beauty, holds the potential to deepen our understanding and engagement with moral values.

<sup>5</sup> This analogy not only facilitates a reconciliation between art and nature but also raises questions about the nature of beauty and its relationship to artistic creation and natural phenomena. Derrida’s inclusion of Hegel’s opposing view, that beauty is exclusively found in art, adds further complexity to the philosophical discourse surrounding aesthetics and its connection to the broader domains of politics and economy.

*tekhne* (art) and *physis* (nature). Kant argues that nature operates according to mechanical necessity, while art embodies the play of freedom. This scheme acknowledges the intentional nature of artwork by linking it to the concepts and guiding principles behind its creation. By recognizing the intentionality of artistic creation, Kant acknowledges that art is not merely a product of chance or natural processes, but rather a deliberate and purposeful expression of human creativity and agency. This perspective emphasizes the significance of artistic intention and the role of concepts and ideas in shaping the artistic endeavor, distinguishing it from the spontaneous workings of nature. There are several secondary determinations interspersed between them. As a result of analogy, this opposition is annulled. It prioritizes what is freely produced over Nature. At this point, all arguments against imitation are suspended and all criticisms of imitation are discarded. Nature, having entrusted the rules to genius, “has folded itself, returned to itself and reflects itself through art” (Derrida, “Economimesis” 4) It is through this “specular flexion”<sup>6</sup> that we gain both “the principle of reflexive judgments,” nature validating authenticity in a progress that stems out of the specific and undisclosed resource of mimesis.<sup>7</sup> It is a manner to imitate nature through art and reflect nature’s bond to itself. At present, there does not seem to be a conflict between *physis* and *mimesis*, nor between *physis* and *tekhne*. Nature possesses an inherent or immanent quality that allows it to fold back onto itself. This folding implies a self-contained and self-referential nature, which is described as “aneconomic” and “noncircular.” In other words, nature does not operate within the confines of a traditional economic system and does not adhere to circular patterns or returns. It suggests a kind of self-sufficiency and self-contained essence of nature. When this flexion or folding is brought into relation with art, it creates an assemblage or a coming together of *physis*, which refers to the

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<sup>6</sup> “The ideality of the idea as copy in the mind is the power to reinstitute what is no longer there, *in absentia*, something anterior and exterior to it. In this specular flexion the thinking subject can only come to know itself to the extent to which the form of this self has always already been there as a potential presence. Without a doubt, the grasping of the image is a maintaining-in-the-presence of consciousness” (Moran 37).

<sup>7</sup> Derrida suggests that within the context of the analogy between art and nature, secondary determinations emerge that challenge the strict opposition between *tekhne* and *physis*. Through this analogy, the hierarchical distinction between art and nature is nullified, with priority given to freely produced art over nature. Consequently, arguments against imitation and criticisms of imitation are suspended and discarded. Nature, in this framework, entrusts the rules to genius, and in doing so, it folds itself, returns to itself, and reflects itself through art. Derrida refers to this reflective process as “specular flexion.” It is through this flexion that we gain the principle of reflexive judgments, where nature validates authenticity through a progression that arises from the specific and undisclosed resource of mimesis. In this perspective, art becomes a means through which nature self-reflects and affirms its own essence, further blurring the boundaries between artistic creation and the natural world.

natural or essential qualities of something. In this case, the assemblage of *physis* implies that nature and art come together and interact in a way that reveals their interconnectedness.<sup>8</sup> In Kant's framework, art or mimesis (artistic representation) is distinct from nature. While nature possesses its own intrinsic beauty, art is created by human beings and involves the use of human imagination and creativity. However, Kant does suggest that art can imitate or represent the aesthetic ideas found in nature, leading to a harmonious relationship between art and nature. This concept aligns with the idea of the assemblage of *physis* described in the passage, where nature and art come together to reveal their interconnectedness.

“Art is distinguished from nature as doing (*Thun*), (*facere*) is distinguished from acting (*Handeln*) or working (*Wirken*) generally (*agere*), and as the product (*Produkt*) or result of the former is distinguished as work (*Werk*) (*opus*) from the working (*Wirkung*) (*effectus*) of the latter” (Kant qtd. in Derrida, “Economimesis” 4). The difference between art and nature “effects as being grounded on production through freedom” (Sweet 136) and is “conceived as the product of conscious human intent and skill” (Allison 273). Several seemingly irreducible oppositions are the basis of these proportional analogies. However, in order for them to dissolve, as they always do, oppositions must be “produced, propagated, and multiplied” (Derrida, “Economimesis” 4) Another split within the general field of art results in recognizable distinctions, their logical structure is neither inconsequential nor proportionate between the terms but hierarchical. Any attempt to distinguish between them remains lopsided and unbalanced. The purpose of defining two distinct types of art is to demonstrate two phenomena, of which one is more appropriately regarded as art than the other. Kant differentiates between art and nature by stating that “art” is merely a process of achieving freedom through freedom. While nature “involves a “beautiful thing,” art presents “a beautiful representation of thing” (Murdoch and Holzhey 64). Thus, art properly understood implies free-will and places rationality at its core.

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<sup>8</sup> The terms “aneconomic” and “noncircular” are used to describe nature's operation outside the confines of a traditional economic system and its departure from circular patterns or returns. This implies that nature is self-sufficient and self-contained, not subject to the rules and cycles of human-made economic systems. When this notion of folding or flexion is brought into relation with art, it creates an assemblage or a coming together of *physis* and art. This assemblage suggests that nature and art interact and reveal their interconnectedness. By combining the inherent or essential qualities of nature (*physis*) with artistic representation (mimesis) or craftsmanship (*tekhne*), a deeper understanding of their interconnected relationship can be achieved.

Therefore, art, strictly speaking, can only be produced by beings who have free will and speech: bees cannot produce works of art. Art is rife with humanistic themes rooted in ontology which treat animality as a general phenomenon. The concept of art is also constructed with such a guarantee in mind, as if there were only one “animal” structure opposed to the human being, which is endowed with rationality, freedom, sociality, laughter, language, law, symbolism, consciousness, or unconsciousness in an inalienable way (Derrida, “Economimesis” 5).

The purpose of a man-god is to elevate man, to prevent contamination from below, and to mark an incontrovertible boundary to “anthropological domesticity.” Economimesis is embodied by this gesture in its entirety. To preserve the absolute privilege of emergence (art, freedom, language, etc.), it is necessary to predicate it in absolute naturalism and an absolute indifferentialism so that its stratagem and credulity of human logic are preserved. It is ultimately imperative to re-naturalize human production and to place differentiation in opposition to it. Consequently, bees lack art and if one were to refer to their production as an art work, it would be only by analogy. Art is always the result of human efforts. The reference to “anthropological domesticity” and the need for boundaries could be seen as highlighting the separation between human beings and other forms of existence, aligning with Kant’s distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal realms. It is the recognition of the limits of human knowledge and an acknowledgment of a realm beyond human comprehension, which aligns with Kant’s distinction between the empirical and the transcendental:

The freedom of the fine artist is such only to the extent that it resembles nature, and ‘it does so precisely because, free and pure, it does not depend on natural laws’. Genius is the agency which ensures this creative freedom, and it is a structural necessity for Kant’s philosophy of art; for, granted the injunction that art must be as free from constraint as if it were simply given, while at the same time being the result of a deliberate doing (*facere*), it follows that in order to meet this condition natural genius must be posited as the *sine qua non* of (free) artistic activity. So genius is the capacity to liberate oneself from natural mechanisms and rule-governed programmes, but, crucially, it grants this only in as much as one allows one’s hand to be steered by ‘nature.’ (Haworth 324)

“A power, aptitude, property, destiny of man, art is distinguished in its turn from science. Scientific knowledge is a power; art is what it does not suffice to know, in order to know how to

do it, in order to be able to do it” (Derrida, “Economimesis” 5). Art is different from science and it cannot be reduced to craft. Craft is a mercenary art characterized by the exchange of a salary for the value of the work. Art is liberal or free. “Its production must not enter the economic circle of commerce, of offer and demand; it must not be exchanged” (Derrida, “Economimesis” 5). Liberal and mercenary art do not constitute opposites. One is more ‘artistic’ than the other; it has more value because there is no economic benefit associated with it. If art is the production of freedom, liberal art is more in tune with the essence of that freedom. In the context of art, mercenary art can only be applied by analogy. The productivity of mercenaries is similar to the productivity of bees in the sense that there is no freedom, a clear purpose or conclusion, utility, finitude of the code, and fixity of the program without imagination or reason. A craftsman, like bee, does not play. The hierarchical opposition between liberal and mercenary art is one of play and work. Since the first is regarded as a play, which is a pleasant occupation in itself, we view it as only having a purpose as a play. According to the second definition, work refers to occupations that are unpleasant in themselves and that are striking only because of their significances, which can only be imposed upon us by means of constraint:

Kant implies that just as man’s elevation in nature empowers him to enlist the utility of animals toward his ends and “higher” labors, so too many the freer individual, the artist, enlist the mercenary work of the craftperson, or use the vulgar tools of craft, without the value of art being implicated in an economy of usefulness and exchange. Oppositions deriving from nature/man and animal/human are thus reproduced as hierarchies defining the relative value of individuals and their labor, subordinating remunerated work and the lesser freedom of the craftperson to the higher ends of the artist. (Rodowick 117).

Kant follows the law of analogy: 1) Free art, as the distinguishing attribute of human freedom, exceeds indemnified work in its embodiment of human essence, much like it eclipses the instinctual activities of bees. The artist, who is a free individual in this context, defies the restraints of the *homo oeconomicus*. 2) In nature, it is inherent for humans to engage with the structures of animal organizations. However, individuals who appreciate their freedom must have the ability to operate, albeit under restraints, the products of human labor that lack freedom. It is decisive for liberal art to have the ability to make use of mercenary art without enmeshing itself or affecting interference. Similarly, an economy must possess the capability to derive



expediency from work economy without hampering its functioning. 3) The notion of pure productivity has been recognized as synonymous with the value of play. Even though both beauty and art transpire from imagination, it has become essential to differentiate between a reproductive mode of imagination and a spontaneous, free, and playful productive manner of imagination. Through the above-mentioned examination, it can be determined that everything is interrelated with the concept of taste, which is the faculty by which an object is appraised based on the imagination's intentional cohesion to principles. The imaginative productive mode transcends mealy imagination by obliging action or creation. It is a spontaneous expression of the imagination, which is the basis of beauty and creativity. This concept of taste is what allows us to evaluate the value of a thing or an idea. It is the ability to judge an object based on its free conformity to the law of imagination, which corresponds to the concept of taste. According to the law of association, imagination is not regarded as reproductive if it assumes freedom in the judgment of taste. Thus, it is considered productive and spontaneous only due to the author's differential forms of intuition. Furthermore, it aligns with an explicit object type without free play as the object of meaning. A collective imagination is imagined to exist in the form of an object. The law of understanding would dictate that if it were free, it would extend in accordance with the law of sense.

A form of fine art deliberated as form of art, poetry takes the freedom to play proclaimed by the productive imagination to its bounds, bringing it to its apex. "Poetry opens thought to the intuitions alone of sense impression and indicates the supersensuous ideas" (Stewart 137). Poetry is said to engage with the intuitions of sense impressions. This means that it goes beyond rational analysis and appeals to the immediate, sensory experiences and emotions that arise from our interactions with the world. Poetry often evokes vivid imagery, uses metaphors, and employs sensory language to evoke emotional and sensory responses in the reader. Poetry indicates or points to "supersensuous ideas." These are ideas or concepts that surpass the boundaries of sensory perception and rational understanding. Poetry has the potential to express abstract or transcendent concepts that go beyond the limitations of everyday language and conventional modes of expression. Through poetic language, complex and profound ideas can be communicated in ways that resonate with readers on an intuitive or emotional level. Mimesis is,

however, not limited to reproduction, but also involves the creative process in its purest form. Only by attending to nature, to its dictates, to its statutes can the latter exploit the brute power of its invention. The Fine-Arts can be seen as an expression of freedom of play and pure imagination, which serves this onto-theological humanism and obscurantism of capitalism. Fine arts can be seen as expressions of freedom of play and pure imagination.<sup>9</sup> This aligns with the idea that artistic creation allows for free expression, unconstrained by practical or utilitarian considerations. Artistic endeavors can provide a space for exploring ideas, emotions, and aesthetics without the limitations imposed by societal norms or economic interests. The distinction between liberal and mercenary art, as well as the hierarchy of subordination it commands, reproduces nature in its production by giving examples as well as prescribing its own rules, which are determined by its own nature. By breaking with mimesis, which can be considered to be imitation of what is, it identifies itself with the unfolding and refolding of the physical state spontaneously. However, this view ignores the fact that art can also be used to express political or social messages. For example, many works of art have been used to protest against wars, or to raise awareness of social issues such as poverty or sexism. Art can also be used to celebrate different cultures, or to promote peace and understanding between different groups of people.

Considering that liberal art is a pleasant occupation in itself, one should carefully examine the paragraph that exploits the false opposition between liberal art and craft. “The fact that the relationship of art to other modes of human making is one neither of identity nor of mutual exclusion, but of a strange, overlapping difference emerges over and over, but it is not a relationship for which Kant has a name” (Chaouli 122). In contrast to mercenaries, who do not earn a living, liberal artists enjoy their work and give it to others immediately. The non-enjoyment of the mercenary artist (his work) serves the cause of liberal enjoyment since we are dealing with a hierarchy within a general organization that is subject to the universal law of nature. As a result, nature is the one that forces the creation of mercenary art, which commands

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<sup>9</sup> The distinction between liberal and mercenary art, which can be understood as art created for its own sake versus art driven by economic interests. The hierarchical subordination mentioned suggests that one form of art is considered superior to the other, potentially perpetuating certain power dynamics and reinforcing the dominant norms of the art world.

genius, which in turn commands everything through all kinds of mediations. An occupation such as watchmaking is thought by Kant to be a (free) art or a (mercenary) handicraft immediately following his discussion of a “hierarchy” in the grade of professions. Kant’s idea here is that mercenary art is not enjoyable because it does not allow for the same kind of creativity that free art does, and it can be imposed on people by force. Therefore, it is nature that ultimately determines the hierarchy within professions, deciding whether something is an art or a handicraft.

The onerous standard does not exist at present and so this difficult question can be ignored because a new perspective is required, namely, “proportion of talents.” In addition, Kant intends to refrain from discussing here the issue of whether or not some of the seven liberal arts can be classified as sciences, while others as handicrafts. Unlike mechanical arts, which require primarily manual labor, the liberal arts taught in the Middle Ages<sup>10</sup> rely more on the mind. Liberal arts (of the free spirit) must, however, be accompanied by certain constraints. There must be a compulsory mechanism present in the practice of a liberal art. As a result of this “coercive constriction,” the spirit that must be free in art would not be able to exist and would disappear entirely. Kant maintains that the “constraints imposed on the procedure of moral judgment by features of human imagination” (Herman 60) are consistent. It would be lexical accuracy, richness, prosody, or metrics that constitute a poem’s body, constraint, or mechanism. In the context of liberalism, freedom is defined as freedom with respect to the system of coercions or constraints, to its own mechanisms, just as the spirit relates to the body as the living body relates to its corset, which provides form to everything. Liberal arts must be constrained in order to exist, otherwise they would disappear entirely. This is because without constraint, there would be no form to everything. Without the structure of constraint, the creative spirit that is essential to the arts would be lost and entirely unable to exist.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, in order to preserve the arts and their beauty, we must also recognize the need for constraint and structure within them. Without

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<sup>10</sup> “*trivium*: grammar, dialectic, rhetoric; *quadrivium*: arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, music.” (Derrida, “Economimesis” 6)

<sup>11</sup> In liberalism, freedom is defined as the absence of coercive constraints. Similarly, the argument suggests that in the arts, the creative spirit needs the structure and form provided by constraints to exist and flourish. Constraints such as lexical accuracy, richness, prosody, and metrics are seen as components that give shape and structure to a poem, forming its body or mechanism.

it, the freedom to create would be lost. To understand the system properly, one must understand its organic linchpin: the two arts (liberal and mercenary) are not two separate totalities indifferent to one another. Liberal art relates to mercenary art as the mind does to the body, and it cannot produce itself, in its freedom, without the very thing that it subordinates to itself, without the force of mechanical structure which in every sense of the word it *supposes*—the mechanical agency, mercenary, laborious, deprived of pleasure” (Derrida, “Economimesis” 7). There is already a well-known criticism of non-directive pedagogy where modern educators believe that the foundational method to produce a free art is to eliminate all constraints and transform it from work to play. While this idea seems appealing, some argue that it overlooks the importance of structure and guidance when it comes to developing creativity. An effective approach should strike a balance between providing support and allowing the student to explore independently.

Liberality offers enjoyment, as opposed to mercenary art, which is free play. As a result, this statement remains vague. One must distinguish pleasure from enjoyment. Kant contrasts *Lust* and *Genuss* in a conventional manner to illustrate their differences in this context. This is exactly what he does when he identifies the Fine-Arts as fine art.<sup>12</sup> “The German word ‘Genuss’ refers both to the consumption of food and to pleasure, and it is traditionally used in the language of art criticism. The same word denotes the pleasure of eating and the pleasure of contemplating art. In fact, since antiquity the production and consumption of art has been metaphorically spoken of in terms of cooking and eating” (Seeber 287). This definition does not proceed by symmetrical opposition, nor does it proceed by classification of gender or species. Fine arts are free arts, but they do not necessarily belong to the liberal arts. Some of these belong to the fine arts and others to the sciences. Kant is saying that the Fine Arts are free arts, but they don’t necessarily belong to the liberal arts. The definition of fine arts does not proceed through symmetrical opposition or classification based on gender or species, likely referring to the way in which different art forms are categorized or classified. The point made is that fine arts can be considered free arts, but they may not necessarily belong exclusively to the category of liberal arts. Some fine arts may also be

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<sup>12</sup> In Kantian terms, pleasure (*Lust*) is associated with immediate gratification or sensual satisfaction, while enjoyment (*Genuss*) is a deeper, more intellectual or reflective satisfaction derived from the contemplation or engagement with an object or activity. The passage implies that liberal art offers a deeper form of satisfaction or enjoyment compared to mercenary art, which may focus more on immediate pleasure or utilitarian goals.

classified under the sciences, indicating that the classification of art forms is not straightforward and may not align precisely with the division between liberal and mercenary art.

The phrasing, notwithstanding its understanding, does not seem self-evident. Why are the words “fine” or “beautiful” used to describe an art that fashions the beautiful? Beautiful is an object, a work of art, a form that is produced. To achieve structural unity, art must be bound by a productive subjectivity, no matter how unstipulated or unspecified it may be, as long as a predicate appears to belong to its product. Empiricism requires a signature, which is not to be confused with extrinsic demands. The words “fine” and “beautiful” are used to describe art because they are seen as objective terms that can be applied to anything. However, Kant’s criticism suggests that art needs to be judged by a subjective standard in order to be truly unified. Empiricism, on the other hand, requires that things can be objectively measured and compared. In order for art to be truly unified, the subjective criteria of beauty and fine art must be taken into account, rather than relying on the objectivity of empiricism. Without this subjectivity, art can become fragmented and disjointed. Therefore, it is important to acknowledge the subjective nature of art and use it as a tool to unify and elevate it. As much as the object, “Work” will always be the most beautiful, the work whose signature remains in the parergonal viscosity of the frame at the edges of the work, neither there nor there, out or in. A beautiful product or production act is not solely a function of the product or production act, but a function of the path between these two, so it is a parallel development alongside another development: Productive imagination “generates a new combination of existing concepts, ideas and perceptual features” (Küplen 117). Fine Arts are always framed and signed.<sup>13</sup> This proposition does not appear to be entirely incompatible with Kant's conception of aesthetic subjectivity, but it is unlikely that he would endorse it. In the context of fine or beautiful art, a singularity, an act of productivity, or a unique production are not considered. The generality implies, within the totality of the operation’s subjective powers, a repetition, the possibility of beginning again. Fine arts are inextricably linked to the concept of iterability. In the context of fine or beautiful art, singular acts of productivity or unique productions are not emphasized. Instead, there is an emphasis on

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<sup>13</sup> Framing can refer to the contextualization or presentation of the artwork, while signing refers to the authorship or intentionality behind the work. This highlights the idea that fine arts are not merely objects or acts of production, but intentional expressions of the artist’s creativity and vision.

generality and iterability. Iterability refers to the idea that artistic works can be repeated or reproduced, yet still retain their aesthetic qualities. This concept implies that fine arts are not tied to individual, isolated instances, but rather exist within a broader framework where the creative process can be repeated or continued. Accordingly, “Fine art imitates the productivity of the divine artist by presenting design rather than imitating his products by representing specific design” (Wigley 162).

“Can a science be beautiful?” Kant answers this question in the negative by stating that it is “an absurdity, an absurd concept, a nonentity: nothing” (Kant qtd. in Derrida, “Economimesis” 7). Science can certainly be a source of beauty; artists can also use scientific knowledge to create beautiful things. An actor or a scientific object, for example, a scientific statement, cannot be referred to as beautiful in the same way as an art is referred to as scientifically valuable. Kant’s point is that beauty cannot be placed in an objective category, and that it is a subjective experience. He acknowledges, however, that science can be used to create beautiful things and can be appreciated for its own aesthetic value. The beauty of science lies in the fact that it is a powerful tool that can be used to explore and understand the world, and it can inspire awe and admiration. Ultimately, it is up to the individual to decide if science can be beautiful or not. Science must dispense with knowledge as such in order to be what it is. It must therefore be without art, without beauty, and indissolubly, without pleasure. Pleasure is a distant source of knowledge. It has existed for centuries has only become mystified with mere cognition as it is impossible to have the most commonest experience without it, thus no longer attracting our attention.<sup>14</sup> Throughout time, neither is pleasure devoid of knowledge nor is science excluded from beauty. The force of *Witz* in the *bonmot* leads back to the roots of science that have been forgotten or repressed, namely the science of science. When the Kantian text itself proclaims the effacement of this pertinence, it is important to recognize the sweeping implications of this issue.

Fine-Arts are not scientific in any way, nor are sciences beautiful or artistic. Fine-Arts are pleasure without pleasure, whereas science is neither pleasure nor enjoyment; fine art is pleasure

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<sup>14</sup> Pleasure is seen as an integral part of common experiences, often taken for granted and no longer drawing our attention. However, it asserts that pleasure is not devoid of knowledge and plays a role in our understanding of the world.

without pleasure. However, not all art results in pleasure. This must be distinguished on a number of levels. As long as a mechanical art conforms to the knowledge of a possible object, performs the necessary operations to make it a reality, and knows in advance that it must produce it, and consequently does so, such an art does not seek nor give pleasure. It is possible to print a book, build a machine, and utilize a model and a purpose. Kant opposes aesthetic art to mechanical art which seeks immediate pleasure. Mechanical arts are “those which are based on a clear and determinate concept of what is to be produced, i.e., they follow a rule. Thus “mechanical arts” signifies, precisely, artifice in general, as purposive action” (Zammito 122). Fine-Arts are not created to give pleasure, but some art may give pleasure. This is distinguished from mechanical art, which is created to give pleasure. In the context of aesthetic judgment, freedom, such as the freedom of enjoyment (*Genuss*) or artistic free play, operates as a consequence of the judgment’s differentiation from cognitive judgments. Aesthetic judgments are not grounded in concepts or intentionally directed towards them, unlike academic or cognitive judgments. This implies that the freedom experienced in the aesthetic domain is a result of its divergence from purely rational or cognitive aspects and represents a distinct mode of experience. Consequently, such freedom would appear closer to frivolity and license than to the concept of “liberty” (Rowe 142).

Among aesthetic arts, certain of them, the agreeable arts, strive for pleasure (*jouissance*, *Genuss*). Fine arts, however, pursue pleasure (Lust) without any intention of enjoyment. Following a leisurely description of the art of enjoyment, the art of conversation, jest, laughter, gaiety, simple-minded entertainment, irresponsible gossip around the table, serving, managing music during meals, and party games. The purpose of all of these activities is to facilitate enjoyment. In contrast, fine art is a form of representation that is purposeful in itself and which, although devoid of any purpose, advances the culture of mental abilities. Fine art thus serves a purpose greater than purely providing pleasure. It contributes to the cultural advancement of society by exercising the mental abilities of its viewers. It is impossible to experience a sense of sociality, universal communicability. Pure pleasure is the property of judgment and reflection, without empirical enjoyment. It is associated with an empirical sensibility that includes a kernel of incommunicable sensation. Further, “although merely aesthetic judgments, in Kant’s sense,

likewise involve the social via the link between taste and the community standards of *sensus communis*, the emphasis on the kind of contribution to knowledge that interpretive judgments are argued to be making establishes the combination of reflective and teleological reasoning as an entirely separate process of cognition” (Ruthrof 67). It is, however, not advisable to conceptualize judgment and reflection for the reasons already outlined. In this pleasure, there is neither a concept nor a feeling of enjoyment. It can only be conceived as a reflective judgment, within a certain social order, and in accordance with certain reflective intersubjectivity.<sup>15</sup>

Free men are capable of non-exchangeable productivity if they are able to take pleasure in a reflective pronouncement without enjoying or conceiving it. It is not exchangeable either as a use or as an exchange value when it comes to sensible objects or signs of sensible objects. This pure productivity of the inexchangeable, however, creates a reflective form of commerce that allows for the exploration of fine arts. Universal communicability between free subjects is a reflection of the exchange. Essentially, there exists a pure economy in which the *oikos*, the defining characteristic of man, manifests itself in his pure freedom and his pure productivity. non-exchangeable productivity refers to a type of productivity that cannot be traded or measured in terms of its use or exchange value, particularly concerning sensible objects or signs of sensible objects. It exists independently of practical or economic considerations. However, this non-exchangeable productivity creates a reflective form of commerce, which allows for the exploration and expression of fine arts. Through this reflective commerce, individuals can engage with artistic endeavors that go beyond the realm of utilitarian or exchangeable value.

Kant recurrently emphasizes that Fine-Arts are not products of nature. The appearance of nature is required in the Fine-Arts, precisely in the sense that they are productions of freedom or fashions of freedom. Although the Fine-Arts are, at their heart, works of artistic confection, they must reflect the effects of natural action. The purpose of a Fine-Arts product should appear as free from arbitrary rules as it would be if it were a pure natural product, despite the fact that it is not natural. Because of this sense of freedom in our cognitive faculties, which must also be

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<sup>15</sup> Pleasure derived from fine art cannot be purely conceptualized or felt as enjoyment. Instead, it is described as a reflective judgment that takes place within a certain social order and in accordance with a particular reflective intersubjectivity. This implies that the experience of art involves a complex interplay between individual perception and interpretation, as well as the cultural and social context in which it is experienced.



purposeful, this pleasure (lust) can be universally communicated and not based on concepts. This means that the Fine-Arts should be created with the same sense of freedom and spontaneity found in nature, while still being purposeful and meaningful. The artist should strive to capture the feeling of nature in their works, while also creating something new and unique. Through this, the artist can create something that will bring joy to all who view it.

In terms of pure and free productivity, it is similar to that of nature because it is pure and free without being controlled by natural laws. The “logic of economimesis secures the figure of Genius as the exemplar of a divine agency in art where the artist creates—without concepts, as a pure and free productivity of the imagination—in a fashion analogous to the way God produces his works in nature” (Preziosi 97). The less it is reliant on nature, the closer it resembles nature. Mimesis here is not the act of representing one thing by another, not the act of resemblance or identification between two beings, but the act of reproducing an object from nature through the use of art. It is not possible to establish a relationship between two products, but rather between two productions and two freedoms. “To establish the absolute privilege of free human creation or imitation, one renaturalizes it with organicist language, as something natural and proper to man, a function which cannot be contaminated by animality, as can other human activities” (Culler 200). Art does not imitate nature but rather natural acts. *Mimesis*, however, indicates that human action is equated with divine action, that one freedom is equivalent to another, since an analogy has already made *natura naturans* the art of a subject, author and, indeed, a god-artist. Mimesis is not about making things look the same, but rather about making things work in the same way. It is about taking the natural world and using it as a guide for our own actions. A commerce between divine artists and human artists is necessary due to the communicability of pure aesthetic judgments. This commerce constitutes mimesis, in its strictest meaning, a play, mask, identification with another on stage, as opposed to a reproduction of an object. There is no such thing as “true” mimesis between two producing subjects, but rather between two produced objects. It is implied throughout the third *Critique* that, even though the explicit theme, or the word itself, never appears, this type of mimesis always implies a condemnation of imitation, which the critics always view as servile. The idea of mimesis is often used in a negative light, as

it is seen as a form of imitation that is often servile. However, mimesis can also be seen as a way of understanding and connecting with the world around us. Besides,

in the Kantian aesthetic system, this concept of mimesis is best expressed by the mouth of the genius-poet, whose vocal labors are identical with those of nature because of one additional condition: the poet is not paid. Lifted above the moral obscenity of working for payment, the poet's mouth produces an unfettered and authentic art by imitating nature in its most faithful and absolute form: made without purpose and absent of telos. For humans and nature to express each other on the ground of an analogy, e.g., for humans to produce freely like nature, art thus must be liberated from the chains of payment. (Gyenge 120).

The consequence of anthropo-theological mimesis affects a divine teleology accompanied by this mimesis, resulting in a hierarchical opposition between mercenary and free art. In the economimesis, everything is put in its place, beginning with instinctive animal work without language, passing through mechanical arts, mercenary arts, liberal arts, aesthetic arts, and fine arts, to culminate with God. One significance of anthropo-theological mimesis is the emergence of a hierarchical opposition between two forms of art: mercenary art and free art. Mercenary art can be understood as art created for practical or commercial purposes, driven by external incentives such as monetary gain. On the other hand, free art refers to artistic expression that is autonomous, liberated from utilitarian concerns, and more aligned with the pursuit of higher ideals or aesthetic values. Within the framework of economimesis, which is a system where everything is organized and placed in its appropriate position, the passage outlines a progression of art forms. It starts with instinctive animal work without language, progresses through mechanical arts (presumably referring to art forms that involve mechanical processes or technology), and then moves on to mercenary arts, liberal arts, aesthetic arts, and finally fine arts. This progression suggests an increasing level of complexity, creativity, and freedom in artistic expression. The culmination of this progression is depicted as reaching God, implying that God represents the highest form of artistic expression or the ultimate source of inspiration and creativity.

Economimesis, as elucidated by Derrida, is an economic principle that governs the realm of helio-poetics, incorporating a paradigm of immaculate commerce. Helio-poetics (in the plural) refer to the specifically solar trajectories of a long tradition of Western writings on poetry. "A

‘helio-poetics’ is drawn, as if unconsciously, towards the sun because it takes this star to be both the giving origin and receiving end of the poetic work” (Rosenthal 1). This principle facilitates the attainment of a certain level of profitability without succumbing to the debased nature associated with Mauss’ concept of the mechanical cruelty inherent in monetary transactions. Indeed, helio-poetics exhibits striking parallels to the structural framework examined by Mauss within the domain of potlatch. Embedded within this framework is a dynamic where spontaneous and boundless acts of generosity coexist harmoniously with a utilitarian system predicated on mutual benefit. Each instance of gift-giving encapsulates an ethos of unlimited generosity, unfettered by any contractual obligations. However, when viewed collectively, the cumulative occurrences of such acts of giving enable all participants to ultimately achieve a state of equilibrium in their respective transactions over time. Blood maintains that,

The specific political economy that accompanies Kant’s heliopoetics can thus be seen as a form of enlightened despotism. In such an economy the King may patronize the Poet, but the production of poetry need not thereby be viewed as a mercenary activity. When paying the Poet, the King does not render fee for service; instead he gives without counting in a gesture that imitates the free production of poetry. By the same token we could say that the Poet in writing poetry imitates the King’s largesse-with this kind of self-sacrificing expenditure it becomes difficult to say who is imitating whom. For this reason it is not accurate to assert that Kant’s helio-poetics is grounded in the patronage system-when we cannot separate poetry from payment then we cannot say that one term is more fundamental than the other. (Blood 843

Now that mimesis has been established, the opposition between nature and art has been removed. In Aristotle’s view, mimesis is the essential characteristic of man, previously earmarked for art and the beautiful, but belongs to knowledge. It is possible that we will be able to discover here the source of pleasure that was once reserved for knowledge. Kant defines “imitation” as akin to “aping,” the ape knows how to imitate, but is not a subject and is not subject to any other person. According to the *Poetics*, poetry is born of two factors, both natural in nature, which seem to be the source of knowledge and pleasure. Humans are unique among animals in that they are highly adept at imitation, through which they acquire his first knowledge, and in that all humans enjoy imitation. Kant believes that humans have the ability to find pleasure in things other than just knowledge. He believes that poetry, for example, can be a source of pleasure. The *Poetics*

supports this idea by stating that poetry is born out of two natural factors, which are the source of knowledge and pleasure. Both the *Poetics* and Kant stress the importance of imitation in the development of knowledge, and emphasize the idea that the pleasure we gain from poetry can be seen as a form of knowledge. Therefore, the act of reading and exploring literature can be understood as a way to gain knowledge and pleasure. Derrida observes a distinction between Aristotle's understanding of mimesis as a human prerogative and Kant's differentiation between mere mechanical imitation and the creative production of the pure artist. According to Kant, the artist, in imitating nature, is not slavishly bound by its laws and prescriptions but instead freely creates a double of nature—an alternative expression of nature that possesses its own freedom to be naturally itself, original, exemplary, and as real as nature itself. For example, the radiant calm that springs forth from virtue illuminates the shining of the sun through comparison. The different sources of their respective qualities enable a mutual clarification, with one serving as an imitation of the other. The transparency of conceptual being allows for a better understanding of our material representation of the sun's radiance. It is as if the spontaneous expression of calm from enacted virtue performs the same gesture as the freely shining sun. The imitation or comparison takes place between two freedoms, two actions that represent the utmost pouring forth of abundant and pure production. This is akin to what Derrida describes as the “free imitation of a freedom that freely imitates divine freedom.” In this sense, imitation can be understood by analogy to how an actor imitates a king. The actor's greatness does not lie in mechanically copying or aping a particular king, but in embodying, as if spontaneously, the kingly spontaneity of a “real” king. If an actor were to imitate the princely generosity of an absolute monarch, such as Louis or Frederick, they might envision themselves as the sun, bestowing their beneficence upon the grateful subjects of their realm through shining forth.

While the *Poetics* identifies pleasure with knowledge, the third *Critique* appears to disassociate them within the same space of mimesis, as part of the analysis of a traditional link. The unity between knowledge and pleasure has not been excluded, but has rather been relegated to a state of unconsciousness. Natural beauty is the result of a natural art, which in turn turns out to be an art rather than just a source of knowledge. Natural beauty comes from nature. This feeling of freedom in the play of our faculties of knowledge, which must at the same time be purposeful, is

what gives us the pleasure which alone is universally communicable, but that is not based on concepts. There is beauty in nature because it is simultaneously perceived as art, and art cannot be considered beautiful unless it is acknowledged as art at the same time as perceived as nature.

“The only beauty therefore remains is that of productive nature. Art is beautiful to the degree that it is productive like productive nature, that it reproduces the production and not the product of nature, to the degree that nature may once have been (was), before the critical disassociation and before a still to be determined forgetfulness, beautiful” (Derrida, “Economimesis” 10). The analogy guides us to the precritical time, frontal to the disconnections, oppositions and incongruences of critical discourse. Nature's artistic ability restores its productive power and qualifies the spectacles it has fashioned for itself as well. Rather than masking himself, God has revealed himself to be seen in spectacles: a *theomime*, a *physiomime*, for his pleasure. A liberality of such magnitude cannot be consumed in isolation. When economimesis establishes a “specular” relationship between two freedoms, readable in reflective judgment, it is difficult to say that human freedom is similar to God's freedom. Only by not imitating another freedom can one freedom resemble another. There can be no opening of mimesis through concepts, but only through quasi-natural productions with reflective value that introduce the rules of art that are not conceptual. “The very idea of human freedom and the moral- political economy of a subject emancipated from the animal needs of nature rely, Derrida argues, on an analogy between nature and the mouth” (Colebrook 22). The inventive agency is a genius figure who benefits from the concept of freedom while naturalizing the concept of economics. “*Ingenium* is a natural talent, a gift of nature.” (Derrida, “Economimesis” 10). In other words, genius itself is an instance of productive and donation produced by nature itself. It is nature who produces what it produces; it produces freedom [for] itself and gives it to itself. Fine art would not exist without this gift from nature, without this gift of productive freedom. It is nature which produces freedom and gives it to itself. In giving non-conceptual rules to art in producing “exemplars,” genius is nothing more than reflecting nature, representing nature, acting as its successor or delegate, or acting as its faithful image. Innately, the spirit is a genius, which is the means by which nature gives rules to. In this text, the author is claiming that it is nature that produces what it produces, including freedom. They go on to say that genius is simply a reflection of nature, and that the spirit is

innately a genius. Colebrook explains: “The artist’s relation to nature is not a passive copying but an analogy with nature’s quasi-divine creative freedom. Art, as opposed to craft or the pleasures of sensible consumption, has no end outside itself. What is disclosed in art – as opposed to mere copying of a thing – is nothing other than the subject’s own, active, spontaneous and transcendental aesthetic power” (22).

A non-conceptual role, which can be read in action and away from the exemplar, cannot be derived from imitation. Genius cannot be taught. It is a product that is an imitation of a good work which does not merely recur. That which does not reproduce, contains no counterfeits and is not merely a servile repetition. It is difficult to explain how genius freedom frees itself to mimic divine freedom. There is a difficult nuance between good and bad imitation, which is the opposition between imitation and copy.<sup>16</sup> It is the indiscernibility of that distinction, which nevertheless permeates everything, that is echoed, imitated, counterfeited in the signifier: a perfect anagrammatical inversion, except for one letter. This one letter can make all the difference between a faithful rendering of an idea and a distorted version of it. Thus, understanding the subtle differences between imitation and copy is essential for any artist, writer, or creative thinker.

When nature detaches genius from itself in order to represent it and give its rules to art, everything becomes naturalized, whether directly or indirectly, all is viewed as a structure of naturality. The definition of fine art must be that it is free art in both a physical and emotional sense, meaning that it cannot be studied or painful. However, one must also be occupied without regard to any other objective independent of any salary, even if the mind is appeased and exhilarated. Quantity cannot be determined by a defined measure that can either be imposed or paid for. Art should be created with passion, and the artist should be driven by the joy of expressing their creativity. It is a celebration of individual expression and should not be limited by expectations of public approval or monetary gain. The poet, analogous to God, ultimately

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<sup>16</sup> There is a non-conceptual aspect or role in creativity that cannot be derived solely from imitation. This implies that genuine creativity goes beyond mere imitation and involves a unique expression that cannot be fully captured or reproduced through imitation alone. Genius, which represents exceptional creative ability, is portrayed as something that cannot be taught. It is a product that imitates a good work but goes beyond mere repetition or reproduction. It is difficult to explain how genius freedom is able to mimic divine freedom, suggesting that true creative brilliance somehow taps into a higher source of inspiration.

exceeds his obligations, submits to no exchange contract, and breaks the circular economy with his surplus. Thus, the Fine-Arts hierarchy suggests that some power surpasses the (circular) economy and governs it in addition to placing itself above the (restricted) political economy. As political economy is naturalized, art production and commerce become subordinate to the transeconomy.<sup>17</sup> Klein explicates:

The poet at the summit of the hierarchy gives his logos freely and spontaneously; no wage is exchanged for pure poetry, but God supports him-indirectly so to speak-by giving him inspiration through the mediation of nature and genius. God furnishes him with his poetic capital and in giving profusely thereby reproduces the poet's own labor power [*sa force de travail*], which essentially consists in his capacity to give generously and spontaneously. Like the sun, the poet pours forth his voice more abundantly, over-amply, more than is expected or could be predicted or determined in advance by any law or contract. God gives the poet the gift of expression -a surplus-value of His own generosity-and gives him the gift of giving surplus value. The gift in the system of economimesis is always the gift of a content and of a capacity for giving-of a constative thing and a performative act. An immaculate commerce between God and poet, it has its analogue in the city. (30)

An infinite circle plays itself in an attempt to appropriate the gift once again. Hegelianism, rather than diminishing the economy, unfolds itself to infinity as though passing through a transeconomy. Eventually, the poet or genius receives what is bestowed upon them by nature (from God), but first and foremost, they receive the power to produce, to deliver more than what they promise. A poetic gift, in which content and power, wealth and action are included, is an add-on provided by God for the poet as a power to transmit, so that this excess value can be returned to its infinite source, which cannot be lost. All of this must pass through the voice. Poets of genius are the ones who have been given voice by God and who give themselves to themselves by giving themselves. In other words, they give themselves what they give, giving themselves the freedom to give freely with themselves, and only break the finite circle or contractual exchange in order to reach an infinite agreement. It is eliminated when the infinite manifests itself (to be thought) that the opposition between limited and general economics,

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<sup>17</sup> As the political economy becomes naturalized, meaning it is accepted as the norm or the dominant economic system, art production and commerce are positioned under its influence. However, the passage implies that art, with its transcendent qualities, is not confined solely within the boundaries of the political or circular economy. It suggests that there is a realm beyond these economic systems where art thrives and holds its own power.

circulation and expenditures is eliminated. The passage to the infinite is the function of that passage, if we can still use such terms: the passage to the infinity between gift and debt. The voice is a unique and powerful gift, and those who have been granted it can use it to give something to the world. Poets of genius are those who take full advantage of this ability, creating art that gives the gift of freedom to the listener. By experiencing the infinite through them, you open up the possibility of experiencing something more than the finite. It is this passage to the infinite that allows us to transcend the boundaries of limited and general economics. “For Kant, artistic genius is also like nature – an unbound, relentless force of potentiality that creates endlessly without purpose. But by producing like nature, genius is a modulation of nature itself, an expression, if you will, of its consciousness, which is nothing other than the power of pure production” (Gyenge 120). The poet is what he is, and he gives more than he promises. In addition, it describes something conceptually: it announces a game. It is generated by a faculty that values spontaneity. Those who are genius poets often give more than they promise or are asked of, and no one compensates them for it - at least not within the political economy of men. However, God supports them as a result. Providing him with speech, he provides him with his capital, produces and reproduces his labor force, provides him with surplus value and the means to produce it. Poetic action as exemplified in the speaking art as an analogy with the poetic action embodied in *logos*. “It is this condition of free artistic labor – an economic condition – that unfurls an entire ontology of “man” and yet it never ceases disturbing every filial lineage of the German tradition. Not only is this a Kant we do not entirely recognize, a Kant concerned with the problem of labor, it is a Kant haunted by the proto-Marxist blood that flows impossibly through the comfortable universalist vein of his aesthetics” (Gyenge 120).

The poet, Kant indicates, cannot exist without the (mechanical) labor force, because poetry cannot exist without the (mechanical) labor force. When a poet is not writing or singing, he is just like any other man in the city and must eat as well. As a way of reminding him that his essential wealth comes from on high, and that true commerce is associated with the loftiness of free, rather than mercenary art, he receives subsidies from the sun-king or the enlightened and enlightening monarch. “A metaphor bestows its vivifying power on a concept the way the sun gives its over-abundance, the way a King pours forth his grace. This theory of poetic metaphor is



therefore a theory of liberality, of a certain absolute or pure generosity. The example in Kant becomes the rule: the way aesthetic attributes lend their power to concepts exemplifies the way the sun gives its over-abundant benefits to the world. Or the way the king pays” (Klein 29). This ensures that he will not forget that his true wealth is divine and not mercenary art. To alleviate the demands of supply and demand during liberal times, despite this powerful scheme spreading to other organizations within the restricted economy, Economimesis will still be able to make a profit. However, there are some drawbacks to this system. For one, it can be difficult to keep track of all the different subsidies and funds that are available. Additionally, this system can be susceptible to corruption, as those in charge of distributing the funds may be tempted to give them to their friends or allies.

Rational representations may be animated by intellectual concepts if they are accompanied by a perceptible awareness of the supersensible as a characteristic of sensible representation. It is difficult to imagine a more sublime statement or thought than that found on the Temple of Isis (Mother Nature): “I am all that is and that was and that shall be, and no mortal hath lifted my veil” (qtd. in Derrida, “Economimesis” 12). It is Kant’s analysis that is sandwiched between the springtime quotation and the note regarding Mother Nature’s veil. We can diffuse a multitude of sublime and restful feelings in our minds if we substitute virtue for virtuous men in our thoughts, as well as the endless prospect of a joyous future that no expression can fully comprehend. The fold of mimesis is at the origin of pure productivity, a gift from God in which he presents himself to himself before producing reproduction or imitation; genius does not copy anything; it identifies itself at the origin of the origin, as the product of production, as a symbol of the productive freedom of God. Comparing nature’s free productivity with the free productivity of genius, between God and the Poet, is more than simply comparing two subjects, two origins, two productions. In analogy, the origin is also the logos. It derives from the logos, reason, and word, which serve as mouths and outlets, from which it proceeds and towards which it returns. Analogy is derived from the logos, reason, and word, from which it proceeds and towards which it returns. Productive of freedom, and thus not subject to the base logics of exchange, liberal art produces divine value – the same value that nature proffers by its unbridled creative dynamism, a valueless value. In doing so, free artistic labor expresses the most elemental entanglement

between the sacred and the profane: artistic production is bare labor and so nothing more than the essence of making, labor that is also above and supplementary to all other forms of value. One would call it transcendent were it not for the fact that aesthetic labor (and nature as its originary model) is never detached from the raw materiality that makes it possible – the human body and the natural world. Nothing is more empirical than this production that stands proudly outside (and above) the obscenities of exchange and payment, raising the torch of human freedom (Gyenge 121).

Genius does not impose rules on science, but on art. Genius transcribes nature's prescription, and its rules are formulated under the guidance of nature, whose secretary it freely accepts to serve. As a writer, the genius allows itself to be inspired by nature, which guides it in writing and prescribing, but the genius is unable to comprehend what it writes as it is inspired by nature. Generalized, it does not comprehend the instructions it transmits. In any case, it has neither a conceptual understanding nor a knowledge of them. When the author of a product is indebted to his genius, he does not know how he came up with his ideas; also, he cannot devise similar products on a whim or according to a plan, nor can he communicate them in a manner that will allow them to create similar products at their discretion. As the genius prescribes, he does so in the form of non-conceptual rules that prevent repetition or imitative reproduction from occurring. Nature itself is already a product, the creation of the divine genius, which is presently freely giving orders to man by means of the genius voice. Once it dictates, it is already in a similar position to human genius, which is also capable of producing its own second nature. The productive imagination has the capability of creating "as if" another nature. The first nature dictates its precepts to genius, while genius creates a second nature and God creates the first nature and produces an archetype that serves as a guide and example. It is as if a society of the logos, a sociology of genius, a logoarchy is formed by using such hierarchical analogies. In any case, it speaks God's commands, nature speaks to transmit genius at every step in the analogy. It is the poet, who speaks, who is the highest genius. Genius is guided by nature. Not by concepts or descriptive laws, but by norms that serve as orders, imperative statements. Hegel demonstrates the moral order which sustains the aesthetic order by reproaching the third Critique for remaining at the level of "you must." In discourse, this order is expressed through a signifying element,

which leads from freedom to freedom. Several aspects of this text are analogous to discursive metaphors. These are not just any metaphors, but analogies of analogy, whose message is that the literal meaning is analogous: nature is the proper logos to which one must always return. Language is always an analogy.

“Analogy is the rule” (Derrida, “Economimesis” 13). The analogy between art (of fine art) and the moral rule, between the aesthetic order and the moral order, is the rule. There is an “analogy” between the pure judgment of taste which, independent of any interest, provokes a *Wohlgefallen* suitable *a priori* to humanity, and the moral judgment that does the same thing by means of concepts. This analogy confers an equal and immediate interest upon the two judgements. The articulated play of this analogy is itself subject to a law of supplementarity: we admire nature demonstrating itself in its beautiful products as art but in aesthetic experience the purpose or end of this purposiveness does not appear to us. Essentially, we seek purpose within ourselves because the outside appears meaningless. There has been a gradual movement toward interiorizing suppliance, a kind of self-searching that is characteristic of slurping, in which we, cut off from what we desire outside, from a purpose suspended outside, seek and give internally, autonomously. This idealizing interiorisation movement is described by Kant in terms of nature displaying its beautiful products, intentionally created and in symmetry, purposeless. When we are not experiencing aesthetic experience, which is a primary component of our experience, we fold ourselves back toward our purpose, which we find too far away, invisible, or inaccessible, and it calls and determines us from within, leading us to respond to an autonomous vocation, from within. In our *Dasein*, the *Da* is determined by the purpose which is present to us and which we accept as our own, and expressed accordingly as what we are: a free existence or presence. There is a moment in which we call our *Da* what it is, and it passes through the mouth. The *Da* of the *Sein* is what cannot be consumed outside of the body, while that which cannot be consumed forms the condition for taste, which reflects our state of purposelessness. It is also intended to explain why we should take an interest in the beautiful in nature, a moral interest in this disinterested experience, through numerous analogies regarding the language of nature. A principle of harmony between nature and our disinterested pleasure must be inherent in nature itself. Nature’s purposefulness is similar to our *Wohlgefallen*, but the latter is purely subjective,

not linked to any objective end. The *Wohl* would not be explicable without this harmony. It is necessary, therefore, to announce this agreement in some other manner in order to demonstrate its existence. In the third *Critique*, we acknowledge that signs are the basis for all subsequent significations. Thus, Nature informs us via signs and traces that a harmonious agreement, correspondence, concert, and reciprocal understanding must exist between the purposefulness of its own productions and our disinterested *Wohlgefallen* precisely as it appears to be oblivious to its purpose. A rational interest lies in the idea that these ideas (should have objective reality, i.e. that nature should at least provide a trace of a sound argument or an indication for assuming that its products are in regular agreement with ours exclusively. In contemplation of nature's beauty, the mind finds itself at the same time interested in it. However, this interest resembles that of morality. Consequently, reason must recognize each expression of such an agreement on the part of nature. Meditation on disinterested pleasure, therefore, stimulates a moral interest in the beautiful. It is a strange motivation to be interested in disinterestedness, to be interested in interestlessness, to receive moral revenue from natural production that does not pay interest, a natural production that is significant in its own way, and that provides benefits free from interest, the unique value of the without of pure detached being, a relationship which is unbreakable with the trace itself. Nature's sign and sign. As our stocks and values increase morally, the latter leaves us signs that enable us to remain confident, in the without of pure detachment, banking on our own account, and fulfilling our purpose.

Kant elaborates an analogy between taste judgement and moral judgment for those who might find it subtle, specious, and studied. Aesthetic judgements are akin to moral feeling appears far too studied to be interpreted as a true interpretation of a cipher through which nature is able to figuratively communicate her beauty. Nature produces encoded signs, a form of writing embedded in nature's production, as forms of beauty which do not represent anything and serve no purpose are encoded signs. Nature speaks detachment to us by encrypting herself onto things and signing them, as she likes to do. The insignificant non-language of forms, without sense or purpose, is therefore a language between man and nature.

As Kant views it, it is not only the beautiful forms that converse, but also the adornments and charms that we too often mistake for beautiful forms.<sup>18</sup> Beauty as a moral interest presumes that nature's trace and wink are not subject to objective regulation by conceptual science. As a natural language, colors speak to us in hermeneutic terms: it is not about understanding if nature is communicating with us, but rather about how we relate to it and how aesthetic disinterestedness intervenes. We continue to believe in the sincerity, loyalty, and authenticity of the ciphered language, despite the impossibility of objective control. Poetry cannot exist without loyalty and sincerity. In order for a poem to be authentic and veridical, its content must be dictated by the poet's voice and written in the poet's hand, as if the poet were speaking from nature. "That which speaks through the mouth of the poet as through the mouth of nature, that which, having been dictated by their voice, is written in their hand, must be veridical and authentic. For example, when the voice of the poet celebrates and glorifies the song of the nightingale, in a lonely copse, on a still summer evening by the soft light of the moon, the mouth to mouth or beak to beak of the two songs must be authentic." (Derrida, "Economimesis" 16). Kant uses an oral example once again to describe those who lack the feeling of beauty in nature. The purpose of this discussion is to illustrate a certain example of exemplorality. We judge as coarse and ignoble the "mental attitude" of those who do not value beautiful nature and who limit their enjoyment to food and drink, to the mere enjoyment of the senses. In the first exemplorality, it is about singing and hearing, of an unconsummated voice or ideal consummation, of a heightened or interiorized sensibility; however, in the second exemplorality, there is a consumption orality, which, when viewed as a source of interest or as an actual taste, has no relation to pure taste at all. It is evident that pure taste and actual tasting are allergic to one another in the mouth. It is important to consider, however, where disgust should be placed. Gyenge opines that "Kant must rigorously separate the vocal powers of the poet from the animal machinations of taste – those base actions of a mouth that dreams only of food and drink, a mouth which shamefully enjoys [*genuss*]. Even though it ostensibly occupies the same material space as the voice, eating is situated as the absolute antithesis of the voice. In order for art to

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<sup>18</sup> For instance, "The white color of lilies seems to "dispose" the mind to ideas of innocence; the seven colors, in order from red to violet, seem respectively to suggest the ideas of sublimity (red then), intrepidity, candor, friendliness, modesty, constancy, tenderness" (Derrida, "Economimesis" 15).

stand outside and above the obscenities of salaried work, the poetic mouth must be cut off from its material existence” (Gyenge 128).

In order to organize all the sites and to localize all the organs, mouth is not simply one of many. It cannot be situated within a typology of the body, but seeks to organize all the sites and to localize all the organs.

Is the *os* of the system, the place of tasting or of consumption but also the emitting production of the *logos*, still a term in an analogy? Could one, by a figure, compare the mouth to this or that, to some other orifice, lower or higher? Is it not itself the analogy, towards which everything returns as towards the *logos* itself? The *os* for example is no longer a term that can be substituted for the anus, but is determined, hierarchically, as the absolute of every *analogon*. And the split between all the values that at one moment or another are opposed will pass through the mouth: what it finds good or what it finds bad, according to what is sensible or ideal, as between two means of entering and two means of leaving the mouth, where one would be expressive and emissive (of the poem in the best case), the other vomitive or emetic. (Derrida, “Economimesis” 16)

In order to demonstrate this, it is necessary to consider the fine arts division. Kant establishes taste as that which unifies the three faculties, imagination, understanding, and spirit, all of which are required by the Fine Arts by an effect of framing. Kant’s chapter on Fine-Arts has three major divisions: 1) introduces the expression category into operation 2) takes into account the expressive organization of the human body 3) organizes the description of the arts into a hierarchy. These three motifs are interconnected. Further, “The hierarchy of the senses which governs Kant’s division of the fine arts according to the regulation of affect also plays a role in the core distinction in Kantian aesthetics between appetitive pleasures and pure aesthetic taste. For Kant, appetitive pleasures are dictated by the sensory properties of an object, while aesthetic taste, by contrast, is a pleasure in a form purified of material inducements.” (Ross 378). In Fine-Art, an object concept precedes the expression of an idea; although this is not a necessity in nature, it does not prevent us from considering nature's beauty and expressing ideas in spite of the absence of the concept. Ross explains:

Derrida shows how Kant’s division of the fine arts is organized around a typology of the bodily senses. In Nietzsche’s vocabulary this typology is both spectatorial and ascetic. Through it Kant privileges those senses and the arts paired to them that are most able to regulate affect: poetry, for example, is at the apex of the fine arts on account of the pared-down materiality of its literary form, which extends to the subject a maximal licence to manipulate aesthetic ideas. The visual arts are

second because their material form is addressed to the sense of sight, and the eyes, as an autonomous sense, can choose to turn away from unpleasant images. (Ross 377-8)<sup>19</sup>

The highest form of expression is the spoken, because it expresses what it says and passes through the mouth, which is self-affecting since it does not take any inspiration from outside and enjoys what it produces. As soon as it becomes clear that the highest form of expression is the spoken, that which expresses what it expresses and passes through the mouth. This dictate can be considered an axiom for dividing the Fine-Arts into the expressive organs of human expression, which are based on the axiom that beauty is expression, even if it means nothing. Kant recognizes that only men could create the Fine-Arts. In explaining that the arts will be classified in accordance with the expression organs of men, he recognizes that the forcing is somewhat obvious. There is an analogy with *Sprechen*, with language and its modes. Since language is at the center of the relation as well as its ultimate expression, everything revolves around itself. By producing analogies, language places all things in relation to one another. As language is divided into words, gestures, and tones, there can only be three types of Fine Arts: Speech, Formative, and the art of the “play of sensations.” (Derrida, “Economimesis” 17)

Literary art is largely discussed in terms of rhetoric and poetry, whose generality is great that no other literary art is considered. Furthermore, it is an extremely pure concept: through complex combinations, we can obtain poetic genres such as tragedy, didactic poetry, oratorio, and many others. Poets meet orators and exchange masks, masks of an as if. Neither is truly as real as the other, but his as if is greater and better than his. It is the poet's wish to serve truth, loyalty, sincerity, and productive freedoms, which allows him to express more effectively. As a result, the orator deceives and manipulates. It is precisely a machine, or rather a deceitful art, that manipulates men like machines. The orator announces serious business and treats it as though it were a simple play of ideas. Poets propose entertaining plays of imagination and proceed as if they were handling the business of understanding. Orators provide what they had not promised,

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<sup>19</sup> “Music, which addresses the heteronomous sense of hearing, is at the bottom of the fine arts on account of its intensive material form. Music is the parallel in the fine arts to the disturbance of an uncontrollable noise. In each case sound not only momentarily defeats the control of the subject over sensory stimuli but, as in the case of a repetitive tune, can insinuate itself within the mind and become a residual material disturbance” (Ross 378).

the play of the imagination, but they also withhold what they had promised to do, namely, to provide and occupy the understanding appropriately. Conversely, the poet announces a play and performs a serious work. The orator promises to provide understanding and imagination; the poet promises to nurture understanding and to give concepts life. It is not my intention to impose nursing metaphors upon Kant. As a poet, you play at understanding, and what you do is animate concepts: conception occurs through the imagination and the ear, and nutrition passes from mouth to mouth and from mouth to ear, providing more than is promised in a finite contract.

In terms of the speaking arts, poetry stands at the top. Almost entirely derived from genius, poetry is at the top of the list. By virtue of its “origin,” it is in the closest proximity to free productivity which is rival to nature by virtue of its “origin.” Art that does not imitate the other is the work of art most closely resembling divine productivity. The freedom of the imagination enables poetry to produce more; it becomes more playful since external sensible forms do not restrict the imagination. By unleashing the creative potential of poetry, it is able to break the bounds of other disciplines. Through fostering the imagination within the confines of a concept, amid the infinite number of possible forms that may be produced according to it, it expands the mind by facilitating the unification of by providing this concept with a wealth of thought for which no words can fully express, thus creating an aesthetic expression. Strengthening the mind occurs as a result of making it feel free, spontaneous, and independent of natural determination. Presentation is the primary criterion to be considered in this case. Poetry demonstrates, more and more, the fullness of thought. Expression binds this fullness of thought to the presentation. In other words, it facilitates the binding of the presenter to the presenter. By reducing our external senses' limitations as poets, we can present a more comprehensive thought, conceptual idea, or concept. Kant speaks immediately of the supra-sensible’s “scheme.” It remains a fine art, but it still belongs to the imagination as a fine art. However, it does not satisfy the absolute plenitude of the supra-sensible. Imagination is of course the locus of schematism and the name of the art that lies hidden in the depths of the soul. Thus, it is possible for us to gain a deeper understanding of why this art should be considered a form of speech and that it is at its best a form of poetry.



A key component of its relationship to truth is authenticity, sincerity, and loyalty. It is the faithful adherence to its own content, if not ad rem-to the interior content that assures in presentation the fullness of meaning, the fullness of thought presented. It is important to note that these values are not narrowly or immediately moral. The value of full presence or full speech directly contributes to moral agency. When a poet goes beyond what he has promised, he is giving a gift, an authentic gift: a gift of truth as well as the gift of truth. As he presents a fullness of thought, he does not deceive because he declares that his exercise is merely a game of imagination, and that his scheme is inadequate. Poetry interacts with illusion by employing various literary devices, such as metaphor, imagery, and symbolism, to create vivid and imaginative representations. These illusions are not meant to deceive the reader or present a false reality but rather to evoke emotional responses and engage the imagination. Poetry openly declares its activity as play because it is not bound by the same rules of logical reasoning as empirical or scientific discourse. It explores the realm of imagination and allows for creative expression and interpretation. However, despite its playful nature, poetry can still serve profound purposes by offering insights into truth. Derrida emphasizes on the inherent instability and ambiguity of language. According to Derrida, language is always subject to interpretation and is incapable of conveying an absolute or fixed meaning. Poetry, in its playful and imaginative use of language, exposes this inherent instability and opens up new possibilities for understanding and truth. Derrida's notion of "play" in language suggests that meaning is not fixed but continually deferred and deferred. Poetry, through its creative and inventive use of language, disrupts conventional meanings and invites multiple interpretations. This playfulness allows for a deeper engagement with language and the exploration of alternative perspectives and truths. Therefore, despite poetry's claims of playfulness and its interaction with illusion, it can still be considered a serious work for truth. Through its unique form of expression, poetry engages with the limitations of language and perception, providing an opportunity to challenge and expand our understanding of reality and truth. It invites us to embrace ambiguity, question fixed meanings, and explore the richness of human experience beyond the constraints of rationality.

In addition to ensuring the truth of poetry, full presence also ensures morality. Eventually, the feeling of plenitude can only be achieved if one hears oneself speak, and poetic formalization

facilitates the process of interiorization without the need for external sensory stimulation. On the other hand, rhetoric defines itself as the art of deceiving, frustrating with attractive appearances, artifices of sensible presentation, and persuasion devices. Classical condemnation of machines illustrates precisely that discourse produces effects on others without intention, that there are no intentions intervening to animate and fill the discourse. The poetic discourse, therefore, is the most telling, and it is capable of producing and preserving interiority better than any other means. In addition, it produces the most moral and genuine disinterested pleasure, which is therefore the most present and highest, as well as the most positive pleasure. This experience is truly priceless. Poetry breaks with the exchange of values when it gives more than is expected and more than it promises, and thus is both out of circulation, at least outside the finite commerce system, without any fixed value, but at the same time of infinite value. Poetry is the source of value. Everything is measured on a scale on which poetry occupies the absolute highest level. It is both an analogy, and a value of values at the same time. By transforming hetero-affectation into auto-affectation, a poem provides the maximum amount of disinterested pleasure.

The intrusion of immediate materiality through the senses differs from disturbances in the fine arts that disrupt the ascetic model observed in the free reflective play of cognitive faculties. Among the senses, smell poses the greatest challenge in terms of regulation. It permeates the absorbent vessels of the mouth and throat, defying the requirements for aesthetic reception and the moral perspective's claim over circumstances. Drawing inspiration from Kant's writings, Derrida highlights the indigestible nature of the formless within Kant's philosophical system. The boundary between the digestible "form" and the indigestible "formless" is undermined by the presence of vomit that remains "stuck in the mouth." It is neither an assimilable form nor can it be identified and expelled as formless. "The five senses are categorised as cognitive powers that belong to the category of sensibility (the power of intuitive ideas); imagination also belongs to this category. Sense relates to the power of intuiting when the object is present, and to imagination when the object is absent" (Borthwick 185). The senses can be categorized into two distinct groups: the outer sense, which involves the physical interaction between external objects and the body, and the inner sense, which pertains to the impact of mental processes on bodily experiences. The inner sense can be understood as a faculty of perception that deals with

empirical intuitions, and it should be distinguished from an interior sense that encompasses the sensations of pleasure and displeasure that arise from our susceptibility to certain ideas. This division highlights the contrast between the mere ability to perceive an object, which characterizes the inner sense, and the influence of ideas on our subjective experiences, which constitutes the interior sense. Consequently, the inner sense maintains a direct connection with the external world, while the interior sense, as implied, focuses inwardly, emphasizing its introspective nature. According to Kant, the objective senses play a crucial role in enabling the subject to form conceptual understanding of an object. Without the senses of sight, hearing, and touch, the subject remains confined to subjective representations. Moreover, the objective senses provide a means of acquiring knowledge about the object as it exists independently of the subject. This knowledge is considered to be of a purer form compared to the information conveyed by the chemical senses. While the chemical senses may offer a sense of pleasure, they contribute relatively little to the subject's understanding of the object itself.

Hearing is one of the five senses and, according to the Anthropological classification, one of the objective senses, providing a mediate perception of the object. Accordingly, it is a sense of touch, sight, and hearing. Unlike taste and smell, objective senses place us in relation to the outside world. At this point, the senses, for example, mix with saliva and penetrate the organ without retaining their objective existence at all. Borthwick writes:

Unlike taste and smell, sight provides the ideal conceptualisation of the object; there is a purity of perception in sight: the eye sees the object without the addition of any other substance. Clearly, light is part of seeing the object but, for Kant, this is not an 'admixture' since light does not become part of the body in a way that induces the kind of enjoyment that overwhelms the object and the perception. Light illuminates the object and the eye apprehends it, in an immediate representation that is presented to the mind, and this without the subject becoming aware of the organ's functioning. (Borthwick 187)

The perception of visual and auditory information requires the mediation of light or air, while the perception of touch is immediate and objective. Hearing prevails over sight in terms of its relationship with air, namely vocal production. Mouth is the organ of voice, which moves this element, allowing men to enter into a community of thought and sensation more easily and more completely, particularly when the sounds each one gives the other to hear are articulated and

connected by understanding according to laws, thus constituting a language. Object forms cannot be determined by hearing, and linguistic sounds do not necessarily lead to representations of objects, but because they represent nothing in themselves and are primarily indicative of interior feelings, they are the most appropriate means of describing concepts.

In this context, communication is more spontaneous, free, and complete, since interiority directly expresses itself. Moreover, no outside means are necessary, and nothing outside of the human body poses an obstacle to communication. The third *Critique* identifies hearing as having a universal tongue, based on tone and modulation. As sounds are no longer associated with external sensible things by their natural representation, they are more easily associated with spontaneity in understanding. The local signifier reveals its arbitrariness when articulated as a language in accordance with its laws. This element belongs to freedom and can only possess interior or ideal signifieds, namely conceptual ones, as there is a privileged relationship between the concept and the system of hearing oneself speak. Hearing-oneself-speak is an auto-affective structure; the mouth and ear cannot be separated from it. As it is an auto-affective structure, the term appropriate for this structure is “hear-oneself-speak.” They may imitate the logos or establish some sort of external relation with it. According to both empirical and metaphysical evidence, the deaf are dumb. They lack access to the logos. A logos of analogy is a source of all analogy, but is not itself analogous, since the principle that governs all analogy is the basis of all analogy. As the source of all analogy, the logos of analogy is the point to which everything flows, but it does not possess any system of its own, orienting itself outside of the system where it is the source and end, the embouchure, and the source of all analogy. It follows that the mouth has analogues within the body at each orifice higher and lower than it, but is not interchangeable with each of those orifices. Among the senses, vicariousness is less true of the sense of hearing, which is the ability to hear oneself speak. It is not the “noblest” sense. Beauty is closely related to vision in that it consumes less energy. It is not the “noblest” of all senses. As a result of its ability to distance itself from touch, it is able to be less affected by objects. Moreover, mourning presupposes sight as well. By suspending consumption on behalf of the *theorein* and making itself visible above all else, it creates an object of pure taste. Poems require a more adherent aesthetic and prescriptive concept on an immediate moral horizon.

In spite of the fact that hearing cannot be considered among the noblest senses, it does enjoy a great deal of privilege because it is considered the least replaceable. As such, it tolerates substitution poorly and almost rejects any form of vicarious experience. Hearing is more than merely an ordinary sense among others for a number of reasons, including its peculiarity, aversion to prostheses, autoaffective structure that distinguishes it from sight, proximity to the interior, and constitutive action of hearing oneself speak. Although conventional classifications suggest it is an external sense, Kant has an apparent affinity for what he calls an internal sense. In Kant's view, time is unique and its element, its "form," is similar to hearing oneself speak. The inner sense differs from pure perception in that it is a conscious awareness of what one does, but also a conscious awareness of what one feels, influenced by one's own mental processes. This consciousness is derived from intuition and the relationship between representations in time. Freedom, as a fact of consciousness, lacks the capacity to generate cognition or serve as a substantial foundation for self-consciousness. Since the "fact" that defines the moral subject is neither a concept nor an intuition, it is unable to confer substance upon the subject. As a result of these perceptions, its inner experiences are not merely part of anthropology, which ignores the question of whether souls exist, but rather are part of psychology, in which we believe that we are able to experience this in ourselves, and in which we regard the mind as a substance that inhabits the human being, described as a pure faculty of feeling and thinking. There is only one inner sense, since man lacks a variety of organs through which he receives inner perceptions of himself.

When one hears oneself speak, everything becomes auto-affective, assimilates all things by idealizing them within interiority, masters everything by grieving its departure, refusing utterance, digesting it naturally, but digesting it optimally, consumes what was not consumed and vice versa, and produces disinterest in judging. When that mouth governs a space of analogy that it refuses to enter, and if it orders pleasure out of the irreplaceable phantasm, at what point does this problematic border or become completely excessive? A conceptual framework is framed, hierarchized, and regulated by the (internal and external) boundary tracing its boundary. It is not that logo-phonocentric systems exclude anyone in any way, but rather that they are excluded from their own productions and work. What this very work excludes is what cannot be digested,

represented, or stated, what cannot be turned into auto-affection by exemplification. Consequently, as an irreducible heterogeneity, it is not possible to eat either sensibly or ideally, and so it must vomit by avoiding swallowing itself. In spite of the fact that they may be less disgusting in that they involve some activity, some initiative whereby the subject can at least pretend to be master or dream that he makes himself vomit by auto-affection, the interesting thing is not the act or process of vomiting. This means that hetero-affection is no longer predigested in making oneself vomit, as it is no longer able to allow itself to be predigested in the act.

Kant acknowledges that there may be negative pleasures, such as the sense of the sublime. While the beautiful directly contributes to the sense that life is progressing and is compatible with charms and the play of the imagination, the sublime, on the other hand, is the pleasure that is derived indirectly. In order to accomplish this, a momentary arrest of the vital powers occurs, followed by a stronger outflow of them. The outflow is similar to an ejaculation rather than a throwing up as a result of *Wohlgefallen* and pleasure; therefore, the outflow resembles play rather than a serious exercise of imagination. As the mind is always alternately attracted and repelled by an object, *Wohlgefallen* in the sublime is not so much a positive pleasure as an admiration or respect, which is considered a negative pleasure).

For Kant there are two kinds of sublime—the mathematical and the dynamic. The dynamic in fact is a modification of the mathematical and obeys the same principle of organization. The sublime is an aesthetic experience which means for Kant—as Hegel never fails to recall—a subjective one. It is an experience of pleasure or satisfaction, of *Wohlgefallen*, which unlike the calm associated with the experience of the beautiful moves and excites us. The sublime moves us, unlike the experience of the beautiful, because its object arouses in us contradictory feelings of pleasure—what Kant calls negative pleasure—and because its object is not able to be represented with the calm repose of the beautiful. In order to be able to call an object beautiful it must be able to be distinguished and differentiated from other objects whose limits and terminuses—whose determined margins—can be precisely and unmistakably drawn. (Klein 33)

The sublime, as an object in itself, possesses a definite form, but its form has the capacity to appear boundless to us. It is the subjective experience of pleasure or satisfaction that arises from contemplating vastness, greatness, and limitless magnitude that is deemed sublime. Kant acknowledges that he himself finds it surprising yet undeniable that we can have an aesthetic

experience of an object whose defining attribute is sheer size. This experience encompasses a complex interplay of subjective satisfaction and a concurrent sense of fear that accompanies feelings of reverence when confronted with absolute greatness. The designation of this experience as aesthetic implies that the recognition of boundless magnitude belongs to the imagination, which is the highest faculty of sensible representation in human beings. The intuition of sheer greatness is not an a priori concept of the understanding, nor is it solely a sensory representation of a natural entity. It is also not a transcendent category akin to the principles of rational morality. Instead, it constitutes a judgment—a subjective representation that only approximates the universal validity and general certainty associated with a concept. The notion of experiencing aesthetic magnitude becomes even more intricate when we consider the distinction between greatness or size and absolute greatness. Kant, careful in his analysis, refrains from assuming the existence of the sublime and instead focuses on analyzing the language and expressions used in ordinary discourse, common sense, and the history of scholastic philosophy. Kant defines the sublime as that which possesses absolute greatness. Within this definition, there exists a distinction between greatness or size that can be quantifiably measured and that which exceeds all measures, rendering any unit of measurement insufficient. It is precisely this characteristic of surpassing everything else that constitutes the sublime. Consequently, the sublime can be denoted as a mathematical sublime, as the experience entails an act of estimation or measurement. When an object or phenomenon appears so immense that it defies comparison with any unit of measurement, it is regarded as possessing absolute, infinite greatness, transcending all boundaries and limitations of finitude.

The sublime may appear repulsive on the surface, but it is not necessarily the opposite of the beautiful. Despite its negativity, it still gives some pleasure, despite the fact that it leads to disputes among faculties and an imbalance in subject unity. However, it remains a source of pleasure and can be explained by the system of reason. Negative internal feelings do not reduce to silence; they may be allowed to speak. Art can bring about a sublime experience. In silence that prevents the movement of reappropriation from taking place, spirit and freedom are less heterogeneous and less ambiguous, but spirit and freedom are still active. By working against our senses, or in opposition to their interests, Kant claims that this silence keeps in mind the extension of a domain and of power. By experiencing a negative *Wohlgefallen*, they are able to

acquire power and an extension that exceeds the sacrifices they make. Through economic calculation, the sublime can also be swallowed. It is also true of all sorts of negative pleasures, those that displease those who experience them at that moment: for example, a needy but well-meaning individual inherited by an affectionate, but avaricious father or a widow who has lost her husband. As a result, mourning is not entirely barred, impossible, or excluded in all cases, regardless of whether they resemble each other or not. Therefore, there are negative pleasures or a negative pleasure, but still pleasure, regardless of whether or not they resemble each other.

One of the superiorities of Fine-Arts is that they are able to transform ugly or disgusting things into beautiful things, which is one of their greatest assets. Art can assimilate the ugly, the evil, the false, the monstrous, and anything else negative. An old *topos*: furies, diseases, wars, etc., can all be described beautifully and even depicted in paintings. In this way, a system such as this is capable of overcoming the ugly, the evil, and the horrible. It is obvious that the inability to assimilate a single “thing” will result in the transcendental of the transcendental, the intranscendentalisable, the unidealable, and the disgusting. Kantian discourse describes it as a “species” (Art) of hideous or hateful, but it is evident that this species cannot peacefully belong to its genus. According to nature, there is only one form of ugliness that can be represented without destroying all aesthetic satisfaction, and therefore artificial beauty, namely that which is repulsive. As a result, the issue is no longer one of those negative values, a thing ugly or harmful that can be idealized and represented through art. Even the status of an object of negative pleasure or of ugliness redeemed by representation cannot be granted to the absolute excluded. It is unrepresentable. Furthermore, its singularity leaves it nameless. To enter the self-affective circle of mastery or reappropriation, an economy must be named or represented. In spite of its disgusting nature, even the disgusting one cannot even announce itself as a sensible object without being engulfed in teleological hierarchy. Insensitive and unintelligible, irrepresentable and unnameable, it is the absolute other of the system.

Vomiting is associated with enjoyment, but it also represents the very thing that makes us want to enjoy, so it remains an unrepresentable phenomenon. The irrepresentable is not only described or circumvented as colossal, but also presented as a structure of itself. As a consequence of violating our enjoyment without defining any limits, representative distance, beauty, and



mourning are abolished. Although the idea is irresistible, it cannot be idealized. While an idea may remain unrepresentable or unspeakable - absolutely heterogeneous - it does not necessarily imply it can be either one or the other. The suspension of pleasure occurs when enjoyment of representations, pleasures bound to discourse and poetry in its purest form is forced. It is also neither beautiful, nor ugly, nor sublime, nor does it produce pleasure, positive or negative, neither engaged nor disengaged. As a result, all mourning work has been consumed. A word like disgusting cannot be relegated to a state of mourning. When mourning involves biting off a bit as a part of the mourning process, vomiting is the only means by which the disgusting can be released. Disgust represents the opposite side of the taste system. If taste represents exemplarity, then disgust would represent the same, but inverted manner. As a result, nothing has been learned. The tautological necessity will have to be questioned in a different manner, so long as it is possible to question whether the tautological structure itself is not the form in which exclusion is constructed. Disgust, according to Kant's political terminology, represents an unsuccessful rebellion against the subject's capacity to shape and form, as it can be recognized as something separate from taste or, in the context of politics, as something separate from civil order. Therefore, in Derrida's perspective, disgust, similar to the historically failed rebellion, strengthens the formal aesthetic worth of taste, or the legitimizing authority of constitutionality.

Assimilation, representation, interiorization, idealization are all capable of being expressed by the logocentric system except vomiting. In addition to serving as a metaphor, the oral relation taste/disgust is the whole discourse on discourse, the tautology of the logos as itself, apart from being a metaphor. Disgust symbolizes not the negative or repugnant, but rather the positive. This must be verified by ensuring it does not refer to the negative or repugnant. The "disgust's guarantee of the integrity of aesthetic judgment is the radical singularity of its outside: the absolute alterity of bodily disgust, the impossibility of any vicariousness of vomit, that is, any economy of disgust" (Macarthur 35). Essentially, it is a description of what causes one to wish to vomit. A similar analogical derivation occurs once disgust is fixed in its literal sense by Anthropology. In addition to the literally disgusting, there are even worse things to come. The worsening is a consequence of maintaining the literally disgusting as a security measure in the event of worseness. Rather than something worse, or at least a replacement for an inadequate

replacement, one that does not have a proper location, a proper trajectory, or a circular and economically sustainable return. Rather than being objective senses, taste and smell are subjective. Taste occurs when external objects come into contact with the tongue, gullet, and palate. The sensory organ is remote from the body from which these vapors originate when an individual activates their sense of smell and draws air into their body that is mixed with alien vapors. As taste and smell are closely related, individuals who possess a weak sense of taste will also possess a weak sense of smell. As a result, neither of the senses is capable of cognizing an object without the assistance of the other. It can be said that each organ is affected by salts, of which one is broken up by liquefaction in the mouth, while the other is affected by air, which must penetrate the organ before it is experienced. Mechanical and chemical sensations are associated with the external senses. In contrast to mechanical senses, chemical senses consist of two lower senses. The first three senses are those of perception, whereas the other two are those of pleasure. Therefore, nausea is given to man as such a strong stimulus because such an internal feeling can pose a threat to animals because it is a powerful vital sensation used to rid oneself of food [which has been enjoyed as quickly as possible. However, the intellect also provides pleasure in communicating thought. However, when forced upon, it ceases to be nutritious as food for the intellect. Similarly, nausea is the natural instinct to escape a situation, which is an inner sense. Taste at a distance is an analogy that forces others to participate in pleasure regardless of their wishes. Due to the interference with individual freedom, smell has less social significance than taste; one may choose which dish or bottle best suits his taste without being forced to share it with others. As a matter of fact, filth's stench appears to awaken nausea more because it is repulsive to the eye and tongue rather than because it has a repulsive smell. As opposed to an absorptive vessel in the mouth or gullet, a smell penetrates the lungs more intimately.

Smell chemistry transcends the tautology of taste/disgust. There is something that disgusts more than what disgusts taste. It is not the symmetrical opposite of disgust, the negative key to the system, except insofar as a particular interest sustains its excellence, such as the mouth itself, its chemistry of words, which prohibits substitutes from outside the mouth. In this sense, the system seeks to define the other as its other, i.e., literally disgusting. In the absence of vomiting, there is

the possibility of vicarious vomiting, a replacement of it by something else-by some other unrepresentable, unnameable, unintelligible, insensible, unassimilable, obscene other that demands enjoyment and whose irrepressible violence undermines logocentric analogy's hierarchical authority, thereby destroying its identification power.

It is impossible to assign a sensible or intelligent concept to the impossible. In a logocentric system, where one can only vomit it and vomit oneself into it, it cannot be named. It constructs a framework that captures what is completely unassimilable and totally suppressed, capturing its energy. Derrida's "provocative assertion that the logocentric system can accommodate, consume, and represent everything except vomit, which, nevertheless, is not the negative of the system" (Brinkema 59). Philosophical questions already determine, regarding this other, a paregoric parergon. According to their name, paregoric remedies are made up of words, such as comfort and exhortation. It arrests the vicariousness of disgust by substituting oral for anal in some cases, putting the thing in the mouth in place of anal. As the other of the system of the beautiful, the symbol of morality, it remains still, in philosophy, an elixir, even if it has the quintessence of a bad taste. The sublime does not oppose the organic order of form, as it confronts the challenge of formlessness by generating form through reason's ideas. Instead, the disturbance to the organic order arises from a materiality that lies beyond the realm of analogical equivalence. It is incorrect, as Kant believed, to consider the disgusting as formless. In fact, disgust functions as the aesthetic counterpart to acts of rebellion that are repelled by a lawful constitutional government and are historically judged and condemned by the spectator. This spectator is driven by an interest in a historical narrative of progress and a preference for a minimal set of rights protected by a modest constitution, as opposed to the formless, disorganized state of anarchy.

In conclusion, Derrida explicates "economimesis" as the governing principle that operates within the paradoxical requirement of imaginative production. This principle dictates that the representations produced by the imagination must adhere to the laws of association while also experiencing a sense of freedom. Economimesis serves as the name for the productive boundary or the transitional space that exists between the economy of associative law—governed by the principles of equivalence and identity—and that which exceeds and goes beyond those laws. It is in this space between law and lawlessness that imagination generates the richness of its pure

creations. Similar to an absolute monarch, the imagination is both constrained by the law of association, which it embodies and enacts, and simultaneously projected beyond the confines of the law due to its limitless power and prerogatives. It fulfils its productive role according to an economic principle that lies within the terms Derrida, following Bataille, identifies as a restricted economy on one hand, and a general economy on the other.

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